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People have been pondering moral questions for centuries. But what makes 
some things more morally right or wrong than others? And why do some people 
answer this question in very different ways? Moral Foundations Theory seeks to 
answer this question, proposing that our moral judgments are driven by several moral 
intuitions, or ‘foundations’, that have been shaped by our evolutionary history, but that 
are also shaped by our social and cultural learning. But if this is the case, and we have 
multiple moral intuitions that guide our judgments, these intuitions might sometimes 
clash with one another in ways that are quick and automatic, before we have had a 
chance to reflect on them. In this research, we set out to capture such clashes, or 
conflicts, between these intuitions. To do this, we have developed a new task – the 
Moral Foundations Conflict Task – that asks people to quickly make choices between 
foundations, judging which is better (for virtues) or worse (for vices), e.g. is it better to 
‘act for the good of the group’ or to ‘treat everyone equally’. We argue that what people 
choose, and how long it takes them to choose it, may tell us something important about 
moral intuitions. Across five studies we compare this task against an established 
questionnaire measure of how much people value different foundations. In our first 
three studies, we find that the relationship between these two measures is a close but 
not perfect match, and does not change even when people are not able to pay much 
attention, indicating that we really are measuring intuitive choices with this task. 
Across a further study we find that this match does not seem to change when people 
are asked to pay close attention, but we are not able to draw many conclusions about 
this. In our fifth and final study, we show that the task captures unique aspects of other 
important variables that are relevant to moral values, such as people’s political 
ideology and attitudes towards society, that are not captured by the established 
questionnaire measure of moral foundations. Across all these studies we find that the 
task is a stable and reliable measure of preferences for foundations and that patterns in 
response times support our interpretation that it is tracking intuitive conflict between 
moral foundations. Thus, in this research we demonstrate that looking at how people 
intuitively trade-off moral values against one another is a valuable approach, and, 
based on our evidence, we have developed a tool that seems to do this well. We hope 
that this contribution will help further test and develop theories of morality. 
 iii 
Abstract 
This thesis represents a body of work to validate the Moral Foundations 
Conflict Task (MFCT), a novel measure that aims to probe directly at intuitive conflict 
between moral foundations. Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) explains variation in 
moral judgments on the basis of innate and intuitive foundations, representing distinct 
moral concerns. However, little work has explored how foundations might compete 
within individuals. Prior research has tended to rely on an explicit self-report measure 
– the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ). In contrast, the MFCT requires quick, 
intuitive choices between foundations, tracking endorsement based on how often they 
are chosen, and how long it takes to choose them (response times – RTs). 
Across five studies, we test whether responses on the MFCT: reflect explicitly-
endorsed moral values measured by the MFQ (Study 1); are altered under cognitive 
load (Study 2 and 3); and under deliberation (Study 4); and are predicted by 
established correlates of the MFQ (Study 5). Endorsements on the MFCT reliably 
correlate with those on the MFQ. Increased load does not affect this correlation, 
enhancing confidence that the MFCT is an effective measure of moral intuitions. 
Increasing deliberation over choices in the MFCT also does not seem to alter this 
correlation, though this finding is subject to limitations to Study 4. Furthermore, the 
MFCT performs better than the MFQ in models with political orientation, 
authoritarianism and social dominance, indicating that the MFCT captures unique 
variance that the MFQ does not. Across all studies, we employ exploratory analyses of 
RTs, applying Ex-Gaussian decomposition alongside analyses of mean RT to support 
interpretation of the MFCT as a direct measure of inter-foundation conflict. An Ex-
Gaussian approach models RTs as a combination of pure decision processes and 
conflict resolution, where the τ parameter corresponds to the latter. Generally, we find 
that mean RT and τ decrease as the value, and the difference in value, of foundations in 
a choice increases. 
In conclusion, this work provides a significant theoretical and methodological 
contribution, allowing future research to explore inter-foundation conflict. It 
demonstrates that the MFCT captures systematic variance in foundation endorsement, 





1 Chapter 1: Prologue 
1.1 Context of this research 
What is worse: turning away vulnerable refugees from war-torn countries in 
need of safety and protection, or overloading social services, housing departments, 
health systems and schools, and taking support away from fellow citizens? Moral 
conflicts like this pervade not only debates on asylum-seekers and immigration, but 
numerous other issues that split the political domain – including climate change, the 
rights of sexual minorities, and gun control. How are judgments made about these 
moral conflicts? 
Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) presents a social psychological framework for 
examining the mechanisms that lead to divergent moral beliefs and values. MFT 
explains moral divergence as varying manifestations of five innate, intuitive 
foundations that drive moral judgments (Haidt & Joseph, 2007), a claim which has been 
recently challenged in terms of the structure and nature of foundations (Jacobsin, 2008; 
Jost, 2012; Kugler, Jost, & Noorbaloochi, 2014; Schein & Gray, 2015, 2018). MFT has 
had empirical successes in accounting for moral disagreement across individuals, 
particularly in political contexts (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007; 
Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012). Empirical findings with left-right political 
orientation remain the most well-known and widely replicated (Graham et al., 2013): 
liberals endorse the individualising moral foundations of care and fairness, more 
strongly than the binding foundations of authority, loyalty, and purity, while 
conservatives, on the other hand, value foundations relatively equally (Franks & Scherr, 
2015; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Graham, Nosek, & Haidt, 2012; Graham et al., 
2011; Milesi, 2016, 2017; Nilsson & Erlandsson, 2015; Van Leeuwen & Park, 2009). 
However, one under-addressed issue is inconsistency in moral judgment within 
individuals. If moral judgment is driven by innate, intuitive foundations, conflict should 
both be apparent at an intuitive-level and should be related to deliberated 
endorsements of foundations. In other words, while situational factors may 
differentially trigger moral foundations and thus potentially lead to notably different 
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judgments to seemingly similar problems, even within individuals (Greene, Nystrom, 
Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; 
Moore, Clark, & Kane, 2008), relatively little is understood about how people process 
and resolve intuitive moral conflicts. This is an importantly distinct question than that 
which has been addressed in a wide variety of work on dual-process models of moral 
judgment (Crockett, 2013; Cushman, 2013; Cushman & Greene, 2012; Greene et al., 
2004; Haidt, 2001; Moore et al., 2008; Moore, Lee, Clark, & Conway, 2011). The current, 
unaddressed, question is how conflict between automatic, intuitive level moral values 
is processed and possibly resolved at the intuitive level, prior to recruitment of 
controlled or model-based (Crockett, 2013; Cushman, 2013; Greene, 2017; Moore, 
2011) cognition. 
1.2 Contributions of this research 
We investigate these questions by measuring intuitive preferences for moral 
foundations when in conflict with one another, as opposed to the widely accepted/used 
approach of asking participants how important each foundation is in isolation (Graham 
et al., 2011). This is particularly relevant in the context of findings that explicit 
hypothetical moral judgments do not predict ‘real life’ moral judgments or behaviour 
(Bostyn, Sevenhant, & Roets, 2018). We seek to isolate and explore the nature of such 
intuitive conflicts in order to bridge this theoretical gap. Thus, we seek to address 
existing limitations in testing the intuitive base of moral foundations, and help inform 
debate about the nature and dynamic interaction of moral intuitions.  
This thesis presents an important first step in investigating these questions, 
using a novel task designed to measure deeper, intuitive conflicts between foundations. 
Thus, our intended contribution is multifold. Firstly, we seek to develop the first, and 
possibly best, way to trigger such intuitive conflicts as cleanly as possible. Secondly, we 
seek to validate this task against the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al., 
2011), as a well-established measure of (explicit) foundation preferences. Thirdly, we 
seek to probe the assumptions of the task in order to show that it is stable over 
multiple manipulations that are directly relevant to the claims of an intuitive level of 
measurement. Finally, we seek to show that the task makes a unique contribution in 
capturing foundation preference that is separate from that of the Moral Foundations 
Questionnaire. Fundamentally, we hope to provide, not only a methodological tool, but 
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also a means to address deeper theoretical questions, that will provide opportunities to 
push models of moral judgment forward in exciting new ways.  
1.3 Overview of this thesis 
In Chapter 2, we give an overview of the development of Moral Foundations 
Theory as an explanation of moral diversity, the evidence for multiple, distinct, and 
intuitive foundations that drive moral judgment, and an overview of the theoretical and 
methodological gaps we seek to address in developing a way to target and measure 
intuitive-level conflicts between foundations. In Chapter 3, we give an overview of the 
development and structure of the Moral Foundations Conflict Task (MFCT), as a means 
to address these gaps. In Chapter 4, we provide an overview of the analytic approach 
we have taken with the patterns of responses and response data produced by the MFCT 
and in validation against response patterns on the Moral Foundations Questionnaire 
(MFQ). Here, we also provide rationale for an Ex-Gaussian approach to analysing 
response time data that isolates conflict in decision processes. Chapters 5 through 8 
represent a set of five empirical studies applying this analytical approach. In Chapter 5, 
we test whether patterns of responses on the MFCT reflect responses measured by the 
MFQ (Study 1). Moreover, we explore whether preferences for foundations, as 
measured on both the MFQ and on the MFCT itself, predict response time distributions 
for choices that would be expected to incur greater conflict, and seek to replicate these 
findings in Chapters 6 to 8. In Chapter 6, we test the assumptions of the MFCT as an 
intuitive-level of measurement by manipulating cognitive load on the task in two ways, 
through a concurrent tone-counting task (Study 2) and after alcohol consumption 
(Study 3). In Chapter 7, we manipulate attention in the other direction, instructing 
participants to deliberate their choices on the MFCT (Study 4). In Chapter 8, we test 
whether we can replicate foundation preferences on the MFCT with three established 
correlates of the MFQ (Study 5). Finally in Chapter 9, we discuss the findings from this 
empirical body of work, provide an overview of its contribution and limitations, and 




2 Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 General Background 
In recent decades, psychologists have embarked on a descriptive and empirical 
campaign exploring moral judgment and behaviour. Drawing from evolutionary and 
cultural psychology, Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) presents a social psychological 
framework for examining the mechanisms that lead groups and individuals to hold 
divergent moral beliefs and values. Understanding moral disagreement is arguably one 
fundamental goal of the moral psychologist. A glance at most recent political debates 
shows that people characterise their own views as ethically untainted, and the views of 
the opposition as dangerous and immoral. Understanding what drives this 
implacability, and how we might achieve common ground, are key goals for the moral 
foundations theorist (Graham et al., 2013).   
MFT proposes that an evolutionary history of consistent adaptive challenges 
that face socially living hominids has resulted in a set of psychological foundations that 
underpin morality, the expressive intensities of which vary across individuals, groups, 
and cultures as a function of social experience (Graham et al., 2013; Haidt & Joseph, 
2004). These foundations, and their associated adaptive challenges, are: (1) care – 
concerns about protection and preventing suffering, evolved from a need to nurture 
young and care for vulnerable kin; (2) fairness – norms of reciprocity, from a need to 
secure the benefits of dyadic cooperation; (3) loyalty – concerns associated with social 
group membership, from a need to secure the benefits of group cooperation; (4) 
authority – concerns about obeying superiors, protecting subordinates, and respecting 
traditions, from a need to negotiate social hierarchies; and (5) purity – concerns about 
physical and spiritual purity, from a need to avoid contamination and disease. In 
addition to these five, liberty has been proposed as a sixth candidate that centres on 
reactance and resentment towards domination and restriction (Iyer, Koleva, Graham, 
Ditto, & Haidt, 2012). 
MFT posits that moral foundations are innate, automatic, intuitive and affective, 
and thus, our moral judgments, and our moral disagreements, are a function of visceral, 
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automatic, and emotional responses to moral stimuli in these five distinct domains 
(Graham, 2010; Graham et al., 2013; Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). However, 
despite this commitment to intuitionism, most MFT research is conducted using 
explicit self-report measures such as the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et 
al., 2011). The following literature review provides an overview of the key theoretical 
claims, empirical applications, and methodological approaches that have been 
developed within the context of MFT. Thus, we demonstrate the existing gaps in 
addressing questions about the processing of foundations at an intuitive level, 
particularly in the processes that occur as foundations clash within individuals. It is our 
view that methodological development in this area could help drive forward key 
debates about the nature and structure of moral foundations. 
2.2 Moral Foundations Theory 
Classic models of moral judgment have maintained a narrow focus on what 
counts as ‘moral’, typified by the debate between Kohlberg (1971, 1973), whose 
rationalist model places justice as the pinnacle of moral development, and Gilligan 
(1982) who instead proposed an ethics centred on care. In this context, concerns about 
values such as purity, patriotism, and deference to authority were consigned to a non-
moral status as social conventions (Turiel, 1983; Turiel, Hildebrandt, Wainryb, & 
Saltzstein, 1991) on the basis that moral status should be reserved for universal values 
about how individuals ought to relate to one another.  
Building on previous anthropological work on values pertaining to group 
membership, institutions and traditions, and divinity and worship (Shweder, 1990; 
Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997), MFT was developed to explain variation in 
virtue concepts across cultures (Haidt & Joseph, 2004) in terms that do not exclude 
concerns about groups (Graham et al., 2013; Graham et al., 2009). MFT proponents 
argue that scientific understanding of morality has maintained a narrow focus on 
concerns about individuals as a product of over-generalisation (Haidt, 2015; Haidt & 
Graham, 2007, 2009; Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009) from non-representative western, 
educated, industrialised, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) samples (Henrich, Heine, & 
Norenzayan, 2010). In the context of WEIRD-based study, it is the foundational nature 
of moral foundations that has prevented typically ‘liberal’ psychologists from 
acknowledging moralities that do not align with their own. 
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MFT proposes that moral systems should instead be defined by their function as 
interlocking sets of values that bind moral communities and make social life possible 
(Graham & Haidt, 2010; Graham et al., 2013; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). In doing so, MFT is 
committed to a number of theoretical claims about the nature of morality and 
foundations. 
2.2.1 Theoretical claims 
According to MFT, moral foundations constitute an innate ‘first draft’ of 
morality that is “organised in advance of experience” (Haidt & Graham, 2009, p.382, 
quoting Marcus, 2004, p.40). This ‘first draft’ results in multiple ‘hardwired’ aptitudes 
for learning specific responses to recurrent social challenges (Graham et al., 2013; 
Haidt & Joseph, 2004, 2007), providing an innate structure that constrains the 
moralities that can be formed across cultures, with specific foundations being tuned-up 
or down by cultural and developmental learning. In this sense, MFT makes distinctions 
between original triggers – the social challenges a foundation has evolved to detect – 
and modern-day current triggers (see Table 2.1). MFT draws on evolutionary 
psychology (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994; Fodor, 1983) to suggest this is realised by sets of 
related adaptive modules (Haidt & Joseph, 2007), though this has been a source of 
criticism (Suhler & Churchland, 2011). Theorists argue that a modular view of the mind 
is not necessary to accept the general principles put forward in MFT (Haidt & Joseph, 
2011). In this way, MFT accounts for cross-cultural similarities and also for 
divergences. This view of morality converges with arguments arising in developmental 
work suggesting that innate and adaptive aspects of morality are present from birth, 
and combine with learning and experience to create a culturally-specific morality in 
adult life (Hamlin, 2013; Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007). 
In addition to theoretical claims of nativism, pluralism, and cultural learning, 
MFT is committed to intuitionism. Drawing from Haidt’s (2001) social intuitionist 
model, MFT holds that moral judgments tend to occur as a result of automatic and non-
conscious intuitions, rather than by explicit and deliberative reasoning (Haidt, 2001; 
Haidt & Joseph, 2004). Thus, moral foundations drive moral judgment on the basis of 
intuitive and affective responses to morally-relevant stimuli across multiple, and 
adaptive, domains. We will return to the intuitive and implicit nature of moral 
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foundations, however we will first turn to a review of how this list of domains has been 
developed and measured. 
Table 2.1. Moral foundations and their related adaptive challenges, original and current triggers, 
and intuitive responses, modified from Graham et al. (2013)  
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2.2.2 Developing a list of moral foundations 
Early development of a list of foundations was informed by Shweder’s tripartite 
theory (Shweder, 1990; Shweder et al., 1997), identifying three ‘moral languages’: an 
ethic of autonomy – relating to protecting individuals; an ethic of community – 
preserving groups and social order; and an ethic of divinity – protecting against 
degradation. Precursory empirical work to MFT related this model to the political 
domain, finding that liberals primarily endorsed ethics of autonomy, whereas 
conservatives made greater use of community and divinity concepts (Haidt & Hersh, 
2001). 
In the initial proposal of MFT, Haidt and Joseph (2004) extended Shweder’s 
ethics to incorporate Fiske’s (1992) Relational Models Theory (also Relationship 
Regulation Theory – Rai & Fiske, 2011), which proposes that a biologically innate set of 
mental templates regulate and motivate social relationships: Communal Sharing – 
caring for and supporting in-group integrity; Authority Ranking – maintaining 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
  
 8 
hierarchical social group ranking; Equality Matching – achieving balance and 
reciprocity, and Market Pricing – calculating and responding to ratios that ensure 
rewards and punishments are proportional.  
Thus, MFT was first proposed with four foundations (Haidt & Joseph, 2004): 
suffering (referred to here as care), reciprocity (fairness), hierarchy (authority), and 
purity. As the theory developed, a fifth foundation – loyalty, or ingroup – has been 
included (Graham & Haidt, 2010; Graham, Haidt, & Rimm-Kaufman, 2008; Haidt & 
Graham, 2007; Haidt et al., 2009; Haidt & Joseph, 2007). More recently, liberty has been 
proposed as a sixth foundation, following empirical work on distinct facets of 
libertarian affective and cognitive dispositions (Iyer et al., 2012). In line with MFT’s 
commitment to pluralism, this list is not intended to be comprehensive or complete, 
and it is expected that it will be revised and extended as future candidates for 
‘foundationhood’ emerge. The Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) was designed 
to measure the first five foundations in the theoretical framework of MFT (Graham et 
al., 2011), and it is this version has been most widely applied to probe the internal and 
external validity of the model. On this basis, we focus here on the foundations of care, 
fairness, authority, loyalty, and purity. 
2.2.3 Measuring five moral foundations 
At its core, MFT was developed to explain moral variation, and thus a key 
context in which MFT has been developed and applied is in explaining so-called ‘culture 
wars’ between liberals and conservatives. MFT predicts that the intractability of these 
ideological and moral disputes can be explained by differences in patterns of the five 
moral foundations: liberals focus on individualising foundations of care and fairness, 
while conservatives place emphasis on all five foundations, including the binding 
foundations of authority, loyalty and purity (Graham, 2010; Graham et al., 2009; Haidt 
& Graham, 2007). This prediction has been demonstrated in a number of contexts, 
including with representative US samples (Franks & Scherr, 2015), and across cultures 
(Graham et al., 2009; Milesi, 2016, 2017; Nilsson & Erlandsson, 2015; Van Leeuwen & 
Park, 2009). We revisit this central prediction in Chapter 8.  
The MFQ was developed as an individual differences measure of foundation 
endorsement, with early versions applied, in conjunction with other methods, to test 
this hypotheses about ideological differences (Graham, 2010; Graham et al., 2009; 
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Haidt & Graham, 2007). The first version of the MFQ (Graham et al., 2009, Study 1) 
asked for explicit ratings of the moral relevance of abstract foundation-related 
concerns, e.g. ‘Whether or not someone did something to betray his or her group’, with 
a second version (Graham et al., 2009, Study 2) adding a new section assessing 
agreement with more contextualised moral statements, e.g. ‘People should not do 
things that are disgusting, even if no one is harmed’. Final items were selected with the 
large online samples (using ProjectImplicit.org, total N = 3,825) collected in Graham et 
al. (2009), using confirmatory factor analysis and correlations with three criterion 
scales (Graham et al., 2011).  
This final 30-item version of the MFQ was further tested with a large cross-
national sample (collected on YourMorals.org, total N = 34,476). In both of these 
samples, MFT’s five-factor solution fit the data better than alternative models, including 
three-factor (corresponding to Shweder’s tripartite theory), two-factor (individualising 
vs. binding) and single factor models (Graham et al., 2011). The five-factor model has 
been replicated in both WEIRD (Davies, Sibley, & Liu, 2014; Métayer & Pahlavan, 2014; 
Nilsson & Erlandsson, 2015) and non-WEIRD (Berniūnas, Dranseika, & Sousa, 2016; 
Yilmaz, Harma, Bahçekapili, & Cesur, 2016; Zhang & Li, 2015) cultures. Furthermore, 
using a short-form of the MFQ, Doğruyol, Alper, and Yilmaz (2019) found that a five-
factor model is a good fit across 30 WEIRD and non-WEIRD countries, performs better 
than a two-factor model, and is stable, i.e. satisfies configural measurement invariance.  
However, a number of studies challenge this five-factor structure, finding it to 
be a poor fit in non-WEIRD contexts (Davis et al., 2016; Yalçındağ et al., 2017). A recent 
study by Iurino and Saucier (2020), also using the short form of the MFQ, showed 
measurement non-invariance across 27 countries, suggesting that the five-factor model 
is not cross-culturally valid. Further research has suggested that a two-factor model is, 
in fact, plausible (Napier & Luguri, 2013; Van Leeuwen & Park, 2009; Wright & Baril, 
2011; Yilmaz, Harma, et al., 2016).  
In summary, there is strong support for the validity and reliability of the MFQ as 
a measure of five, distinct, moral foundations. However, there has also been sufficient 
contradictory evidence to fuel debate about the structure of moral foundations.  
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2.2.4 Challenges to Moral Foundations Theory 
There have been a number of key challenges to MFT, that centre on 
disagreement about the number, and status, of moral ‘foundations’. 
According to MFT, moral foundations are multiple, distinct and differentially-
activated. Over recent years, MFT has been challenged on this claim by the theory of 
dyadic morality (TDM – Schein & Gray, 2017; Schein & Gray, 2015), which proposes 
that all five ‘foundations’ are instead manifested by a single harm-based template, 
rather than by differing patterns of distinct moral foundations (Schein & Gray, 2015). 
Under this view, liberal-conservative disagreement is the result of differences in 
perceived harm.  
Under TDM, the perception of harm involves intuitive judgments about the 
intention of the perpetrator, or agent, and the suffering of the victim, or patient (Schein 
& Gray, 2017; Schein & Gray, 2015; Gray, Waytz, & Young, 2012). The harm template is 
an evolved response to counter-normative acts, where instances are judged against this 
dyadic agent-patient harm template to assess for match, with closer matches being 
more robustly categorised as immoral. This view bears parallels with others proposing 
that similar kinds of templates, or representations, of moral agents play a central role, 
for example on the basis of inferences about an agent’s intentions, and meta-intentions 
(Pizarro, Uhlmann, & Salovey, 2003), or to formulate causal models of moral behaviour 
(Sloman, Fernbach, & Ewing, 2009). 
MFT has also been challenged on its structure based on the status of the binding 
foundations. It has been suggested that an individualising foundation (aggregating care 
and fairness) and a binding foundation (aggregating authority, loyalty, and purity) 
sufficiently explain MFQ data (Van Leeuwen & Park, 2009; Wright & Baril, 2011; 
Yilmaz, Harma, et al., 2016). Furthering this support for a two-factor structure, a 
number of researchers have argued that, rather than being distinct ‘moral’ domains, 
binding foundations are manifestations of cognitive processes that underlie ideological 
attitudes. Preferences for authoritarianism (i.e. right-wing authoritarianism) and 
group-based inequality (i.e. social dominance orientation) share psychological 
antecedents with endorsement of binding foundations (Van Leeuwen & Park, 2009). 
Furthermore, Kugler et al. (2014) found that ideological differences in foundation 
endorsement are partially attributable to differences in right-wing authoritarianism 
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and social dominance orientation, adding to a number of previous studies showing 
similar associations (Federico, Weber, Ergun, & Hunt, 2013; Hadarics & Kende, 2017; 
McAdams et al., 2008; Milojev et al., 2014; Yilmaz & Saribay, 2017a).  
This research is consistent with conceptions of political conservatism as 
motivated by a number of epistemic needs, that include an intolerance of ambiguity, 
uncertainty avoidance, and needs for order, structure, and cognitive closure (Jost, 
Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). Here, evidence converges in ideological 
differences in cognitive style, and tendencies to think more rationally versus more 
intuitively, that have been linked to ideological differences in foundation endorsement 
(Garvey & Ford, 2014; Napier & Luguri, 2013; Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & 
Fugelsang, 2014; Wright & Baril, 2011; Yilmaz & Saribay, 2017a). This work seeks to 
uncover which foundations are ‘core’ by exploring and manipulating the effects of 
cognitive load and analytical thought. However, there is conflicting evidence in this 
context, with failures to replicate (Graham et al., 2013), and inconsistent effects (Van 
Berkel, Crandall, Eidelman, & Blanchar, 2015). 
These contradictory findings in exploring moral foundations at an intuitive level 
will be discussed further in the following section. However, they have been attributed, 
in part, to features of the MFQ as a measure that does not include reverse-coded items 
(Jost, 2012; Yilmaz & Saribay, 2017a). Given that agreement with any given statement 
is more likely under intuitive thought (Knowles & Condon, 1999), higher scores on all 
items in the MFQ are more likely under cognitive load. This artefact has also been 
connected as a confound to ideological differences in foundation endorsement arising 
from ideological differences in cognitive style. 
Challenges to MFT tend to agree that moral judgment is driven by fast intuitive 
processes, but disagree on the structure, and nature, of these processes. These critiques 
not only present a significant challenge to MFT, but also pose important theoretical 
questions about the nature of the moral domain. A central, and practical, way to help 
resolve these issues has been to look at patterns of responses on the MFQ, as a 
validated measure of foundations. However, the MFQ is an explicit self-report measure 
and there are thus central questions about the intuitive processing of moral 
foundations that it is unable to adequately address. We will now turn to a review of this 
literature. 
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2.3 Moral Intuitions 
According to MFT, moral judgments are primarily driven by innate, intuitive 
foundations. A variety of work has elucidated the qualities of moral ‘intuitions’. Many 
definitions of moral intuitions make contrasts with consciously-controlled moral 
reasoning (Kauppinen, 2015). In Cushman, Young, and Hauser (2006), a defining 
feature of moral intuitions is that they persist despite “insufficient justification”, 
“uncertainty about how to justify”, or “confabulation of alternative explanations for 
judgments”, and contrast this with conscious reasoning in which the “principles used in 
judgments are articulated in justifications” (p.1083). According to Haidt (2001), moral 
intuitions result in the “sudden appearance in consciousness of a moral judgment… 
without having any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of search, 
weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion” (p.818). These definitions emphasise 
inaccessibility to conscious reasoning as a key element of moral intuitions, and a variety 
of empirical work has sought to interrogate what kinds of moral judgments are driven 
by such inaccessible intuitive processes (Cushman & Greene, 2012; Cushman et al., 
2006; Greene et al., 2004; Haidt, 2001; Moore et al., 2008; Moore et al., 2011). In 
addition to inaccessibility, Haidt (2001) outlines a number of other features of intuitive 
processing that include that it: is “fast” (speed); “is unintentional and runs 
automatically” (automaticity); and “does not demand attentional resources” 
(cognitively effortless) (p.818). The conception of moral foundations as intuitive 
processes draws from these definitions.   
Foundations are theorised to operate as clusters, or “learning modules”, of 
“little bits of input-output programming” that connect perceptions of morally-relevant 
patterns in the social world to an evaluation (Haidt & Joseph, 2007, pp.379-380). These 
processes produce moral intuitions – flashes of affective approval or disapproval – and 
it is these intuitions that drive our moral judgments, beliefs and actions. This is an 
important departure from classical views of morality in philosophy (e.g. Kant, 
1785/1998) and psychology (e.g. Kohlberg, 1971, 1973) which have focused on reason 
as the driver of moral judgment. 
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2.3.1 Intuitive-level moral foundations 
As an intuitionist theory, research on implicit and intuitive foundation-related 
moral judgment provides important evidence for MFT. There is a range of evidence that 
foundations operate at an intuitive level, and differentially predict moral decisions. 
Facial micro-expressions predict foundation-related judgments, e.g. anger expressions 
predict increased care-related condemnations, while disgust micro-expressions predict 
condemnation on purity and fairness (Cannon, Schnall, & White, 2011). Manipulating 
foundation-relevant intuitions and emotions, outside of conscious awareness, has also 
been shown to yield expected effects. Much of this research centres on disgust, as a 
purity trigger, and includes manipulations of incidental disgust (Horberg, Oveis, 
Keltner, & Cohen, 2009; Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008); differences in disgust 
sensitivity (Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom, 2009); hypnotic disgust (Wheatley & Haidt, 
2005); and effects of cleansing actions, such as hand washing (Schnall, Benton, & 
Harvey, 2008; Zhong, Strejcek, & Sivanathan, 2010). Furthermore, a number of studies 
have found ideological and attitudinal effects with regard to implicit processing. Helzer 
and Pizarro (2011) found participants reported more conservative political 
orientations in the presence of visual reminders of physical purity (e.g. hand sanitizer), 
and differences in disgust sensitivity predict intuitive negativity towards gay people 
(Inbar et al., 2009). However, given work indicating the non-replicability of social 
priming effects that activate similar attitudes and stereotypes (Doyen, Klein, Pichon, & 
Cleeremans, 2012; Schimmack, Heene, & Kesavan, 2017; Shanks et al., 2013), these 
findings should be cautiously interpreted. 
This evidence suggests that foundations operate and can be manipulated at an 
automatic level outside of conscious control to yield expected effects that are consistent 
with the MFT model. However, this work has focused on implicit processing of single 
foundations, and mainly just purity. It provides little insight into the structure of moral 
intuitions and how multiple, distinct, intuitive foundations might dynamically interact 
with each other. Here, there is a body of work that draws from dual-process theories of 
morality to probe questions of the structure of foundations, and the intuitive nature of 
foundations, by exploring how they relate at implicit and explicit levels. To situate MFT 
within this literature, we include a brief overview of dual-process models. 
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2.3.2 Dual-process models of moral judgment 
Dual-process models essentially argue that human cognition functions on the 
basis of two types of systems (Evans & Stanovich, 2013): an automatic, intuitive, and 
low-effort System 1; and an analytic, consciously-deliberated, and effortful System 2 
(Kahneman, 2011). Dual-systems theory has been applied to explain a number of 
attitudes as arising from intuitive System 1 thinking because they have been acquired 
in socialisation as opposed to through logical inquiry, including social conservatism 
(Deppe et al., 2015; Talhelm et al., 2015; Yilmaz & Saribay, 2017b), and religious belief 
(Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012; Pennycook, Ross, Koehler, & 
Fugelsang, 2016; Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2012; Yilmaz, Karadöller, & Sofuoglu, 
2016). 
Dual-process models have also been applied to moral judgment (Crockett, 
2013; Cushman, 2013; Cushman & Greene, 2012; Greene et al., 2004; Haidt, 2001; 
Moore et al., 2008; Moore et al., 2011). Arguing for a central role of intuitive processes, 
Haidt’s (2001) social intuitionist model has been a major influence on MFT, and 
emphasises cultural and social influences in shaping moral intuitions that drive moral 
judgment. Here, deliberative System 2-type reasoning is typically employed as post-
facto rationalisation in order to justify initial intuitive moral responses (Haidt, 2001; 
Mercier & Sperber, 2011). Table 2.2 outlines the distinguishing features of System 1 
versus System 2-type processes. In particular, as discussed above, the features of 
inaccessibility, speed, automaticity, and cognitive effortlessness contrast with the 
consciously accessible, slow, controllable, and attentionally demanding nature of 
System 2 reasoning. It is also worth highlighting the distinction between the parallel 
intuitive processing of Sytem1 and the serial processing of System 2 – we return to this 
point below to consider questions around how multiple foundations might operate at 
the intuitive level.  
Table 2.2. General features of the intuitive and reasoning systems, modified from Haidt (2001) 
Intuitive system (System 1) Reasoning system (System 2) 
Fast and effortless 
Process is unintentional and runs automatically 
Process is inaccessible; only results enter 
awareness 
Slow and effortful 
Process is intentional and controllable 
Process is consciously accessible and viewable 
 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
  
 15 
Does not demand attentional resources 
 
Parallel distributed processing 
Pattern matching; thought is metaphorical, 
holistic 
Common to all mammals 
 
Context dependent 
Platform dependent (depends on the brain and 
body that houses it) 
Demands attentional resources, which are 
limited 
Serial processing 
Symbol manipulation; thought is truth 
preserving, analytical 
Unique to humans over age 2 and perhaps 
some language-trained apes 
Context independent 
Platform independent (can be transported to 
any rule following organism or machine) 
 
Other dual-system models place reasoning processes in a more prominent role 
than Haidt (2001), positing that moral judgment is a result of two distinct neural 
systems: An automatic, action-based, affective system and an abstract reasoning, 
outcome-based, system (Crockett, 2013; Cushman, 2013; Cushman & Greene, 2012; 
Greene et al., 2004). These models make predictions about the kinds of moral 
judgments that differentially engage these two distinct systems. In particular, 
utilitarian (consequence-based) responses to trolley-type dilemmas entail greater 
recruitment of cognitive control regions of the prefrontal cortex compared to 
deontological (rule-based) responses, and take more time to make (Greene et al., 2004; 
Greene et al., 2001), become less likely under cognitive load (Greene, Morelli, 
Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008), and more likely under deliberation (Paxton, 
Ungar, & Greene, 2012). These models have also been applied to predict why, and 
when, instances of cognitive conflict arise in moral judgment, how this can lead to 
notably different judgments in seemly similar moral problems (Cushman & Greene, 
2012; Moore et al., 2008; Moore et al., 2011), and how that conflict may be resolved by 
engaging cognitive and reflective processes (Kahane, 2012).  
In summary, understanding how multiple, distinct and intuitive foundations 
operate in moral judgement is an important aspect of MFT, however most of the 
empirical research on the intuitive processing of foundations does not address this 
question directly. In the wider literature on dual-process models, moral intuitions have 
been defined via a number of key aspects: they are the result of inaccessible, fast, 
automatic, and effortless processes. Furthermore, under these views, moral intuitions 
co-exist in parallel, and when they conflict with one another, this is detected and 
resolved by System 2-type processes. However, this work on dual-process models does 
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not address whether, and how, intuitions might compete at the intuitive level, before 
controlled and reflective cognitive processes are engaged.  
It has, however, provided a framework in which to begin to address questions 
about the structure of moral intuitions, and how these might relate to consciously-
endorsed values and beliefs. 
2.3.3 Relating intuitive and reflective moral foundations 
There are several possibilities with regards to how the intuitive and reflective 
levels of foundations might relate. In this regard, we will discuss what we interpret as 
three alternative views in the literature: (1) differences that emerge in consciously-
endorsed values merely reflect differences in intuitions; (2) everyone has intuitions 
based on all five foundations, but selectively and effortfully suppress intuitions not in 
line with consciously-endorsed values; and (3) everyone has intuitions based on a few 
‘core’ foundations, but other apparent ‘foundations’ – the binding foundations – are 
manifestations of selective and effortful enhancement to satisfy other ‘non-moral’ 
motives. While the former two possibilities are compatible with the theoretical 
commitments of MFT, the latter presents a challenge related to critiques of the theory. 
Previous work has tended to approach this question through political ideology, and 
there is conflicting support for each of these proposals. Here, we present these 
alternatives as distinct to highlight the tensions between them that particularly focus 
on disagreement about the status of the binding foundations. However, we also 
acknowledge that there may be conceptual overlap between them.  
In support of proposal (1), Graham et al. (2009) argue that liberals and 
conservatives have different intuitive moralities and that this accounts for differences 
in endorsed values. This view is supported by findings that ideology has a strong 
heritable component (Alford, Funk, & Hibbing, 2005), and is developed based on 
environmental and cultural factors (Hess, Torney, & Valsiner, 2006), suggesting a 
feedback loop between ideology and moral intuitions (Graham, 2010). Under this view, 
everyone has intuitions based on all five foundations, but differ in the levels of import 
they intuitively place on each, and these intuitive differences manifest in their 
conscious endorsements.  
There is also work advocating proposal (2). Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson, 
and Chamberlin (2002) found that under cognitive load, liberals’ attributions 
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concerning victims become more like those of conservatives, but that liberals correct 
for these when they conflict with their explicit ideological values. Applied to moral 
foundations, this ‘motivated correction’ hypothesis proposes that conservatives and 
liberals share similar intuitive moral values based on binding foundations, but that 
liberals actively suppress these because they conflict with their consciously-endorsed 
care and fairness concerns. Under this view, everyone has intuitions based on all five 
foundations, but work to suppress those not in line their consciously-endorsed values. 
However, other studies have compounded this research, and instead advocate 
for proposal (3). They find that cognitive load had the opposite effect, with 
conservatives scoring lower on the binding foundations (Wright & Baril, 2011). This 
finding is contextualised within a ‘motivated social cognition’ approach (Jost et al., 
2003), suggesting that, rather than liberals effortfully suppressing binding intuitions, 
conservatives effortfully enhance binding foundations to satisfy a number of other 
motives, including a resistance to change, and opposition to equality (Jost, 2012). In its 
strongest form, this view suggests that everyone possesses ‘core’ individualising 
intuitions based on care and fairness, and that the binding ‘foundations’ in fact manifest 
as a result of explicit-level processes to satisfy these other, non-moral, motives. 
However there are inconsistent effects, with findings failing to replicate in two further 
studies (Graham et al., 2013), or instead showing increased endorsement of care and 
authority under load conditions, regardless of political orientation (Van Berkel et al., 
2015).  
It remains difficult to disentangle (2) and (3) based on existing evidence. 
Converging support for (2) comes in the form of individual differences in tendencies to 
think more rationally and less intuitively (Garvey & Ford, 2014; Royzman, Landy, & 
Goodwin, 2014) and higher cognitive ability (Pennycook et al., 2014) predicting 
reduced condemnation of binding-related violations, and decreased endorsement of 
binding foundations. Some studies that manipulate analytical thinking, rather than 
cognitive load, instead support proposal (3). Napier and Luguri (2013) reported an 
increase in endorsement of individualising foundations and a decrease in binding 
foundations for both liberals and conservatives, as a result of manipulating abstract (vs. 
concrete) thinking. In this case, it is unclear whether the abstract versus concrete 
distinction maps directly on to analytical versus intuitive thinking. To explore this, 
Yilmaz and Saribay (2017a) found that, when encouraged to engage in effortful 
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analytical thinking, people place more value on individualising foundations, regardless 
of political orientation, but that – counter to expectations – there was no shift in the 
value placed on binding foundations.  
Furthermore, in support for proposal (2), a number of other studies suggest 
that liberals resemble conservatives when they adopt a more intuitive cognitive style 
under situations of threat and mortality salience (F. Cohen, Ogilvie, Solomon, 
Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2005; Nail, McGregor, Drinkwater, Steele, & Thompson, 
2009), and that mortality salience acts as a kind of high cognitive load that in turn 
impacts moral judgments (Trémolière, De Neys, & Bonnefon, 2012). Testing 
representative samples before and after the 2005 London bombing, Van de Vyver, 
Houston, Abrams, and Vasiljevic (2016) found that endorsements of loyalty increased, 
while fairness decreased, and that this change occurred more strongly for liberals than 
conservatives. Linking to work showing that terrorist attacks have effects similar to 
mortality salience manipulations (Landau et al., 2004), events like the 2005 London 
bombing may thus operate as a form of cognitive load that has asymmetrical effects on 
liberals and conservatives, interfering with the former’s ability to suppress moral 
foundations that conflict with consciously-endorsed values. If differences in 
consciously-endorsed values are simply differences in intuitive responses to moral 
stimuli then we would not expect these asymmetrical effects of increased System 2-
type thinking. However, recent work suggests that literature on priming effects, 
including mortality salience, suffers from low replicability (Klein et al., 2019; 
Schimmack et al., 2017). This includes a multi-lab replication (Klein et al., 2019) that 
was unable to replicate a classic effect of mortality salience on worldview defence 
(Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon, & Breus, 1994), though subsequent analysis 
suggests that effects may replicate in the larger samples included in this project 
(Chatard, Hirschberger, & Pyszczynski, 2020). However, these questions around 
replicability present sufficient reason to interpret these findings with caution. 
Graham (2010) proposes a hypothesis in between proposals (1) and (2). Across 
five studies exploring different levels of awareness, ranging from self-reported gut 
reactions to automatic neural responses, liberals had a greater discrepancy between 
explicit and implicit foundations, compared to conservatives. Specifically, though 
liberals endorse binding foundations less than conservatives at the explicit level, this 
difference diminishes at the implicit level, or under cognitive load (Graham, 2010), 
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suggesting that liberals are effortfully suppressing binding foundations. However, 
liberals and conservatives were also found to implicitly differ in the same directions 
that they explicitly differ (Graham, 2010), suggesting that explicit-level foundations do 
reliably map on to implicit-level foundations. Here, there may also be some conceptual 
overlap with proposal (3), related to the notion of ‘morality shifting’ (Leidner & 
Castano, 2012), whereby groups shift their values, from individualising concerns about 
care and fairness to binding concerns of loyalty and authority, when under threat, and 
that this shifting process can occur as automatic framing. As such, it may be possible to 
reconcile elements of all three proposals, suggesting that while everyone has moral 
intuitions beyond those of care and fairness, certain contexts may result in motivations 
to either suppress or enhance foundations.  
In summary, there is a range of, somewhat conflicting, evidence about how 
multiple moral foundations manifest at the intuitive-level, and how these might relate 
to consciously-endorsed foundations. Generally, these divergent views agree – though 
to different extents – that foundation-related intuitions will be systematically and 
reliably linked to explicit foundations, but disagree on how this operates, and in 
particular whether the binding foundations have the same status as moral intuitions as 
the individualising foundations. Studies investigating foundation intuitions have tended 
to explore effects as mediated through political ideology, and there is therefore a lack of 
research directly addressing this question. The majority of this prior work has relied on 
manipulating cognitive resources or style, and then testing effects on explicit-level 
foundation-related moral judgments (Pennycook et al., 2014; Royzman et al., 2014), 
statements (Van de Vyver et al., 2016), or on the MFQ (Garvey & Ford, 2014; Napier & 
Luguri, 2013; Van Berkel et al., 2015; Wright & Baril, 2011; Yilmaz & Saribay, 2017a). 
This approach is therefore confounded not only by previously discussed limitations of 
the MFQ, but by a general reliance on explicit self-report measures for addressing 
questions about intuitive-level moral foundations.  
If foundations are fundamentally multiple, distinct, moral intuitions, these 
intuitions may compete at the intuitive-level, and how this competition arises and is 
resolved may be systematically related to how moral judgments unfold under 
deliberation. Attempting to capture this inter-foundation conflict, and understand more 
about how foundations are traded off against one another will help move theoretical 
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development forward. We will now turn to work that has begun to explore these 
foundation trade-offs.  
2.3.4 Moral foundation trade-offs 
A number of studies have put forward the hypothesis that, when two 
foundations conflict, whichever is more strongly endorsed will guide moral judgment 
and behaviour. This ‘moral trade-off’ hypothesis has been shown to have predictive 
power in a number of domains (Dungan, Waytz, & Young, 2014; Monroe & Plant, 2019; 
Waytz, Dungan, & Young, 2013). Waytz et al. (2013) explore the ‘whistleblowers’ 
dilemma’ as a trade-off between competing fairness and loyalty concerns, i.e. being fair, 
impartially reporting your company’s unethical behaviour to a third party versus being 
loyal and staying silent. They found that individual differences in tendencies to value 
fairness versus loyalty, as well as a manipulation to enhance fairness concerns (a short 
essay on the importance of fairness/justice), increased willingness to engage in 
whistleblowing. They further hypothesise that this fairness versus loyalty tension is 
emblematic of deeper tensions between group-based (i.e. binding) and group-
independent (i.e. individualising) moral norms (Dungan et al., 2014).  
Monroe and Plant (2019) have applied this framework to predict perceptions 
of, and discrimination towards, sexual outgroups as tension between care and purity 
concerns. They show that preferentially endorsing purity over care predicts an 
increased tendency to dehumanise sexual outgroups, that include gay men, people with 
AIDS, prostitutes, and transgender people. In turn, this dehumanisation predicted 
discriminatory behaviour towards these groups, including prejudicial attitudes, 
expressing explicit and automatic prejudice, refusal to help, and acceptance of 
discriminatory public policies (Monroe & Plant, 2019). They also found that a 
manipulation to enhance care concerns (a short news audio clip emphasising care 
towards a non-sexual outgroup) reduced dehumanisation towards gay and transgender 
targets. 
These studies demonstrate the predictive value of capturing differences in how 
people make foundation trade-offs. However, they mostly operationalise these trade-
offs as self-reported relative preferences for foundations, either as a composite MFQ-
based score, subtracting one foundation’s score from the other (Monroe & Plant, 2018, 
Studies 1 & 2; Waytz et al., 2013, Study 1), as a composite score of trade-offs against 
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non-moral goods, i.e. an amount of money (Monroe & Plant, 2018, Study 3), or a few 
items capturing forced-choice preferences for foundation-upholding third parties (e.g. 
‘Who would you rather be friends with?’: ‘Someone who is fair and just to others, who 
is impartial and unprejudiced regardless of how it affects their family and friends’, 
Waytz et al., 2013, Study 1).  
It is likely that these explicitly reported trade-offs are driven, at least in part, by 
intuitive-level conflicts between foundation-related concerns. Work on foundation 
trade-offs to date is marked by a reliance on explicit-level measures that do not directly 
probe at intuitive-level conflicts. Given avid debate on how intuitive and explicit levels 
of foundations relate, it remains unclear how foundations may be traded off against one 
another at the intuitive-level, and how this is reflected in explicitly reported moral 
foundations. As yet, there are no sufficient ways of addressing these questions. We turn 
now to a summary of the current methodological gaps. 
2.4 Methodological Gaps 
MFT is a framework for morality that proposes that multiple, distinct, variably-
manifesting, and intuitive moral foundations drive moral judgment, and can account for  
variation in moral value endorsement. Additionally, MFT has been challenged on many 
of these theoretical claims. In the preceding review, we have argued that much of this 
debate hinges on limitations to current approaches, including a reliance on explicit self-
report measures, and most predominantly the MFQ, to map individual moralities. 
Furthermore, these limitations also leave important theoretical questions unaddressed.  
As an intuitionist theory, evidence for the intuitive base of moral foundations is 
important for MFT. A number of methodologies capturing both responses and response 
times have been used in order to bypass self-report and measure foundation-related 
intuitions more directly (Graham et al., 2013). Non-conscious processes connected to 
moral foundations have been investigated in neuroimaging studies (Cannon et al., 
2011; Graham, 2010, Study 5), and by manipulating automatic foundation-related 
triggers (Helzer & Pizarro, 2011; Horberg et al., 2009; Schnall, Benton, et al., 2008; 
Schnall, Haidt, et al., 2008). Experimental methods have included: evaluative priming – 
foundation word primes flashed before positive/negative adjective targets (e.g. 
Graham, 2010, Study 3); affect misattribution – foundation image primes flashed before 
neutral character targets (e.g. Graham, 2010, Study 4); implicit association tests (IATs) 
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– automatic associations between foundation word primes (e.g. Schein & Gray, 2015, 
Study 4 & 7); and speeded foundation trade-off tasks – quick responses to dichotomous 
questions about foundation-violations (e.g. Graham, 2010, Study 2).  
However, though these methods provide support for implicit foundation-
related intuitions, most of these methodologies are limited to measuring implicit 
processes of single foundations, and most often purity (Helzer & Pizarro, 2011; 
Horberg et al., 2009; Schnall, Benton, et al., 2008; Schnall, Haidt, et al., 2008), 
independently of other foundations. MFT has been criticised in this regard for 
measuring foundations in isolation, despite the fact that real world moral judgment 
often requires decisions between values (Jost, 2012). 
Of the methods listed, evaluative priming and affect misattribution techniques 
are vulnerable to this critique, being only able to assess one foundation at a time. IATs 
have been used to some effect to relate foundations. In support of a single harm-based 
moral domain, Schein and Gray (2015) apply an IAT paradigm to show that response 
times for judgments about whether an act was harmful were the best predictor of 
response times for whether an act was immoral (Study 4), and judgments of purity 
violations are more strongly associated with harm than with loyalty, a fellow binding 
foundation (Study 7a), and vice versa (Study 7c). These applications, though attempting 
to falsify MFT, begin to explore how foundation intuitions might relate to one another, 
though the former (Study 4) persists in measuring a single foundations, but in relation 
to a broader immorality concept. However, the IAT structure is limited to measuring 
the associations of two categories to a third category, over multiple trials, and thus 
would be an impractical and highly intensive approach to mapping out all possible 
foundation associations. It is also unclear whether implicit associations do in fact 
reflect intuitive preferences for foundations. Previous work on the race IAT has 
demonstrated the ambiguities of interpreting these associations (Andreychik & Gill, 
2012; Uhlmann, Brescoll, & Paluck, 2006). Further work on the race IAT shows that 
scores are weak predictors of ‘real world’ discriminatory behaviour (Forscher et al., 
2019; Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009; Oswald, Mitchell, Blanton, 
Jaccard, & Tetlock, 2013), and any effects are simply too small to predict individual 
behaviour (Greenwald, Banaji, & Nosek, 2015).  
Foundation trade-off approaches could address these issues, but have only been 
applied in a small handful of studies (Graham, 2010, Study 2; Graham et al., 2009, Study 
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3), and mostly to explore explicit-level trade-offs (Monroe & Plant, 2019; Waytz et al., 
2013). These studies have either measured trade-offs as a composite of MFQ scores for 
two foundations (Monroe & Plant, 2018, Studies 1 & 2; Waytz et al., 2013, Study 1), or 
as isolated foundations in trade-offs against non-moral goods, i.e. amount of money 
required to motivate foundation violations (Graham et al., 2009, Study 3; Monroe & 
Plant, 2018, Study 3). In both cases, trade-offs between foundations are not being 
captured directly.  
Graham (2010) uses a trade-off task that does probe this directly. In this task, 
participants saw dyads of brief descriptions of foundation-related violations – e.g. 
‘Treating people unequally’ versus ‘Disobeying an authority’ – and were prompted to 
make dichotomous judgments about which was worse. However, in this context, this 
task was applied to evidence that ideological differences persisted when participants 
answered with their first gut reaction relative to when they deliberated these decisions, 
rather than to address questions about the intuitive processing of trade-offs between 
foundations. Building and expanding on the principles of the task developed by Graham 
(2010), we seek to develop and test a foundation trade-off task that addresses these 
methodological and theoretical gaps.  
2.4.1 Other methodological concerns 
In addition to these key gaps, we have identified two further methodological 
concerns that we seek to address in the development of the task. 
Firstly, prior approaches – that do not base foundation endorsement on the 
MFQ – have tended to focus on foundation violations (e.g. Clifford, Iyengar, Cabeza, & 
Sinnott-Armstrong, 2015; Garvey & Ford, 2014; Graham, 2010, Study 2; Graham et al., 
2009, Study 3; Landy, 2016; Royzman et al., 2014; Schein & Gray, 2015). Foundation-
consistent virtues, on the other hand, are often neglected, and there has been mixed 
success in exploring intuitive-level virtues. Ferguson (2007) found that automatic 
associations of positivity with words like ‘fair’ and ‘equal’ predicted scores on the 
‘motivation to avoid prejudice’ scale (Plant & Devine, 1998) and suggest that such 
associations reflect automatic goals for egalitarianism. However, Graham et al. (2009) 
unsuccessfully attempted to replicate these automatic priming effects with foundation-
related virtue words. Prior research suggests that intuitive responses to foundation 
violations/vices and virtues may differ. Vices are expected to yield stronger, more 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
  
 24 
reliable priming effects (Graham, 2010), and hold greater moral weight, attributable to 
a general negativity bias based on predispositions to assign greater weight to negative 
events (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001). 
Furthermore, items requiring trade-offs against non-moral goods (Graham et al., 2009, 
Study 3; Monroe & Plant, 2018, Study 3) are inherently only able to measure 
foundation violations, with no symmetrical equivalent for virtues. 
Secondly, prior approaches have tended to either use descriptions of active 
foundation-related behaviour (e.g. Graham, 2010; Graham et al., 2009), i.e. ‘Hurting 
someone’s feelings’ (Graham, 2010, Study 2), or passive descriptors of foundation-
related traits (e.g. Graham, 2010; Graham et al., 2007) i.e. ‘nurturing’ or ‘cruel’, 
(Graham, 2010, Study 3). A body of work on a ‘person-centred’ approach shows a 
dissociation between moral judgments of an agent’s action, and of their character 
(Tannenbaum, Uhlmann, & Diermeier, 2011; Uhlmann, Pizarro, & Diermeier, 2015). 
This action versus character distinction may indeed map on to a distinction between 
foundation-related active behaviours and passive traits, with different processes 
underlying these judgments. This research indicates the psychological primacy of 
character judgments, with automatic inferences about moral character emerging early 
in development and across cultures (Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014; Hamlin et al., 
2007; Lieberman, 2005; Willis & Todorov, 2006).  
Based on this literature, we can reasonably expect that intuitive-level 
processing of vice, relative to virtue, and active, relative to passive, foundation-related 
concerns may differ. We have no specific predictions about how these differences will 
manifest in a trade-off task. However, we will include both foundation vices and 
virtues, and both active and passive formulations of foundation-related stimuli, in 
order to help address these asymmetries in the moral foundations literature, and 
ensure that we are comprehensively covering all the various facets of foundation 
intuitions.  
2.5 Present Research 
Despite emerging evidence of the predictive power of considering conflict 
between foundations, only a few studies have explored these processes even at the 
explicit-level, and to our knowledge, no work has examined the nature of such conflicts 
as they might occur and be resolved at the intuitive-level. Furthermore, where previous 
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work has explored the nature of foundation-related intuitions, it has tended to do so by 
measuring foundations in isolation, or as mediated through political ideology. Little 
research has directly compared intuitive processing of moral foundations to self-
reported endorsements of foundations. Thus, there is unexplored potential to use 
trade-off task methodologies (e.g. Graham, 2010, Study 2) to develop an intuitive 
version of self-report scales (like the MFQ) that provide indices of intuitive conflict in 
decisions between foundations, that not only map relative intensities of moral 
intuitions, but also provide new avenues for future research on inter-foundation 
conflict.  
Across five studies, this thesis addresses existing gaps by developing and 
validating a novel trade-off task – the Moral Foundations Conflict Task (MFCT) – which 
aims to capture decisions between foundations that directly arise from intuitive-level 
conflict. Generally, we hypothesise that patterns of these intuitive trade-offs on the 
MFCT will be reliably related to deliberated endorsements of foundations, though we 
do not have an expectation about the magnitude of this association. 
In Study 1, we test whether responses on the MFCT reflect explicitly-endorsed 
and deliberated endorsements on the MFQ. To address concerns that the MFCT may 
merely reflect quick, and noisy, explicit preferences for foundations, in Studies 2 and 3, 
we apply two manipulations of cognitive load to explore whether associations between 
responses on the MFCT and the MFQ are shifted. If trade-offs on the MFCT occur as a 
result of fast deliberative processes, rather than intuitive-level processes, then we 
would expect a shift, with a weaker correlation between the two under load. In Study 4, 
we instead manipulated deliberation on the MFCT, to explore whether correlations 
would shift in the opposite direction, as trade-offs on the MFCT were being made 
effortfully and explicitly, and thus more closely reflect the MFQ. Finally, in Study 5, we 
explore whether well-established effects with key correlates of the MFQ – political 
orientation, right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), and social dominance orientation  
(SDO) –.replicate with responses on the MFCT.  
Across all studies, we probe the assumption that the task is capturing decisions 
between foundations that arise directly from intuitive-level conflict, by conducting 
exploratory analyses of response times (RTs). Here, we hypothesise that patterns of 
both intuitive (MFCT) and explicit (MFQ) foundation-endorsements will be reflected in 
the time required to make decisions between foundations. When foundations are 
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closely valued, intuitive decisions between them will be more difficult and take longer, 
reflecting conflict. When they are unbalanced, intuitively choosing the more valued 
foundation will be more probable and response times will be faster. 
It is worth noting here that, within the MFCT, we operationalise intuitive inter-
foundation conflict as quick decisions between foundation-related words and phrases. 
In doing so, we emphasise speed – both in how participants are instructed to complete 
the task and in our analysis of response time data. Thus, we are able to capture 
systematic and repeated decisions between foundations, providing a metric of how 
consistent people were across all possible inter-foundation combinations. However, we 
acknowledge that speed is one of a number of key aspects of moral intuitions 
previously discussed, that includes inaccessibility, automaticity, and cognitive 
effortlessness. Through two of the following studies (Study 2 and 3), we seek to show 
that the speeded decisions on the MFCT are not affected when cognitive resources are 
limited, and hence motivate a claim that the MFCT is capturing the outcomes of not 
only quick, but also automatic and effortless, processes. However, our 
operationalisation and testing of the MFCT does not directly consider inaccessibility. 
We justify this on the basis that interrogating this aspect of intuitive decisions, i.e. by 
asking people to justify their decisions (e.g. Cushman et al., 2006), would likely have 
emphasised consistency and thus triggered deliberate self-presentation. We return to a 




3 Chapter 3: Development of the Moral Foundations 
Conflict Task 
The Moral Foundations Conflict Task (MFCT) was created as part of a masters 
project (Ahluwalia, 2015) chronologically prior to the analyses and testing of the task 
described in Chapters 5 to 8. In this chapter, we provide an overview of this 
development. 
3.1 Item development 
To create the task, an initial list of 80 foundation-relevant words and phrases, 
16 per foundation, were developed to fit into one of four formulations defined by 
orthogonally crossing valence (virtue/vice) and activity level (active/passive, or 
alternatively, action/trait) to create four blocks: (1) virtue active – describing active 
virtue behaviour, and completing the stem ‘It is better to’; (2) virtue passive – passive 
virtue traits, completing ‘It is better to be’; (3) vice active – active vice behaviour, 
completing ‘It is worse to’; and (4) vice passive – passive vice traits, completing ‘It is 
worse to be’. Words and phrases were adapted from the Moral Foundations Dictionary, 
which itself was developed from a text analysis study of moral rhetoric (Graham et al., 
2009). Examples of items created for each block is provided in Table 3.1. A full list of 
items is provided in Table 11.1 in Appendix 1. 
Table 3.1. Example items developed for blocks 















Authority Obey elders Respectful 








Show loyalty to 
friends 
Patriotic 
Act for selfish 
reasons 
Unfaithful 




Note. Above sample items have been included here to indicate the breadth of items developed. 
Each item is one of four created per foundation for each block. All of these sample items appear in 
the MFCT. 
 
3.1.1 Item pairings 
In order to create closely-matched item pairings, length (number of letters) was 
recorded for each item. In addition, each item was scored by three independent coders 
for valence, i.e. how positive (for foundation virtues) or negative (vices) on a scale of 1 
(Not at all positive/negative) to 7 (Very positive/negative), intra-class correlation (ICC) = 
.69, 95% CI [.58, .77], F (79, 160) = 7.53, p < .001. There was no evident difference 
between valence ratings for virtue and vice items, Mann–Whitney U = 746.50, Z = -.51, p 
= .61, r = .06, nor between active and passive items, U = 761, Z = -.38, p = .71, r = .04. 
There were differences in valence ratings across foundations, Kruskal Wallis H(4) = 
52.75, p < .001, with pairwise comparisons indicating that care (M = 5.88, SD = .40) and 
fairness (M = 6.23, SD = .45) items scored higher than authority (M = 3.75, SD = .60), 
loyalty (M = 4.31, SD = 1.23), and purity (M = 3.44, SD = 1.29) items, likely a reflection 
that coders were more liberal and thus placed higher importance on care and fairness 
items. Valence ratings from coders were averaged to give each item a valence score.  
A final list of item pairings was developed to match items in each block based 
on their valence score and length. In order to do this, a table of the total 640 item 
combinations (160 possible combinations in each block) was created. For each inter-
foundation combination in each block, item pairings were ordered first to minimise 
difference in valence score, and then to minimise a difference in length. The top four 
most closely matched items were chosen to create the final 160 pairings. Table 3.2 
provides examples of item pairings that appear in each block. As a result of this 
process, five of the original 80 items were dropped because they did not occur in any 
matched pairs (see Table 11.1 in Appendix 1).  
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Table 3.2. Example item pairings for blocks on the MFCT 
Block (Prompt) Item 1 Item 2 Foundation 1 Foundation 2 
Virtue Active  
(It is better to…) 






about other people 





Show loyalty to 
friends 
Care Loyalty 
Act in a modest 
manner 




(It is better to 
be…) 
Obedient Patriotic Authority Loyalty 
Sympathetic Unbiased Care Fairness 
Unbiased Loyal Fairness Loyalty 
Dutiful Pious Loyalty Purity 
Vice Active 
(It is worse to…) 
Act for selfish 
reasons 
Cause chaos or 
disorder 
Loyalty Authority 
Act in an 
obstructive manner 
Behave indecently Authority Purity 
Cheat to get ahead 
Make other people 
suffer 
Fairness Care 
Act in an obscene 
manner 




(It is worse to 
be…) 
Undisciplined Neglectful Authority Care 
Rebellious Unfair Authority Fairness 
Biased Selfish Fairness Loyalty 
Selfish Sinful Loyalty Purity 
Note. Above sample item pairings represent a subset of the 40 item pairings (4 per inter-
foundation combination) that appear in each block. The prompt used in each block is provided in 
parentheses. 
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There were no evident differences in the valence scores of paired items for 
virtue pairs (M = 1.02, SD = .85) or vice pairs (M = 1.08, SD = .94), U = 3259.5, Z = .20, p 
= .84, r = .02, indicating that items were evenly matched across these formulations. 
However, there were differences in valence scores between active and passive 
formulations, with a closer match in active (M = .66, SD = .66) compared to passive 
pairs (M = 1.42, SD = .94), U = 1621, Z = -5.41, p < .001, r = -.43.   
Items were also not evenly matched on valence scores across inter-foundation 
combinations, H(9) = 71.56, p < .001, with pairings between care or fairness, and 
authority, loyalty, or purity tending to have a larger difference. Again, this reflects 
higher ratings given for care and fairness. Descriptive statistics of the differences in 
valence scores across inter-foundation combinations is given in Table 3.3.  
Table 3.3. Descriptive statistics of differences in valence scores across inter-foundation 













Authority-Fairness 1.96 (.87) 2.50 (.19) 1.67 (.54) .83 (.43) 2.83 (.19) 16 
Authority-Purity .38 (.36) .17 (.19) .75 (.50) .17 (.19) .56 (.27) 16 
Care-Authority 1.65 (.83) 1.58 (.32) 1.33 (.61) .83 (.19) 2.83 (.19) 16 
Care-Purity 1.62 (.88) .83 (.43) 2.25 (.69) .92 (.32) 2.50 (.19) 16 
Fairness-Care .19 (.17) .00 (.00) .25 (.17) .17 (.19) .25 (.17) 16 
Fairness-Loyalty .85 (.54) 1.25 (.17) 1.00 (.90) .42 (.32) 1.56 (1.57) 16 
Loyalty-Authority .75 (.68) .17 (.19) .83 (.19) .25 (.17) 1.75 (.32) 16 
Loyalty-Care .60 (.59) .50 (.43) .92 (.96) .28 (.25) .83 (.33) 16 
Purity-Fairness 1.60 (1.01) .42 (.17) 2.33 (.77) 1.17 (.69) .75 (.17) 16 
Purity-Loyalty .92 (.66) .50 (.58) 1.25 (.63) .33 (.00) 1.58 (.17) 16 
Note. Valence scores are on a 1 to 7 scale, and thus the difference in valence scores for an item 
pairing could range from 0 to a possible maximum of 6. SDs are provided in parentheses. 
 
Within subsequent analyses in Studies 1 to 5, we have included, either in text or 
appendices, models that explore the effects of length and valence score, and of item 
blocks, on responses and response times on the task. To preview those results, overall 




4 Chapter 4: Overview of analytic approach 
In the studies that follow, we test various properties of the Moral Foundations 
Conflict Task (MFCT), and how it relates to other measures of moral values and 
attitudes. In doing so, we develop a general analytic approach and implement this for 
each study. In this chapter, we provide an overview of this general approach.  
Across the studies that follow, we consider two kinds of data generated by the 
MFCT: (a) responses, as the proportion each foundation is chosen across the task; and 
(b) response times (RTs) for these choices. For each study, results are broadly reported 
in three main sections. Firstly, we consider the properties and structure of the task 
itself, exploring whether responses and RTs differ based on the valence score and 
length of items (see development of the task discussed in Chapter 3), and based on the 
four item blocks in the task, orthogonally crossing whether items describe foundation 
virtues/vices and are in active/passive formulations. Secondly, we consider 
correlations between scores for foundations measured on the MFCT and those 
measured within the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ). Finally, we consider 
patterns in RTs on the MFCT and how these relate to scores both from the MFQ and 
from the task itself.  
Here, we outline the analytic approach applied consistently and repeatedly 
within the subsequent chapters as it relates to: correlations; multilevel models; and Ex-
Gaussian decomposition of RTs. Where relevant, further analyses addressing specific 
predictions in each study are outlined within each of the subsequent chapters. All 
analyses were conducted in R (version 3.6.1) (R Core Team, 2019).  
4.1 Correlations 
We apply two kinds of correlation coefficient: Pearson correlation coefficients 
(Pearson’s r) for between-subject correlations for foundations measured on the MFCT 
and MFQ, and a Kendall rank correlation coefficient (Kendall’s τ) for within-subject 
correlations between each participants’ ordered foundation preferences on the MFCT 
and MFQ. For each study, we take the mean of these within-subject Kendall rank 
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correlation coefficients as an indicator of how relative foundation preferences 
measured on the MFCT corresponds to foundation endorsements on the MFQ. Kendall 
rank correlation coefficients are bootstrapped to assess stability using the boot package 
(version 1.3-24) (Canty & Ripley, 2019). To interpret correlations, we follow Cohen’s 
(1988) suggestions, with r = .10, r = .30, and r = .50 considered to be small, medium , 
and large, respectively. 
4.2 Multilevel models 
To predict choice outcomes and RTs, we fit multilevel models to trial-by-trial 
data from the MFCT. Multilevel models were fit using the lme function in the nlme 
package (version 3.1-140) (Pinheiro, Bates, DebRoy, Sarkar, & R Core Team, 2019). To 
aid interpretation of parameters, all continuous variables are scaled. The distribution of 
RTs was positively skewed, and RTs were thus log transformed prior to scaling. Ex-
Gaussian parameters (discussed below) were also found to be positively skewed and 
were also log-transformed. Histograms of the distributions of RTs and Ex-Gaussian 
parameters have been included in the results for each study. Random intercepts are fit 
for each subject, and where applicable, for either foundation or inter-foundation 
combination (for RT models), and for action (active or passive) within valence (virtue 
or vice) blocks. Random intercepts, and their standard deviations, are reported along 
with fixed effects for each multilevel model. Both marginal R² (variance explained by 
fixed effects) and conditional R² (variance explained by fixed and random effects) have 
been calculated using the r.squaredGLMM function in the MuMIn package (version 
1.43.6) (Bartoń, 2019), and are reported for each model. 
4.3 Ex-Gaussian analysis 
Following theoretical precedents (Heathcote, Popiel, & Mewhort, 1991; 
Lacouture & Cousineau, 2008; Luce, 1986; McGill, 1963; Moore et al., 2011), an Ex-
Gaussian approach has been applied to estimate parameter values for RT distributions.  
The Ex-Gaussian function is a convolution of a Gaussian (normal) and an 
exponential distribution. The Ex-Gaussian approach therefore acknowledges the 
positive skew of RT data, by estimating three parameters: (1) μ – the mean, and (2) σ – 
standard deviation of the Gaussian distribution; and (3) τ – the exponential parameter 
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producing the skewed tail. As a model of cognitive processes, the μ parameter reflects 
the transduction component, i.e. time required by sensory processes and to physically 
make responses, while the τ parameter represents the decision component, i.e. time 
required to decide which response to make (Lacouture & Cousineau, 2008; Luce, 1986). 
The τ parameter thus relates to increased cognitive demand for conflict resolution 
(Heathcote et al., 1991; Moore et al., 2008; Steinhauser & Hübner, 2009). Therefore, 
increased conflict should produce a greater τ estimate. Ex-Gaussian parameters were 
estimated (with 5,000 iterations) using the maximum likelihood method with the 







5 Chapter 5: Measuring intuitive foundation conflict 
5.1 Study 1 
Though MFT is an intuitionist theory, there is limited evidence for the intuitive 
processing of moral foundations. Most studies exploring foundation endorsement use 
an explicit self-report measure – the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) (Graham 
et al., 2011). Moreover, existing studies tend to either focus on the properties of one 
foundation at a time (e.g. Cannon et al., 2011; Helzer & Pizarro, 2011; Horberg et al., 
2009) or are limited to exploring trade-offs of foundations against non-moral goods, i.e. 
amount of money required for ‘kicking a dog hard in the head’ (e.g. Graham et al., 
2009). However, real life often requires trade-offs between moral values themselves.  
Building on previous foundation trade-off methods (e.g. Study 2, Graham, 
2010), this study introduces a Moral Foundation Conflict Task (MFCT) that aims to 
directly map intuitive foundations through inter-foundation conflicts, and compare 
these to self-reported foundation endorsement on the MFQ. Furthermore, this study 
seeks to address existing asymmetries by including foundation virtues and both 
descriptions of active behaviour and of passive traits.  
In this task, participants see pairs of moral violations/vices as active behaviour 
– ‘Cheat to get ahead’ versus ‘Betray a friend’ – or as passive traits – ‘Unfair’ versus 
‘Disloyal’ – and also as moral virtues, also in active or passive formulations. They are 
asked to make a fast intuitive dichotomous judgment about which is worse (vice) or 
better (virtue). The aims of this study are exploratory, and therefore we do not have 
specific hypotheses. Responses and response times on this task, and how these relate to 
endorsements on the MFQ are examined. 
5.1.1 Method 
Participants  
A G*power analysis, ɑ = .05 and β = .20, for a one-tailed medium correlation 
(Pearson’s r = .30) identified a target sample size of 67. To allow for some exclusions, 
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we recruited a total of seventy-eight participants through university networks, who 
were therefore either current students or recent alumni. All participants were required 
to be fluent English speakers. Three participants were removed due to missing data, 
leaving a final sample of 75 participants (68% female, Mage = 24.09; SDage = 4.48). 
Participation lasted 15–20 minutes and all participants were paid 3 GBP for their time.  
To identify error trials on the conflict task, we reviewed cut-offs employed in 
previous research. In a similar trade-off task requiring forced choices between moral 
stimuli, Graham (2010) exclude RTs lower than 150ms and longer than 15 seconds. We 
theorise that RTs will follow an Ex-Gaussian distribution, and therefore – though the 
task has been developed to measure fast, intuitive decisions – we applied this long 15 
second threshold for maximum RT. However, we felt that given the complexity of the 
stimuli in the task, the 150ms lower threshold would not effectively capture error 
trials. Previous work has highlighted the challenges of separating genuine from error 
RTs (Ratcliff, 1993), and prior work on perception employing two-alternative choice 
tasks has implemented a variety of methods, e.g. thresholds of 250ms (Ratcliff, 
Voskuilen, & Teodorescu, 2018) and excluding RTs deviating more than 3 SDs from 
within-subject means (Janczyk, Nolden, & Jolicoeur, 2015). However, these studies have 
tended to involve abstract visual stimuli rather than text-based stimuli, and we thus 
judged these bounds as too lenient. Instead, based on an examination of the 
distribution of RTs (see Figure 5.1), we selected 400ms as a sensible lower threshold. 
Trials with response times (RTs) lower than 400ms and longer than 15 seconds were 
excluded. On this basis, a total of thirteen trials (<.01%) were removed across 8 
subjects, leaving a total of 11,987 trials (MRT = 2542ms; SDRT = 1566ms).  
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Figure 5.1. Distribution of RTs across all trials in Study 1. Grey reference lines indicate cut-off points 
of 400ms and 15,000ms. 
 
Measures and Procedure 
Participants completed two measures in randomised order. 
Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) 
Moral foundations were measured using the 30-item Moral Foundations 
Questionnaire (MFQ-30) (Graham et al., 2011), assessing concerns for care, fairness, 
authority, loyalty, and purity using six items each. The MFQ contains two sets of 15 
questions. The first item set measures perceived moral relevance of specific pieces of 
information (e.g. care: ‘Whether or not someone suffered emotionally’, authority: 
‘Whether or not someone conformed to the traditions of society’), scaled from 0 (not at 
all relevant) to 5 (extremely relevant). The second item set measures level of 
agreement with statements (e.g. fairness: ‘Justice is the most important requirement 
for a society’, loyalty: ‘I am proud of my country’s history’), scaled from 0 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Responses to these two sets of items are combined, and 
a mean score created for each foundation.  
For subscale reliabilities of the MFQ, we report Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 
1951). Previous work has highlighted that the interpretation of alpha values can be 
somewhat arbitrary, with a value of .70 often taken as a sufficient threshold for the 
internal consistency of an instrument (Taber, 2018). Comparing subscale reliabilities to 
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.71; purity = .84), these were judged to be of similar magnitudes, and thus acceptable, 
for fairness ( = .55), authority ( = .63), loyalty ( = .71), and purity ( = .79), but was 
notably lower for care ( = .38). Generally, lower internal consistency is not uncommon 
with the MFQ, and building on previous scale development work (Gough, 1979, 1984; 
John & Soto, 2007), Graham et al. (2011) argue that the MFQ strikes a balance between 
sufficient internal consistency, and comprehensive coverage of the various facets of a 
foundation. 
Moral Foundations Conflict Task (MFCT) 
This task was completed on a computer and required speeded dichotomous 
choices between foundation-related words and phrases. The task is split into four 
blocks: (1) Virtue Active – items describing active virtue behaviour; (2) Virtue Passive – 
items describing passive virtue traits; (3) Vice Active - active vice behaviour; and (4) 
Vice Passive – passive vice traits. Table 5.1 provides examples of items in each block. 
Table 5.1. Example items for MFCT 
Block Prompt Sample Item 
Virtue Active It is better to Treat everyone equally (Fairness) 
Virtue Passive It is better to be Respectful (Authority) 
Vice Active It is worse to Do something disgusting (Purity) 
Vice Passive It is worse to be Cruel (Care) 
Note. For each sample item, the corresponding foundation is provided in parentheses. 
 
Items were adapted from the Moral Foundations Dictionary (Graham et al., 
2009). The MFCT includes 160 pairings of items, comprising four closely matched items 
in each block on valence score, the average of independent coders ratings, ICC = .69, 
95% CI [.58, .77], and length (number of letters) for each inter-foundation combination 
(see Chapter 3 for more information on development, see Appendix 1 for full list of 
items and pairings).  
Participants were randomly assigned to start with either both positive or both 
negative blocks, and within these, with either active or passive items. Instructions were 
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given at the start of positive and negative blocks and asked participants to make 
choices as quickly as they could, based on their gut response.  
Participants were presented with a total of 14 practice trials (7 virtue and 7 
vice) and 160 test trials, with 16 trials for each of the ten inter-foundation 
combinations, with 4 pairings per combination in each of the four blocks. Items were 
randomly reversed to appear on the left or right.  
A response, i.e. which item is chosen, and RT, i.e. time (in ms) to make a choice, 
are recorded for each trial. To analyse responses, a score was created for each 
foundation based on the number of times it was chosen out of the number of times it 
appeared in any combination, ranging from 0 (never chosen) to 1 (always chosen). To 
analyse RT, we employ Ex-Gaussian estimation alongside analyses of mean RT.  
5.1.2 Results 
Results are broadly separated into three main sections. Firstly, we assess the 
effects of the structure of the MFCT, specifically looking at whether the valence score 
and length of item pairings differ across foundation, and if there are any differences in 
response or RT patterns across blocks on the MFCT. We then explore correlations 
between responses on the MFCT and scores on the MFQ. Finally, we look at RTs on the 
MFCT as indicators of conflict in decisions between foundations, and exploring ways of 
capturing differences in the relative value of foundations in choices on the MFCT. 
Examining properties of the MFCT, we found that items that had higher ratings 
of positivity (for virtues) or negativity (vices), or that were longer in length, were more 
likely to be chosen. We also found some differences in RTs across the four item blocks 
on the MFCT. In particular, RT and τ is lower for virtue and passive items. Comparing 
responses patterns on the MFQ and MFCT, we found that these correlated at r (75) = 
.50, indicating a large, though imperfect, match between the two. This correlation is 
stable across the blocks of the task. In RT analyses, we generally found that RTs – and, 
where relevant, τ – decreased for foundations further apart in value, consistent with 
our expectations that this corresponds with making easier and less conflicting 
decisions. However, effects in these models are small. 
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Structure of MFCT 
Valence score and length of items 
Though item pairings were created to be as closely matched for valence score 
(average valence rating given by independent coders in item development), and for 
length (number of letters), slight differences in these properties may impact whether 
an item is chosen in a given pairing. To explore this, we fit a logistic model predicting 
whether or not an item was chosen based on valence score and length (Table 5.2). 
Items with higher valence scores and longer in length are more likely to be chosen. This 
may be partially accounted for by differences in valence scores and item length across 
foundation. 
Table 5.2. Choice by valence score and length for Study 1 
 Model 
  
  OR 
 
Fixed effects   
    Intercept .01 (.13) 1.01 
    Valence Score 1.28*** (.03) 3.58 
    Length .24*** (.04) 1.28 
    Valence Score : Length .25*** (.03) 1.28 
 
Random effects - σ   
        Subject < .001  
        Item Pair 1.04  
        Valence .04  
        Action .14  
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .24 / .41  
LogLik -15,550  
AIC 31,116  
BIC 31,181  
   
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 23,974. OR – Odds 
ratios. Fixed and random effects for logistic model predicting choice. Predictors have been 
standardised. For fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses. Pseudo R2 calculated using the delta 
method (Nakagawa, Johnson, & Schielzeth, 2017).  
 
 
Valence scores were higher for individualising foundations (care and fairness) 
than for binding foundations (authority, loyalty and purity), and this is reflected in 
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separate models predicting valence score for choices (Table 5.3). For both the chosen, β 
= -1.83, p < .001, and not chosen items, β = -1.75, p < .001, binding foundations had 
lower valence scores than individualising foundations, and were also shorter in length 
for both chosen, β = -.12, p < .001, and not chosen items, β = -.27, p < .001. 




 Valence Score Length 
 Chosen Not Chosen Chosen Not Chosen 
 
Fixed effects     
    Intercept -.17*** (.01) .16*** (.01) -.01 (.01) .03** (.01) 
    Foundation     
        Binding v. Individualising -1.83*** (.01) -1.75*** (.02) -.12*** (.02) -.27*** (.02) 
        Fairness v. Care .08*** (.01) .04** (.01) .01 (.01) -.13*** (.02) 
        Loyalty v. Authority .35*** (.01) .33*** (.01) .06** (.02) -.08*** (.02) 
        Purity v. Authority -.17*** (.01) -.01 (.01) -.04* (.02) -.18*** (.01) 
 
Random effects     
    By Subject - σ     
        Intercept < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 
        Item Pair .25 .56 .67 .48 
        Valence .32 .30 .49 .56 
        Action .50 .30 .55 .64 
    Residual .03 .03 .05 .04 
Marginal R2/ Conditional R2 .59 / .99 .50 / .99 .003 / .99 .04 / .99 
LogLik -11,683 -12,869 -16,989 -16,762 
AIC 23,387 25,759 33,998 33,544 
BIC 23,461 25,833 34,072 33,618 
 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 11,987. Fixed and 
random effects for separate models predicting valence score and length of chosen and not chosen 
items in a given trial. Outcome variables have been standardised. Individualising, care and authority 
are reference levels. For fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses.  
 
To explore whether RT might be predicted by valence score and item length, the 
difference between these for the items in a given trial was used (Table 5.4). The 
difference in valence score did have an effect on RT, β = -.11, p < .001, with quicker 
choices as the difference in valence score between items in a trial increased. There was 
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also an effect for the difference in the length of items on RT, β = .08, p < .001, with 
slower choices between items with a larger difference in length. 
Table 5.4. RT by difference in valence score and length for Study 1 
 
 Models 
 log RT 
Fixed effects   
    Intercept .001 (.06) .001 (.06) 
    Difference in Valence Score -.11*** (.01)  
    Difference in Length  .08*** (.01) 
Random effects   
    By Subject - σ   
        Intercept .55 .55 
        Item Pair .47 .47 
        Valence .47 .47 
        Action .47 .47 
    Residual .18 .18 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .01 / .97 .01 / .97 
LogLik -14,888 -14,943 
AIC 29,791 29,899 
BIC 29,842 29,951 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 11,987. Fixed and 
random effects for separate models predicting standardised log RT from standardised absolute 
differences in valence score and length between items in a given trial. For fixed effects, SE is 
provided in parentheses. 
 
Based on models exploring valence scores, items that are more positive 
(virtues) or negative (vices) are more likely to be chosen as better (virtues) or worse 
(vices), with slower choices when the two items in a trial are more closely matched on 
valence score. Items longer in length were also more likely to be chosen, with a greater 
difference in length between two items in a trial predicting longer RTs. These effects 
are likely impacted by differences across foundations, with items for individualising 
foundations tending to be rated as are more positive/negative, and slightly longer in 
length, than items for binding foundations. However, models attempting to include a 
random intercept for item pairings to account for these effects tended to fail to 
converge and we have thus omitted this from subsequent analyses. 
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Effect of blocks 
Analyses assessed whether blocks on the MFCT had any effect on responses and 
RT patterns, to explore whether it may be appropriate to collapse further analyses 
across blocks. Table 5.5 shows separate models predicting scores and RT on the MFCT 
from block valence (virtue or vice), block action (active or passive), and foundation.  
Neither the valence, nor the action formulation of items, nor the interaction 
between valence and action had an effect on MFCT scores. However, the interaction 
between valence and action did affect RT, β = -.27, p = < .001, with passive items being 
faster in the virtue block. 
There was a significant effect of foundation on MFCT scores, with binding 
foundations chosen less than individualising foundations, β = -.75, p < .001. This is 
reflected in RTs, with binding foundations chosen slower than individualising 
foundations, β = .23, p < .001. This pattern likely reflects the fact that most student 
participants were likely liberal, hence prioritising individualising foundations, and 
taking less time to choose them. Significant interactions between valence, action, and 
foundation can be seen in Table 5.5, Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3. 
Table 5.5. MFCT score and RT by blocks and foundation for Study 1 
 Models 
 MFCT Score log RT 
Fixed effects   
    Intercept -.002 (.04) .27*** (.07) 
    Valence (Virtue v. Vice) .001 (.06) -.02 (.02) 
    Action (Passive v. Active) -.001 (.06) -.35*** (.02) 
    Foundation   
        Binding v. Individualising -.75*** (.10) .23*** (.04) 
        Fairness v. Care -.56*** (.06) .12*** (.02) 
        Loyalty v. Authority .36*** (.07) -.06* (.03) 
        Purity v. Authority -.20** (.07) .08** (.03) 
    Valence : Action .0002 (.08) -.27*** (.03) 
    Valence : Foundation   
        Valence : Binding v. Individualising -.58*** (.14) -.11* (.05) 
        Valence : Fairness v. Care .74*** (.09) -.13*** (.03) 
        Valence : Loyalty v. Authority .02 (.10) -.02 (.04) 
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        Valence : Purity v. Authority .58*** (.10) -.09* (.04) 
    Action : Foundation   
        Action : Binding v. Individualising -.63*** (.14) -.003 (.05) 
        Action : Fairness v. Care .07 (.09) -.01 (.03) 
        Action : Loyalty v. Authority .04 (.10) .08* (.04) 
        Action : Purity v. Authority .06 (.10) -.22*** (.04) 
    Valence : Action : Foundation   
        Valence : Action : Binding v. Individualising .85*** (.20) -.06 (.07) 
        Valence : Action : Fairness v. Care -.52*** (.13) .08† (.04) 
        Valence : Action : Loyalty v. Authority -.72*** (.15) .02 (.06) 
        Valence : Action : Purity v. Authority -.76*** (.15) .18** (.06) 
Random effects   
    By Subject - σ   
        Intercept < .001 .55 
    Residual .78 .79 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .39 / .39 .08 / .38 
LogLik -1,757 -14,294 
AIC 3,557 28,632 
BIC 3,674 28,794 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 1,500 (MFCT Score) and 
11,987 (log RT). Fixed and random effects for separate models predicting MFCT score and log RT. 
Outcome variables have been standardised. For RT model, foundation represents the foundation of 
the item chosen in a given trial. Planned contrasts for foundation compare individualising to binding 
foundations (with the former as the reference level), and then compare Care to Fairness (former as 
reference level), and Authority to Loyalty and Purity (Authority as reference level). For valence and 
action, vice and active are reference levels. For fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses. 
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Figure 5.2. MFCT score (a) and RT (b) by valence block and foundation in Study 1. Error bars denote 
95% CIs, corrected for within-subject designs based on Morey (2008). 
 
 
Figure 5.3. MFCT score (a) and RT (b) by action block and foundation in for Study 1. Error bars denote 
95% CIs, corrected for within-subject designs based on Morey (2008). 
 
To explore whether block effects on RT might be informed by Ex-Gaussian 
analyses, within-subject mean RTs and Ex-Gaussian parameters were fit for each block 
(see Table 5.6 and Figure 5.4). Differences in μ and τ across blocks indicate differences 
in processing speed for different formulations of items, and differences in conflict in 
choices, respectively. The interaction between valence and action again predicted mean 
RT, β = -.38, p < .001, and μ, β = -.58, p < .001, indicating faster processing speed for 
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p < .05, indicating lower conflict in these blocks. The effect of both valence and action is 
expressed in both μ and τ, indicating that vice and active items entail longer processing 
time – expected for active items as they are longer, more complex items – and greater 
conflict. In contrast to mean RT and μ, there was no evidence of an interaction between 
valence and action for τ. These patterns for μ and τ demonstrate the strengths of an Ex-
Gaussian approach in revealing more information about RT distributions than mean RT 
alone. 
These analyses indicate that the block structure of the task does impact 
response patterns and RTs on the MFCT differentially across foundations. For RT, it 
seems to be quicker and easier to make choices between virtue and passive items. 
Subsequent analyses include random intercepts for valence and action. 
Table 5.6. RT, μ and τ by blocks for Study 1 
 Models 
 log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects    
    Intercept .36** (.11) .20† (.11) .23* (.11) 
    Valence (Virtue v. Vice) -.03 (.06) .23* (.11) -.26* (.12) 
    Action (Passive v. Active) -.50*** (.06) -.33** (.11) -.31* (.12) 
    Valence : Action -.38*** (.08) -.58*** (.16) .20 (.17) 
Random effects    
    By Subject - σ    
        Intercept .85 .63 .67 
    Residual .36 .69 .72 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .14 / .87 .12 / .52 .05 / .34 
LogLik -238 -369 -385 
AIC 489 751 781 
BIC 511 773 803 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 300. Fixed and random 
effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ and τ. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
For valence and action, vice and active are reference levels. For fixed effects, SE is provided in 
parentheses. 
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Figure 5.4. Mean RT (a), μ (b) and τ (c) by blocks. Error bars denote 95% CIs, corrected for within-
subject designs based on Morey (2008). 
 
To assess the internal reliability of the full MFCT, as well as across blocks, the 
task was randomly split into two halves, scores were calculated for each half, and a 
split-half correlation was calculated for each participant. Split-half correlations were 
then adjusted using the Spearman-Brown formula to get an estimate of the reliability of 
the full MFCT (Eisinga, Grotenhuis, & Pelzer, 2013; Kaplan & Saccuzzo, 2001). This 
process was then repeated, with bootstrap resampling with random splits. Table 5.7 
shows split-half reliability coefficients. Reliability for the full task, and across blocks in 
the task, is acceptable, but slightly lower for the active blocks, likely reflecting more 


































Table 5.7. Bootstrapped split-half reliability across blocks for Study 1 
 rBoot Bias 95% CI of r SE rBoot 
Study 1 (N = 75) 
    Full Task .85 .002 [.81, .89] .02 
    Vice .83 .01 [.77, .87] .02 
    Virtue .79 -.02 [.73, .89] .04 
    Active .69 .05 [.58, .70] .03 
    Passive .80 -.002 [.74, .87] .03 
Note. Bootstrapped with 5,000 iterations. 
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Correlating MFQ and MFCT 
Mean responses on the MFQ and the MFCT are shown in Table 5.8, along with 
correlations, corrected for multiple comparisons, between foundations measured on 
the MFQ and on the MFCT. The correlations for care, r = .47, p <. 001, loyalty, r = .55, p < 
.001, and purity, r = .53, p < .001 are significant, with marginal significance for 
authority, r = .30, p < .10, however this was not the case for fairness, r = .20. 
To compare patterns of foundation endorsement on the MFCT to MFQ 
responses, a Kendall rank correlation coefficient was calculated for each participant. 
These coefficients ranged from -.89 to 1.00, with a mean of r (75) = .50. Bootstrap 
resampling gave an estimate of rBoot = .51 (SE rBoot = .05, 95% CI [.43, .61].  
Table 5.8. Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations for Study 1 variables 
 M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Care-MFQ  3.88 .49          
2. Fairness-MFQ  3.91 .53 .25         
3. Authority-MFQ  2.35 .76 -.09 -.06        
4. Loyalty-MFQ  2.50 .83 -.01 -.02 .54***       
5. Purity-MFQ  1.97 .98 .01 .00 .49*** .38**      
6. Care-MFCT  .70 .13 .47*** .14 -.33* -.42** -.30†     
7. Fairness-MFCT  .57 .13 -.06 .20 -.28 -.45*** -.41** .18    
8. Authority-MFCT  .37 .11 -.23 .00 .30† .26 .17 -.53*** -.31†   
9. Loyalty-MFCT  .46 .13 .01 -.13 .17 .55*** .04 -.35* -.39** -.10  
10. Purity-MFCT  .39 .13 -.22 -.21 .19 .09 .53*** -.38** -.52*** .11 -.20 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. MFQ scores are on a 0 to 5 scale, MFCT scores are 
on a 0 to 1 scale. p-values corrected for multiple comparisons (Bonferroni). Correlations between 
the same foundations on the MFQ and on the MFCT have been highlighted in bold. 
 
A mean correlation coefficient was calculated for each block to explore whether 
this correlation is maintained across blocks (see Table 5.9). To compare correlations, 
an approach proposed by Zou (2008) and Baguley (2012) was used, using upper and 
lower bounds of the CIs for correlations to calculate a CI for their difference, adjusted to 
account for a shared predictor. Here, CIs approaching -1 or 1 indicate increasing 
asymmetry, while CIs that include 0 indicate a non-significant difference between 
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correlations. Based on this, there is no evidence for differences in correlations between 
the MFQ and MFCT for vices and virtues, 95% CI [-.27, .02], nor for active and passive 
blocks, 95% CI [-.31, .01]. 
Table 5.9. Correlations between MFQ and MFCT scores across blocks for Study 1 
 Sample r rBoot Bias 95% CI of r SE rBoot 95% CI of Difference 
Study 1 (N = 75)  
    Full Task .50 .51 -.016 [.43, .61] .049  
    Vice  .43 .45 -.027 [.39, .56] .046 
[-.27, .02] 
    Virtue .53 .57 -.042 [.54, .67] .038 
    Active .38 .42 -.041 [.37, .55] .047 
[-.31, .01] 
    Passive  .49 .53 -.035 [.47, .64] .046 
Note. Bootstrapped with 5,000 iterations. CIs are the Bias Corrected Accelerated (BCa) intervals 
 
These results indicate a 50% match between the order, or ranks, of foundation 
endorsement measured by the MFQ and foundation preference expressed in the MFCT, 
stable across all blocks of the task. 
Predicting RT on the MFCT 
A key feature of the MFCT as a speeded forced choice task is that it measures 
response time as an additional metric of foundation endorsement. We expect that, if 
there is a smaller difference in how valued two foundations are, then it is more difficult 
to choose between them, and the decision should take longer. Therefore, we explore 
whether RT on the MFCT can be interpreted as an indicator of conflict in decisions 
between foundations. We expect conflict to vary based on how valued two foundations 
are, as measured by endorsement on the MFQ, and by overall preferences on the MFCT 
as an indicator of consistency in the task. The following analyses are exploratory in 
nature, and operationalise difference in value between foundations in a number of 
ways, with limitations discussed. 
Difference in foundation scores predicting RT 
First, we modelled the difference in value between foundations as the 
difference in scores between the foundation chosen in a given trial, and the foundation 
not chosen. Separate multilevel models (see Table 5.10) were fit to predict RT from the 
difference between MFQ and MFCT scores. We expected that RT would be highest when 
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the difference is 0 indicating that two foundations are equally valued. In addition, we 
anticipated that this relationship would be non-linear, and could be represented by the 
quadratic equation 𝑦 =  𝑥 – 𝑥2, taking the form of a upside-down parabola with a 
vertex (highest point) when x equals 0. To implement this in our models, we fit both a 
linear (x) and quadratic term (x2) for the difference in scores. Figure 5.5 shows a plot of 
predicted values from the resulting quadratic regressions. 
For MFQ scores, the linear term was significant, β = -.09, p < .01, in the expected 
direction, with RT decreasing as the difference in MFQ scores increases. However, the 
quadratic term was not significant, β = .01, p > .10. Conversely, for MFCT scores, the 
linear term was not significant, β = -.02, p > .10, though the quadratic term was 
significant in the predicted direction, β = -.02, p < .05. This suggests that the 
relationship between RT and difference in scores is linear for MFQ scores, and 
quadratic for MFCT scores. However, in both cases these effects are small.  
Table 5.10. Predicting RT from difference in MFQ and MFCT scores for Study 1 
 
 Models 
 log RT 
Fixed effects   
    Intercept .10 (.07) .10 (.07) 
    Difference in MFQ Scores -.09** (.03)  
    Difference in MFQ Scores2 .01 (.01)  
    Difference in MFCT Scores  -.02 (.03) 
    Difference in MFCT Scores2  -.02* (.01) 
Random effects   
    By Subject - σ   
        Intercept .55 .55 
        Foundation Combination < .001 < .001 
        Valence < .001 < .001 
        Action .37 .36 
    Residual .75 .75 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .004 / .44 .01 / .44 
LogLik -14,698 -14,670 
AIC 29,413 29,356 
BIC 29,472 29,415 
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Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 11,987. Fixed and 
random effects for separate models predicting log RT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
Quadratic models fit terms for difference in scores (x) and squared difference in scores (x2) between 
foundations in a trial. In order to preserve a minimum value of 0 interpretable as no difference 
between scores for the quadratic term, difference predictors in these models were scaled by SD 
without centring. For fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses. Models that included a random 
intercept for item pairings failed to converge and this term was thus excluded. 
 
 
Figure 5.5. Predicting RT for Study 1 with quadratic models for (a) difference in MFQ scores and (b)  
difference in MFCT scores between foundations in a trial. Grey areas represent 95% CI boundaries. 
 
Ranks apart predicting RT 
To probe RT as an indicator of conflict in decisions between foundations, we 
apply Ex-Gaussian decomposition of RT distributions from the MFCT, i.e. how many 
ranks apart foundations in each trial are based on each participant’s rank ordering, or 
order of foundations endorsement/preference. Ranks were produced by ordering 
foundations from most valued (1st rank) to least valued (5th rank), based either on MFQ 
or MFCT scores. When foundations had equal scores, these were given the same rank. A 
total of 32 participants had equally scored foundations on the MFQ, and 19 had these 
on the MFCT. When participants had equally scored foundations, subsequent ranks 
were labelled sequentially, e.g. if a participant had two foundations ranked as 2nd, the 
next highest scoring foundation was labelled as 3rd.  
We predict that it will take longer and be more difficult to choose between 
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expected that fewer ranks apart will result in greater overall RT and τ, as a measure of 
decision conflict, but not necessarily be reflected in μ, a measure of time to physically 
make responses (Heathcote et al., 1991; Luce, 1986). Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7 show 
histograms for within-subject mean RTs, μ and τ calculated for ranks apart categories 
based on the MFQ and MFCT, respectively.  
 
 
Figure 5.6. Distribution of RT (a), μ (b) and τ (c) across MFQ rank apart categories in Study 1 
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Multilevel models were fit to predict RT, μ and τ from ranks apart based on the 
MFQ and the MFCT, with a set of planned contrasts (Helmert coding), testing whether 
the former increases with fewer ranks apart (see Table 5.11). Helmert coding compares 
each level of a categorical variable to the mean of the subsequent levels (UCLA: 
Statistical Consulting Group, 2019). Due to substantial error for equally valued choices 
(0 ranks apart) due to infrequent occurrence, models were fit with this rank category 
dropped.  
Ranks apart on MFQ 
For choices between closely valued foundations, based on rank order on the 
MFQ, we would expect longer RTs and greater τ, but not necessarily greater μ. This 
would manifest in decreasing RT and τ, as the number of ranks apart increased, a trend 
that can be seen weakly in Figure 5.8 (panels a and c).  
Mean RT was higher in choices between foundations one rank apart on the 
MFQ, relative to subsequent ranks apart, β = .10, p < .01, but there were no evident 
differences in RT for other comparisons, βs < |.05|, ps > .10. There was also higher τ in 
two rank apart choices, β = .26, p < .01, relative to further apart choices, with no evident 
differences in τ for other comparisons, βs < |.09|, ps > .10. None of the planned contrast 
were significant for μ, all βs < |.16|, ps > .10.  
Ranks apart on MFCT 
The expected decreasing trend in RT and τ is clearer for ranks apart based on 
the task itself (see Figure 5.9, panels a and c). Mean RT decreased with ranks apart in 
the predicted direction, all βs > .14, ps < .05, as did τ for one rank apart choices, β = .25, 
p < .01, and marginally for two rank apart choices, β = .16, p < .10, relative to further 
apart choices. There was an effect for μ for three rank apart choices relative to four 
rank apart choices, β = .30, p < .05, but no other contrasts were significant for μ, βs < 
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Table 5.11. Predicting RT, μ and τ from ranks apart on the MFQ and MFCT for Study 1 
 
 Models 
 MFQ MFCT 
 log RT log μ log τ log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects       
    Intercept .02 (.11) .003 (.09) .01 (.10) -.03 (.11) -.03 (.09) -.001 (.10) 
    Ranks Apart       
        1 RA v. 2, 3, 4 .10** (.04) .11 (.10) .07 (.09) .21*** (.04) .15 (.10) .25** (.08) 
        2 RA v. 3, 4 .04 (.04) -.16 (.11) .26** (.10) .15*** (.04) .09 (.11) .16† (.09) 
        3 RA v. 4 -.05 (.05) -.02 (.14) -.09 (.12) .14* (.05) .30* (.13) -.13 (.11) 
Random effects       
    By Subject - σ       
        Intercept .94 .71 .76 .94 .69 .77 
    Residual .26 .69 .62 .29 .72 .60 
Marg. R2 / Cond. R2 .003 / .93 .01 / .52 .01 / .61 .01 / .92 .01 / .49 .02 / .64 
LogLik -159 -335 -317 -187 -360 -327 
AIC 330 683 646 386 731 665 
BIC 352 704 668 408 753 687 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 265 (MFQ) and 280 
(MFCT). RA – Ranks Apart. Fixed and random effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ and τ 
for ranks apart based on the MFQ and the MFCT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
Helmert coding compares each rank apart category to the mean of the subsequent categories. For 
fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses. 
 
 
Figure 5.8. Ranks apart on MFQ predicting RT (a), μ (b) and τ (c) for Study 1. Error bars denote 95% 
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Figure 5.9. Ranks apart on MFCT predicting RT (a), μ (b) and τ (c) for Study 1. Error bars denote 95% 
CIs, corrected for within-subject designs based on Morey (2008). 
 
These analyses suggest that foundations endorsement/preference is reflected 
in RTs on the MFCT, and that this tracks expected conflict in decisions between more 
closely valued foundations. However, these patterns are noisy.  
Contributing to this noise, the above ways of operationalising the difference in 
value between foundations do not account for how much value is placed on each 
foundation, i.e. a choice between a participant’s first and second most valued 
foundation may generate the same difference, or the same number of ranks apart, as a 
choice between the fourth and fifth. To address this, we ran a number of analyses 
attempting to capture these differences in value. 
Weighted difference scores predicting RT 
We expect that RT on a choice between foundations on the MFCT will not only 
be predicted by how closely valued the two foundations are, but will also vary based on 
how much they are valued. However, we do not have clear predictions about the 
directions. Decisions between less valued foundations may incur lower conflict, and 
therefore shorter RTs. Conversely, these decisions may incur longer RTs, resulting from 
reduced certainty in choosing between less valued foundations. 
To explore this, a difference score was created for each inter-foundation 
combination to weight the difference between foundation scores by the mean score of 
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Score2)). MFQ scores were transformed into values ranging 0 to 1, to match MFCT 
scores, before being entered into this formula. Difference scores based on the MFQ and 
on the MFCT correlated at r = .58, p <.001, 95% CI [.53, .63].  
Separate multilevel models (see Table 5.12) were fit to predict RT for each trial 
from difference scores based on MFQ and MFCT scores. There were no effects for MFQ 
difference scores, β = -.004, p > .10, nor for MFCT difference scores, β = .01, p > .10, 
which may indicate that the weighted difference score calculated for each inter-
foundation combination does not adequately capture differences in value. 
Table 5.12. Predicting RT from difference score based on MFQ and MFCT 
 Models 
 log RT 
Fixed effects   
    Intercept .001 (.06) .001 (.06) 
    Difference Score MFQ -.004 (.01)  
    Difference Score MFCT  .01 (.01) 
Random effects   
    By Subject - σ   
        Intercept .55 .55 
        Foundation Combination < .001 < .001 
        Valence < .001 < .001 
        Action .37 .37 
    Residual .75 .75 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 < .001 / .44 < .001 / .44 
LogLik -14,713 -14,713 
AIC 29,441 29,439 
BIC 29,493 29,491 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 11,987. Fixed and 
random effects for separate models predicting log RT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
Difference score calculated as mean(Score1, Score2) * (1 - abs(Score1 - Score2)). For fixed effects, SE 
is provided in parentheses. 
 
A further set of models were fit, collapsing RT and fitting within-subject Ex-
Gaussian parameters to RT distributions for each inter-foundation combination (see 
Table 5.13). Here,  higher difference score based on MFCT scores did predict RT with a 
small effect, β = .04, p < .05, but all other effects were not significant, βs = |.06|, p > .10. 
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Table 5.13. Predicting RT, μ and τ from difference score based on MFQ and MFCT 
 Models 
 MFQ MFCT 
 log RT log μ log τ log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects       
    Intercept .00 (.10) .00 (.08) -.00 (.08) .00 (.10) .00 (.08) -.00 (.08) 
    Difference Score MFQ -.01 (.02) -.06 (.04) .02 (.03)    
    Difference Score MFCT    .04* (.02) < .001 (.03) .01 (.03) 
Random effects       
    By Subject - σ       
        Intercept .90 .62 .68 .89 .63 .68 
        Foundation 
Combination 
.40 .71 .67 .39 .72 .67 
    Residual .20 .30 .29 .20 .30 .29 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 




.001 / .92 .002 / .96 < .001 / .91 < .001 / .92 
LogLik -597 -950 -916 -594 -951 -916 
AIC 1,203 1,910 1,841 1,198 1,913 1,841 
BIC 1,227 1,933 1,864 1,221 1,936 1,865 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 750. Fixed and random 
effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ and τ, estimated for each foundation combination. 
Outcome variables have been standardised. Difference score calculated as mean(Score1, Score2) * (1 
- abs(Score1 - Score2)). For fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses. 
 
Weighted ranks apart predicting RT 
We fit models with an alternative way of capturing differences in value based 
on participants’ rank ordering of foundations. These models included a bias term for 
the ranks in a choice, calculated as mean(Rank1, Rank2), to weight the number of ranks 
apart foundations are in each trial. To create the bias term, ranks were reversed, so that 
the most valued foundation ranks as 5, and the least valued ranks as 1, such that a 
higher mean rank for foundations in a choice indicates higher value.  
Models (see Table 5.14) tested effects for the bias term for the mean rank of 
foundations in a given trial, their ranks apart, and the interaction between these. For 
ranks based on both MFQ and MFCT scores, RT is negatively predicted by mean rank, 
βs = -.06, ps < .001, and by number of ranks apart, βs < -.03, ps < .01, indicating that as 
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the value, and the difference in value, of foundations in a choice increases, time to make 
the choice decreases. However, there was no evidence of an interaction between these 
for ranks based on either MFQ or MFCT scores, βs < |.01|, ps > .10. 
Table 5.14. Predicting RT from mean rank and ranks apart on the MFQ and MFCT for Study 1 
 Models 
 log RT 
 MFQ MFCT 
Fixed effects   
    Intercept -.0005 (.06) .001 (.06) 
    Mean Rank -.06*** (.01) -.06*** (.01) 
    Ranks Apart -.03** (.01) -.06*** (.01) 
    Mean Rank : Ranks Apart -.01 (.01) -.005 (.01) 
Random effects   
    By Subject - σ   
        Intercept .55 .55 
        Foundation Combination < .001 < .001 
        Valence < .001 < .001 
        Action .37 .36 
    Residual .75 .75 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .003 / .44 .006 / .44 
LogLik -14,697 -14,680 
AIC 29,412 29,379 
BIC 29,479 29,445 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 11,987. Fixed and random 
effects for separate models predicting log RT. Outcome variables and predictors have been 
standardised. Mean rank calculated as mean(Rank1, Rank2), of reversed ranks, such that higher mean 
rank indicates more valued foundations. For fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses. 
 
Ranks apart split by rank chosen predicting RT 
To further explore effects on RT at different levels of value, we replicated ranks 
apart analyses on RT distributions split by the rank of the foundation that was chosen 
in each trial. Multilevel models were fit to predict RT, μ and τ for each rank, based on 
the MFQ and the MFCT, that was chosen (1st rank to 5th rank) from the rank not chosen 
(also 1st rank to 5th rank) in a given trial. As in previous analyses, the small number of 
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equally ranked choices were dropped, and a set of planned contrasts compare each 
rank category to the mean of the subsequent rank categories. 
Ranks apart split by split by rank chosen on MFQ 
Figure 5.10 shows plots for RT, μ and τ for each rank chosen, based on MFQ 
scores. For mean RT, there were no significant effects, βs < |.10|, ps > .10 (see Table 
5.15 – Table 5.19), with the exception of a marginal effect for 2nd rank choices when the 
1st rank was not chosen, β = .11, p < .10 (see Table 5.15).  
When highest ranked (1st rank) foundations were chosen, μ was higher for 2nd 
rank choices, β = .25, p < .05, but all other effects for μ and τ were not significant, βs < 
|.17|, ps > .10 (Table 5.15). When 2nd rank choices were made, μ was marginally higher 
when the 1st rank foundation was not chosen, β = .19, p < .10. For 2nd rank choices, μ 
was also marginally lower against 4th rank compared to 5th rank foundations, β = -.25, p 
< .10, while the opposite is true for τ, β = .24, p < .10, with τ marginally decreasing for 
5th rank compared to 4th rank foundations (Table 5.16). A dissociation in the opposite 
direction is seen for 3rd rank choices against 2nd rank versus lower rank foundations, 
with marginally higher μ, β = .23, p < .10, and marginally lower τ, β = -.24, p < .10 (Table 
5.17). When 4th rank choices were made, there was a marginal effect for τ, comparing 
2nd rank against lower rank foundations, β = -.27, p < .10, with lower τ when 2nd rank 
foundations were not chosen (Table 5.18). When lowest ranked (5th rank) foundations 
were chosen, μ was also marginally higher against 2nd rank compared to lower ranked 
foundations, β = .27, p < .10 (Table 5.19). Conversely, τ is marginally lower in these 
choices, β = -.30, p < .10, as well as in choices against 3rd rank compared to 4th rank 
foundations, β = -.38, p < .05.  
Taken together, these models suggest a weak pattern with μ decreasing, and τ 
increasing, for choices between lower ranked foundations, indicating a decreasing time 
to physically make choices, but increasing decision conflict. Though this is indication 
that μ and τ parameters are tracking different processes in RT data, this may also be 
indication of the limitations of an Ex-Gaussian approach here, as we would not expect μ 
to vary in this way. 
Ranks apart split by split by rank chosen on MFCT 
Figure 5.11 shows plots for RT, μ and τ for each rank chosen, based on MFCT 
scores. For mean RT, there were no significant effects, βs < |.13|, ps > .10 (see Table 
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5.15 – Table 5.19), with the exception of significantly higher RT for 1st rank choices 
against 2nd ranked compared to lower ranked foundations, β = .16, p < .10 (see Table 
5.15).  
For 1st and 2nd ranked choices, μ was higher against 2nd ranked, β = .22, p < .05, 
and marginally for 1st ranked foundations respectively, β = .18, p < .10, but all other 
effects for μ and τ were not significant, βs < |.11|, ps > .10 (Table 5.15 and Table 5.16). 
For 3rd and 4th ranked choices, μ was also higher against 1st ranked, βs > .40, ps < .01, 
and 2nd ranked compared to lower ranked foundations, βs > .27, ps < .05 (Table 5.17 
and Table 5.18). The opposite is seen for τ, with lower τ against 1st ranked, βs < -.45, ps 
< .001, and 2nd ranked compared to lower ranked foundations, βs < -.29, ps < .05. For 5th 
rank choices, μ was marginally higher against 2nd rank compared to lower ranked 
foundations, β = .28, p < .10 (Table 5.19), with τ marginally lower in choices against 3rd 
rank compared to 4th rank foundations, β = -.30, p < .10.  
Similar to those based on MFQ scores, these models suggest decreasing μ, and 
increasing τ, for choices between lower ranked foundations, indicating decreasing time 
to physically make choices, but increasing decision conflict. Though these patterns are 
clearer when ranks are based on the MFCT, they remain relatively weak and are not 
reflected in mean RT. 
 
Figure 5.10. Ranks chosen on MFQ, split by ranks not chosen, predicting RT (a), μ (b) and τ (c) in 
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Figure 5.11. Ranks chosen on MFCT, split by ranks not chosen, predicting RT (a), μ (b) and τ (c) in 
Study 1. Error bars denote 95% CIs, corrected for within-subject designs based on Morey (2008). 
 
Table 5.15. Predicting RT, μ and τ for 1st Rank choices on the MFQ and MFCT for Study 1 
 Models 
 MFQ MFCT 
 log RT log μ log τ log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects       
    Intercept .01 (.11) -.01 (.09) .02 (.10) -.02 (.11) -.02 (.09) -.002 (.09) 
    Ranks Apart       
        2 RNC v. 3, 4, 5 .09 (.06) .25* (.10) -.07 (.10) .16** (.06) .22* (.10) -.01 (.09) 
        3 RNC v. 4, 5 -.02 (.06) .02 (.10) .02 (.11) .05 (.06) -.06 (.11) .10 (.10) 
        4 RNC v. 5 -.06 (.08) -.17 (.14) -.01 (.14) .13† (.07) .11 (.13) -.01 (.12) 
Random effects       
    By Subject - σ       
        Intercept .89 .71 .73 .91 .67 .71 
    Residual .40 .68 .68 .40 .74 .69 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .002 / .83 .02 / .53 .001 / .53 .01 / .84 .01 / .46 .002 / .52 
LogLik -241 -330 -332 -255 -364 -352 
AIC 495 671 677 523 740 716 
BIC 516 693 698 544 762 738 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 263 (MFQ) and 280 
(MFCT). RNC – Rank not Chosen. Fixed and random effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ and 
τ for ranks apart based on the MFQ and the MFCT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
Helmert coding compares each rank category to the mean of the subsequent categories. For fixed 
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Table 5.16. Predicting RT, μ and τ for 2nd Rank choices on the MFQ and MFCT for Study 1 
 Models 
 MFQ MFCT 
 log RT log μ log τ log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects       
    Intercept .02 (.11) .03 (.09) .001 (.09) .002 (.11) -.01 (.09) -.002 (.09) 
    Ranks Apart       
        1 RNC v. 3, 4, 5 .11† (.06) .19† (.10) -.15 (.10) .03 (.06) .18† (.10) -.01 (.09) 
        3 RNC v. 4, 5 -.01 (.07) .10 (.11) -.08 (.11) .04 (.07) .02 (.11) .10 (.10) 
        4 RNC v. 5 .05 (.09) -.25† (.14) .24† (.14) -.004 (.08) -.03 (.13) -.01 (.12) 
Random effects       
    By Subject - σ       
        Intercept .88 .70 .68 .88 .67 .63 
    Residual .44 .70 .71 .44 .74 .77 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .003 / .80 .02 / .51 .01 / .49 .00 / .80 .01 / .46 .01 / .41 
LogLik -256 -332 -333 -272 -362 -352 
AIC 523 675 679 556 737 716 
BIC 544 697 700 578 758 738 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 260 (MFQ) and 279 
(MFCT). RNC – Rank not Chosen. Fixed and random effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ and 
τ for ranks apart based on the MFQ and the MFCT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
Helmert coding compares each rank category to the mean of the subsequent categories. For fixed 
effects, SE is provided in parentheses. 
 
Table 5.17. Predicting RT, μ and τ for 3rd Rank choices on the MFQ and MFCT for Study 1 
 Models 
 MFQ MFCT 
 log RT log μ log τ log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects       
    Intercept .04 (.11) .001 (.09) .02 (.08) -.003 (.11) -.005 (.09) .01 (.08) 
    Ranks Apart       




        2 RNC v. 4, 5 .003 (.07) .23† (.12) -.24† (.14) .07 (.07) .29** (.11) -.29* (.12) 
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        4 RNC v. 5 -.03 (.09) .05 (.15) -.12 (.17) .09 (.09) -.01 (.13) .09 (.14) 
Random effects       
    By Subject - σ       
        Intercept .89 .67 .49 .87 .64 .57 
    Residual .45 .72 .87 .47 .74 .79 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .001 / .80 .01 / .47 .01 / .25 .002 / .78 .04 / .46 .05 / .38 
LogLik -249 -317 -339 -274 -349 -358 
AIC 510 646 690 561 711 727 
BIC 531 667 711 582 733 749 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 245 (MFQ) and 270 
(MFCT). RNC – Rank not Chosen. Fixed and random effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ and 
τ for ranks apart based on the MFQ and the MFCT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
Helmert coding compares each rank category to the mean of the subsequent categories. For fixed 
effects, SE is provided in parentheses. 
 
Table 5.18. Predicting RT, μ and τ for 4th Rank choices on the MFQ and MFCT for Study 1 
 Models 
 MFQ MFCT  
 log RT log μ log τ log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects       
    Intercept .01 (.11) -.01 (.09) .002 (.08) .01 (.11) .01 (.09) -.02 (.08) 
    Ranks Apart       
        1 RNC v. 2, 3, 5 -.08 (.07) .13 (.13) -.23 (.15) 
-.0001 
(.07) 
.40** (.13) -.71*** (.14) 
        2 RNC v. 3, 5 .01 (.08) .21 (.13) -.27† (.15) -.01 (.07) .27* (.11) -.33** (.12) 
        3 RNC v. 5 .03 (.09) -.04 (.16) .04 (.18) -.04 (.08) .08 (.13) -.22 (.15) 
Random effects       
    By Subject - σ       
        Intercept .87 .61 .35 .89 .64 .47 
    Residual .44 .77 .92 .42 .74 .82 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .001 / .80 .01 / .39 .02 / .15 .00 / .81 .04 / .45 .10 / .33 
LogLik -228 -301 -315 -236 -316 -322 
AIC 467 614 643 485 644 656 
BIC 488 634 663 506 665 677 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 226 (MFQ) and 243 
(MFCT). RNC – Rank not Chosen. Fixed and random effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ and 
τ for ranks apart based on the MFQ and the MFCT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
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Helmert coding compares each rank category to the mean of the subsequent categories. For fixed 
effects, SE is provided in parentheses. 
 
Table 5.19. Predicting RT, μ and τ for 5th Rank choices on the MFQ and MFCT for Study 1 
 Models 
 MFQ MFCT 
 log RT log μ log τ log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects       
    Intercept .01 (.14) .02 (.12) -.02 (.11) .03 (.13) .05 (.11) -.05 (.10) 
    Ranks Apart       
        1 RNC v. 2, 3, 4 -.01 (.08) -.08 (.15) -.15 (.15) .13 (.12) .15 (.17) -.19 (.19) 
        2 RNC v. 3, 4 .10 (.08) .27† (.15) -.30† (.15) .07 (.10) .28† (.15) -.21 (.16) 
        3 RNC v. 4 -.08 (.09) .25 (.16) -.38* (.16) -.12 (.10) .03 (.14) -.30† (.16) 
Random effects       
    By Subject - σ       
        Intercept .90 .64 .62 .87 .66 .54 
    Residual .40 .74 .75 .50 .73 .82 
Marginal R2 / Conditional 
R2 
.003 / .83 .02 / .44 .04 / .44 .01 / .76 .02 / .46 .03 / .32 
LogLik -142 -201 -201 -188 -225 -234 
AIC 297 415 415 388 461 479 
BIC 315 433 433 407 480 498 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 155 (MFQ) and 172 
(MFCT). RNC – Rank not Chosen. Fixed and random effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ and 
τ for ranks apart based on the MFQ and the MFCT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
Helmert coding compares each rank category to the mean of the subsequent categories. For fixed 
effects, SE is provided in parentheses. 
 
5.1.3 Discussion 
The MFCT aims to directly map intuitive foundations through inter-foundation 
conflict, and compare these to self-reported foundation endorsement on the MFQ. We 
found that foundation rankings measured on the MFQ and emerging from the MFCT 
correlated at r (75) = .50. We broadly interpret the MFCT scores as indicators of 
intuitive foundation endorsement, and hence interpret this finding as a substantial but 
imperfect match between intuitive and explicitly reported foundation endorsement. 
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However, it may be that the MFCT is merely capturing noisy and fast deliberated 
judgments, a possibility we aim to eliminate in Studies 2 and 3.  
A key potential strength of the MFCT over the MFQ is that it yields response 
time data, providing a metric for difficulty and conflict in decisions between 
foundations. We expected that when foundations are more closely matched, i.e. have a 
smaller difference in scores, decisions between them will take longer, reflective of 
greater conflict. We found that differences in MFQ scores, as measures of how valued 
foundations are, predicted response time when these foundations were in conflict on 
the MFCT, such that a greater difference was associated with faster reaction time. To 
further probe conflict, we modelled RT and Ex-Gaussian parameters based on how 
many ranks apart foundations are in participants’ rank orderings of MFQ scores. We 
found that, in general, response time and τ, isolating conflict in decision-making, 
decreased with increasing ranks apart. Furthermore, we found some differences in 
effects when how much value placed on each foundation is taken into account.  
These patterns are mirrored with slightly larger effects, when scores indicating 
the value of foundations are derived from the task itself, an indicator of consistency 
within the MFCT. Furthermore, patterns in RT illustrate the potential value of analysing 
response time data collected from the MFCT as a signifier of inter-foundation conflict. 
However, all these models of RT leave a large proportions of variance unexplained, and 
effects are relatively weak. Further exploration of RT on the MFCT will benefit from 




6 Chapter 6: Cognitive load on the Moral Foundations 
Conflict Task 
6.1 Study 2 
A number of studies have attempted to explore the structure of foundations at 
the intuitive levels by manipulating cognitive load (e.g. Wright & Baril, 2011 – see 
Chapter 2.3). Evidence regarding whether individuals are deliberately correcting their 
moral intuitions – either by suppressing them or enhancing other concerns at the 
explicit level – is, at the present, inconsistent and conflicting. Study 2 aims to examine 
whether the response patterns on the MFCT are affected by availability of cognitive 
resources. Particularly, we are interested in whether the relationship between the 
intuitive responses on the MFCT and explicit responses on the MFQ would be affected 
by increasing cognitive load during the MFCT, using a concurrent task to divide 
attention (derived from Skitka et al., 2002). This study was developed in collaboration 
with Marr (2016), who added the concurrent task to the MFCT and collected this data 
for separate and independent analysis for a masters thesis.  
If responses on the MFCT are not intuitively-driven – as we propose – but are 
instead merely reflective of noisy and fast deliberated judgments, we would expect that 
increasing cognitive load will interfere with this process, depleting ability to 
deliberately correct any intuitive reactions and thus reducing the correlation between 
MFCT scores and MFQ scores. Furthermore, there would also be evidence of greater 
conflict between foundations under cognitive load as unsuppressed intuitions clash, 
with longer response times, and greater τ values in the divided attention condition. 
However, if the MFCT is capturing intuitively-driven judgments, we would expect the 
correlation between MFCT scores and MFQ scores to remain stable, and little indication 
of increased conflict under cognitive load. 




One-hundred participants were recruited through university networks and 
were randomly assigned to participate in either a control or a cognitive load condition. 
Sample size was identified on the basis of a G*power analysis, ɑ = .05 and β = .20, for a 
medium effect size (Cohen’s q = .50) for a one-tailed test of difference between two 
independent correlations. We assume a Kendall rank correlation coefficient of ~.50 in 
the control condition (based on Study 1), and expected a decrease to a medium 
correlation of ~.20 in the load condition. All participants were required to be fluent 
English speakers. Participants were paid 3 GBP for their time. One participant was 
removed due to missing data, leaving a final sample of 99 participants (79% females, 
Mage = 22.79; SDage = 3.13) for analysis, with 50 participants in the control condition and 
49 in the load condition. Figure 6.1 shows a histogram of the distribution of RTs. 
Applying the same RT criteria as in Study 1, a total of twenty-five trials (<.01%) were 
removed across 16 subjects, leaving a total of 15,829 trials (MRT Control = 2280ms; SDRT 
Control = 1467ms; MRT Load = 2331ms; SDRT Load = 1502ms).  
 
 
Figure 6.1. Distribution of RTs across all trials in Study 2. Grey reference lines indicate cut-off points 
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Measures and Procedure 
As in Study 1, participants completed the MFQ and MFCT in randomised order. 
Subscale reliabilities on the MFQ for Study 2 (s: care = .58; fairness = .55; authority = 
.67; loyalty = .68; purity = .79) were similar to those found in Study 1 (s: care = .38; 
fairness = .55; authority = .63; loyalty = .71; purity = .79). 
Cognitive load manipulation 
Participants in the load condition completed an adapted version of the MFCT, 
identical but for the addition of a concurrent tone-counting task (see Skitka et al., 
2002). Throughout each block, participants heard a series of tones (one tone every 2 
seconds) through headphones. The tones were either high or low pitched (with a ratio 
of 40% high to 60% low) in a random order. The series of tones was different for each 
block. Participants were instructed to count the number of high pitched tones and 
ignore the low pitched tones at the same time as completing the MFCT. The number of 
high-pitched tones heard depended on how long participants spent on each block. At 
the end of each block, an additional screen required participants to input the number of 
high pitched tones heard to continue to the next block. 
Load participants completed an additional four items designed to gauge the 
perceived performance and difficulty on the tone-counting task, and how much they 
felt the cognitive load manipulation interfered with their performance: ‘How difficult 
did you find the decision making task?’; ‘How much did having to count the tones 
interfere with your ability to choose between the words or phrases?’; ‘How accurate do 
you think you were in the counting tones?’; and ‘How much do you think your 
responses on the decision making task reflected your beliefs/values?’(scaled from 1 to 
10). 
6.1.2 Results 
For Study 2, we replicate analyses for Study 1, separating results into three 
main sections, first assessing the effects of the structure of the MFCT, before exploring 
correlations between responses on the MFCT and scores on the MFQ, and RTs on the 
MFCT as indicators of conflict in decisions between foundations. To address predictions 
for Study 2, we examine differences in correlations between the MFQ and the MFCT, 
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and differences in RT, across conditions. Finally, we assess performance and perceived 
performance for participants in the load condition. 
Results from analyses pertaining to the properties of items and block structure 
of the MFCT were consistent with those in Study 1. Across all analyses, we did not find 
any evidence of consistent effects of condition. In particular, we did not find evidence 
for a difference in the correlation between the MFQ and MFCT, nor for a difference in 
RT patterns, between conditions.  
Structure of MFCT 
We replicated effects in Study 1 of effects of item valence score and length, and 
interpret them similarly. These models are reported in Appendix 2. 
Effect of blocks 
Analyses assessed whether condition and blocks on the MFCT had any effect on 
responses and RT patterns (see Table 6.1). There was no main effect for condition, β = -
.002, p > .10, nor any interactions between condition, valence, action or foundation, βs < 
|.27|, p > .10, on MFCT scores. There was also no main effect of condition for RT, β = -
.04, p > .10, nor interaction between condition and valence, β = .06, p > .10. There was 
an interaction between condition and action, β = .08, p < .05, with a larger difference 
between choices on active and passive trial in the control versus load condition. 
Choosing fairness had longer RTs relative to choosing care in the load condition, β = .10, 
p < .01, but all other interactions between condition and foundation were not 
significant, βs < |.04|, ps > .10, as were all other interactions including condition, βs < 
|.20|, ps > .10. 
As in Study 1, neither the valence, nor the action formulation of items, nor the 
interaction between valence and action, had an effect on MFCT scores. However, the 
interaction between valence and action did affect RT, β = -.38, p = < .001.with passive 
items again being faster in the virtue block. 
Also as in Study 1, there was a significant effect of foundation on MFCT scores, 
with binding foundations being chosen less than individualising foundations, β = -.92, p 
< .001. This is reflected in RTs, with binding foundations chosen slower than 
individualising foundations, β = .27, p < .001. As in Study 1, this likely reflects the fact 
that most participants were liberal, hence generally prioritising individualising 
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foundations, and taking less time to choose them. Significant interactions between 
valence, action, and foundation can be seen in Table 6.1, Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3. 
Table 6.1. MFCT score and RT by condition, blocks, and foundation for Study 2 
 Models 
 MFCT Score log RT 
Fixed effects   
    Intercept -.002 (.05) .28*** (.08) 
    Condition (Load v. Control) -.002 (.07) -.04 (.12) 
    Valence (Virtue v. Vice) -.001 (.07) -.05* (.03) 
    Action (Passive v. Active) < .001 (.07) -.38*** (.03) 
    Foundation   
        Binding v. Individualising -.92*** (.12) .27*** (.04) 
        Fairness v. Care -.54*** (.08) .07** (.03) 
        Loyalty v. Authority .30*** (.09) -.10** (.03) 
        Purity v. Authority -.39*** (.09) .14*** (.04) 
    Condition : Valence .002 (.10) .06 (.04) 
    Condition : Action .002 (.10) .08* (.04) 
    Valence : Action < .001 (.10) -.24*** (.04) 
    Condition : Foundation   
        Condition : Binding v. Individualising -.11 (.17) .01 (.06) 
        Condition : Fairness v. Care -.02 (.11) .10** (.04) 
        Condition : Loyalty v. Authority .06 (.12) .02 (.05) 
        Condition : Purity v. Authority .09 (.12) -.04 (.05) 
    Valence : Foundation   
        Valence : Binding v. Individualising -.57*** (.17) -.11† (.06) 
        Valence : Fairness v. Care .80*** (.11) -.12*** (.04) 
        Valence : Loyalty v. Authority .04 (.12) .10* (.05) 
        Valence : Purity v. Authority .62*** (.12) -.12* (.05) 
    Action : Foundation   
        Action : Binding v. Individualising -.51** (.17) -.06 (.06) 
        Action : Fairness v. Care -.06 (.11) .03 (.04) 
        Action : Loyalty v. Authority .06 (.12) .18*** (.05) 
        Action : Purity v. Authority .29* (.12) -.23*** (.05) 
    Condition : Valence : Action .0002 (.14) .01 (.05) 
    Condition : Valence : Foundation   
        Condition : Valence : Binding v. Individualising -.09 (.24) -.05 (.09) 
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        Condition : Valence : Fairness v. Care -.14 (.15) -.02 (.05) 
        Condition : Valence : Loyalty v. Authority -.01 (.18) -.03 (.07) 
        Condition : Valence : Purity v. Authority -.11 (.18) .05 (.07) 
    Condition : Action : Foundation   
        Condition : Action : Binding v. Individualising .18 (.24) -.12 (.09) 
        Condition : Action : Fairness v. Care .12 (.15) -.05 (.05) 
        Condition : Action : Loyalty v. Authority -.20 (.18) -.03 (.07) 
        Condition : Action : Purity v. Authority -.07 (.18) .01 (.07) 
    Valence : Action : Foundation   
        Valence : Action : Binding v. Individualising .74** (.24) -.03 (.09) 
        Valence : Action : Fairness v. Care -.47** (.15) .07 (.05) 
        Valence : Action : Loyalty v. Authority -.62*** (.18) -.13† (.07) 
        Valence : Action : Purity v. Authority -.84*** (.18) .18* (.07) 
    Condition : Valence : Action : Foundation   
        Condition : Valence : Action : Binding v. Individualising .04 (.34) .20 (.12) 
        Condition : Valence : Action : Fairness v. Care .01 (.22) -.04 (.07) 
        Condition : Valence : Action : Loyalty v. Authority .12 (.25) -.02 (.10) 
        Condition : Valence : Action : Purity v. Authority .03 (.25) .03 (.11) 
Random effects   
    By Subject - σ   
        Intercept < .001 .56 
    Residual .75 .79 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .43 / .43 .07 / .38 
LogLik -2,250 -18,899 
AIC 4,584 37,882 
BIC 4,819 38,204 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 1,980 (MFCT Score) and 
15,829 (log RT). Fixed and random effects for separate models predicting MFCT score and log RT. 
Outcome variables have been standardised. For RT model, foundation represents the foundation of 
the item chosen in a given trial. Planned contrasts for foundation compare individualising to binding 
foundations (with the former as the reference level), and then compare Care to Fairness (former as 
reference level), and Authority to Loyalty and Purity (Authority as reference level). For condition, 
valence and action: control, vice and active are reference levels. For fixed effects, SE is provided in 
parentheses. 
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Figure 6.2. MFCT score (a, c) and RT (b, d) for control (a, b) and load (c, d) conditions by valence block 




Figure 6.3. MFCT score (a, c) and RT (b, d) for control (a, b) and load (c, d) conditions by action block 
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Within-subject mean RTs and Ex-Gaussian parameters were fit for each block 
(see Table 6.2 and Figure 6.4). There was a marginal effect of condition on μ, β = -.36, p 
< .10, with lower μ, and thus lower processing speed, in the load condition. There were 
no effects of condition on mean RT, β = -.01, p > .10, or on τ, β = .25, p > .10. There is a 
marginal interaction between condition and action, β = .17, p < .10, with a larger 
difference between choices on active and passive trials in the control versus load 
condition. All other interactions with condition were not significant, βs = |.22|, ps > .10. 
Here, the interaction between valence and action predicted mean RT, β = -.38, p 
< .001, and marginally predicted μ, β = -.32, p < .10, indicating faster processing speed 
for passive virtue items. In contrast to Study 1, this interaction was also significant for 
τ, β = -.35, p < .05, indicating greater conflict for passive virtue items. 
Table 6.2. RT, μ and τ by condition and blocks for Study 2 
 Models 
 log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects    
    Intercept .34* (.13) .50*** (.13) -.02 (.14) 
    Condition (Load v. Control) -.01 (.19) -.36† (.19) .25 (.20) 
    Valence (Virtue v. Vice) -.05 (.07) -.04 (.13) .06 (.12) 
    Action (Passive v. Active) -.55*** (.07) -.51*** (.13) -.18 (.12) 
    Condition : Valence .08 (.09) .22 (.19) -.07 (.18) 
    Condition : Action .17† (.09) -.07 (.19) .18 (.18) 
    Valence : Action -.38*** (.09) -.32† (.19) -.35* (.18) 
    Condition : Valence : Action .01 (.13) -.02 (.26) .11 (.25) 
Random effects    
    By Subject - σ    
        Intercept .87 .65 .75 
    Residual .33 .65 .62 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .13 / .89 .16 / 0.58 .06 / .62 
LogLik -289 -470 -466 
AIC 598 961 953 
BIC 638 1,000 993 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 396. Fixed and random 
effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ and τ. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
For condition, valence and action: control, vice and active are reference levels. For fixed effects, SE 
is provided in parentheses. 
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Figure 6.4. Mean RT (a, d), μ (b, e) and τ (c, f) for control (a-c) and load (d-f) by blocks. Error bars 
denote 95% CIs, corrected for within-subject designs based on Morey (2008). 
 
Consistent with results for Study 1, these analyses indicate that the block 
structure of the task impacts response patterns and RTs on the MFCT. For RT, it is 
quicker and easier to make choices between virtue and passive items. 
As in Study 1, we assessed internal reliability of the full MFCT and for each 
block, collapsing across conditions. Table 6.3 shows split-half reliability coefficients. 
Reliability is acceptable for the full task, and across blocks. 
Table 6.3. Bootstrapped split-half reliability across blocks for Study 2 
 rBoot Bias 95% CI of r SE rBoot 
Study 2 (N = 99) 
    Full Task .81  .01  [.76, .85 ]  .02  
    Vice .77  -.01  [.71, .85]  .04  
    Virtue .80  -.01  [.76, .85]  .02  
    Active .80  -.03  [.76, .88]  .03  
    Passive .76  .01  [.69, .81]  .03  
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Correlating MFQ and MFCT Scores 
Mean responses and correlation across foundations are shown in Table 6.4. The 
correlations for care, r = .46, p <. 001, authority, r = .54, p < .001, loyalty, r = .50, p < 
.001, and purity, r = .58, p < .001 were all significant, however this was again not the 
case for fairness, r = .24, p > .10. 
Table 6.4. Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations for Study 2 variables 
 M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Care-MFQ  3.92 .59 -         
2. Fairness-MFQ  3.94 .48 .33** -        
3. Authority-MFQ  2.21 .73 -.01 .10 -       
4. Loyalty-MFQ  2.39 .76 .12 -.04 .62*** -      
5. Purity-MFQ  1.73 .98 .15 .04 .62*** .50*** -     
6. Care-MFCT  .72 .14 .46*** .08 -.51*** -.40*** -.33** -    
7. Fairness-MFCT  .58 .14 -.19 .24 -.36** -.40*** -.46*** .02 -   
8. Authority-MFCT  .39 .10 -.26† -.12 .54*** .22 .30* -.54*** -.37** -  
9. Loyalty-MFCT  .44 .10 .02 -.19 .19 .50*** .10 -.22 -.50*** .05 - 
10. Purity-MFCT  .37 .13 -.11 -.12 .38*** .32** .58*** -.53*** -.44*** .17 -.04 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. MFQ scores are on a 0 to 5 scale, MFCT scores are 
on a 0 to 1 scale. p-values corrected for multiple comparisons (Bonferroni). Correlations between 
the same foundations on the MFQ and on the MFCT have been highlighted in bold. 
 
Kendall rank correlation coefficients between MFCT to MFQ responses, 
calculated for each participant, ranged from -.89 to 1.00, with a mean of r (99) = .56. To 
assess stability, this estimate was bootstrapped to give an estimate of rBoot = .58 (SE 
rBoot = .04, 95% CI [.52, .67]). There was no evidence for a difference between 
correlations in the control, r (50) = .53, and load conditions, r (49) = .59, 95% CI [-.23,  
.11] (see Table 6.5).  
This comparison is a crucial test of our hypotheses, and we therefore conducted 
further analysis in order to interpret this non-significant result. As the distribution of 
participants’ correlations between their MFQ and MFCT scores is highly negatively 
skewed, we conducted a non-parametric Mann–Whitney U test of the difference 
between mean correlations between conditions, alongside a Bayes factor for this test. 
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In order to calculate a non-parametric Bayes factor (BF10), we followed an approach 
developed by van Doorn, Ly, Marsman, and Wagenmakers (2020). We confirmed non-
significance, U = 1100.00, Z = -.88, p = .40, r = .09, and calculated a BF10 of .26. To 
interpret this Bayes factor, we apply conventional cut-offs (Jeffreys, 1939/1961; Lee & 
Wagenmakers, 2014), interpreting a value less than 1/3 as moderate evidence for the 
null hypothesis that there is no difference between mean correlations across 
conditions. 
Table 6.5. Correlations between MFQ and MFCT scores across conditions for Study 2 
 Sample r rBoot Bias 95% CI of r SE rBoot 95% CI of Difference 
Control (N = 50)  .53 .48 .050 [.34, .54] .053 
[-.23 , .11] 
Load (N = 49) .59 .65 -.060 [.61, .76] .053 
Note. Bootstrapped with 5,000 iterations. CIs are the Bias Corrected Accelerated (BCa) intervals 
 
As in Study 1, there was no evident difference in correlations in for vice and 
virtue blocks, 95% CI [-.22, .02], nor between the active and passive blocks, 95% CI [-
.18, .06], with CIs that include 0 indicating non-significant difference between 
correlations (see Table 6.6). 
Table 6.6. Correlations between MFQ and MFCT scores across blocks for Study 2 
 Sample r rBoot Bias 95% CI of r SE rBoot 95% CI of Difference 
Study 2 (N = 99)  
    Full Task .56 .58 -.019 [.52, .67] .038  
    Vice  .44 .39 .053 [.29, .42] .040 
[-.22 , .02] 
    Virtue .56 .54 .021 [.44, .59] .035 
    Active .47 .46 .012 [.37, .52] .037 
[-.18 , .06] 
    Passive  .53 .52 .006 [.44, .59] .039 
Note. Bootstrapped with 5,000 iterations. CIs are the Bias Corrected Accelerated (BCa) intervals 
 
Replicating correlations from Study 1, these results indicate a 56% match 
between the order, or ranks, of foundation endorsement measured by the MFQ and 
foundation preference expressed in the MFCT, stable across all blocks of the task. 
Contrary to our prediction that – if choices on the MFCT result from fast deliberation – 
the correlation between MFCT scores and MFQ scores would be lower in the load 
condition, there was no difference between conditions. 
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Predicting RT on the MFCT  
We replicate exploratory analyses conducted in Study 1 to explore RT as an 
indicator of conflict in decisions between foundations, that varies based on how valued 
two foundations are, as measured by endorsement on the MFQ, and by overall 
preferences on the MFCT. We include condition as a predictor in these analyses to test 
predictions that there will be greater conflict between foundations under cognitive 
load, apparent in longer RTs, and greater τ values, in the load condition.  
Difference in foundation scores predicting RT 
As in Study 1, we expected that RT would be highest when the difference is 0 
indicating that two foundations are equally valued, and that the effect on RT would be 
non-linear. Separate multilevel models (see Table 6.7) were fit to predict RT from linear 
(x) and quadratic (x2) terms for the difference between MFQ and MFCT scores. Figure 
6.5 plots these quadratic regressions. 
For MFQ scores, the linear term was marginally significant, β = -.07, p < .10, in 
the expected direction, with RT decreasing as the difference in MFQ scores increases. 
However, as in Study 1, the quadratic term was not significant, β < |.001|, p > .10. As 
also found in Study 1, for MFCT scores, the linear term was not significant, β = .01, p > 
.10, though the quadratic term was significant in the predicted direction, β = -.03, p < 
.05. This may further suggest that the relationship is linear for MFQ scores, and 
quadratic for MFCT scores. However, as in Study 1, these effects are small. There was 
no effect of condition, nor any interactions between condition and any other terms in 
the models, βs < |.08|, ps > .10. 
Table 6.7. Predicting RT from condition and difference in MFQ and MFCT scores for Study 2 
 Models 
 log RT 
Fixed effects   
    Intercept .08 (.08) .07 (.08) 
    Condition (Load v. Control) -.01 (.12) .01 (.12) 
    Difference in MFQ Scores -.07† (.04)  
    Difference in MFQ Scores2 -.0004 (.01)  
    Condition : Difference in MFQ Scores .08 (.06)  
    Condition : Difference in MFQ Scores2 -.02 (.02)  
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    Difference in MFCT Scores  -.01 (.04) 
    Difference in MFCT Scores2  -.03* (.01) 
    Condition : Difference in MFCT Scores  .003 (.06) 
    Condition : Difference in MFCT Scores2  .01 (.02) 
Random effects   
    By Subject - σ   
        Intercept .56 .56 
        Foundation Combination < .001 < .001 
        Valence < .001 < .001 
        Action .34 .33 
    Residual .76 .76 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .004 / .43 .01 / .43 
LogLik -19,448 -19,421 
AIC 38,918 38,864 
BIC 39,002 38,949 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 15,829. Fixed and 
random effects for separate models predicting log RT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
Quadratic models fit terms for difference in scores (x) and squared difference in scores (x2) between 
foundations in a trial. In order to preserve a minimum value of 0 interpretable as no difference 
between scores for the quadratic term, difference predictors in these models were scaled by SD 




Figure 6.5. Predicting RT for Study 2 with quadratic models for (a) difference in MFQ scores and (b)  
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Ranks apart predicting RT 
Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.7 show histograms for within-subject mean RTs, μ and τ 
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Figure 6.7. Distribution of RT (a), μ (b) and τ (c) across MFCT rank apart categories in Study 2 
 
As in Study 1, multilevel models (see Table 6.8) were fit to predict RT, μ and τ, 
based on how many ranks apart foundations in each trial are based on each 
participant’s rank ordering, or order of foundations endorsement/preference. A total of 
37 and 13 participants had equally scored foundations on the MFQ and MFCT, 
respectively. For these participants, following equally ranked foundations subsequent 
ranks were labelled sequentially, as in Study 1. Models were fit with a set of planned 
contrasts (Helmert coding), testing whether the former increases with fewer ranks 
apart. As in Study 1, equally valued choices (0 ranks apart) were dropped from models.  
Ranks apart on MFQ 
As for Study 1, a weak trend of decreasing RT and τ, as the number of ranks 
apart increases, can be seen in Figure 6.8 (panels a and c).  
Mean RT was higher RT in choices between foundations one rank apart on the 
MFQ, β = .17, p < .001, and two rank apart choices, β = .11, p < .05, relative to 
subsequent ranks apart. There was also higher τ in one rank apart choices, β = .27, p < 
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comparisons, βs < |.09|, ps > .10. For μ, there is a marginal effect for two rank apart 
versus subsequent ranks apart, β = .21, p < .10, with no other differences, βs < |.14|, ps > 
.10.  
There are no main effects of condition, βs < |.29|, ps > .10, and no evidence of 
interactions between condition and ranks apart for mean RT, βs < |.06|, ps > .10. For τ, 
there is an interaction between condition and ranks apart for two ranks apart choices, 
β = .29, p < .05, and a marginally for three rank apart choices, β = .30, p < .10, such that 
the predicted downward trend can be seen in the load, but not the control condition. 
For μ, there is also an interaction between condition and ranks apart for two ranks 
apart choices, β = .28, p < .10, in the opposite direction to τ, with higher μ in the control 
condition for two ranks apart choices, relative to subsequent ranks apart. 
Ranks apart on MFCT 
As in Study 1, the expected decreasing trend in RT and τ is clearer for ranks 
apart based on the task itself (see Figure 6.9, panels a and c). Mean RT decreases with 
ranks apart in the predicted direction, βs > .16, ps < .01, as does τ, βs > .22, ps < .10. 
There is a marginal effect for μ for one rank apart choices relative to four rank apart 
choices, β = .20, p < .10, but no other planned contrast were significant for μ, βs < |.13|, 
ps > .10.  
As for ranks apart derived from MFCT scores, there are no main effects of 
condition, βs < |.29|, ps > .10. For mean RT, there is a marginal interaction between 
condition and one rank apart choices, β = -.13, p < .10, but all other interactions for 
mean RT, τ, and μ, are not significant, βs < |.23|, ps > .10. 
Table 6.8. Predicting RT, μ and τ from condition and ranks apart on the MFQ and MFCT for Study 2 
 
 Models 
 MFQ MFCT 
 log RT log μ log τ log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects       
    Intercept -.10 (.14) .11 (.12) -.18 (.13) -.09 (.14) .13 (.12) -.17 (.13) 
    Condition (Load v.  Control) .13 (.20) -.25 (.17) .29 (.18) .14 (.20) -.27 (.17) .29 (.18) 
    Ranks Apart       
        1 RA v. 2, 3, 4 
.17*** 
(.05) 
.01 (.11) .27** (.09) 
.23*** 
(.05) 
.20† (.11) .27** (.09) 
        2 RA v. 3, 4 .11* (.05) .21† (.12) -.04 (.10) .16** (.05) -.04 (.11) .31** (.10) 
CHAPTER 6: COGNITIVE LOAD 
 81 
        3 RA v. 4 .05 (.07) .14 (.16) -.09 (.13) .18** (.06) -.13 (.13) .22† (.11) 
    Condition : Ranks Apart       
        Condition : 1 RA v. 2, 3, 4 -.05 (.07) .04 (.15) -.13 (.12) -.13† (.07) -.08 (.15) -.15 (.13) 
        Condition : 2 RA v. 3, 4 .01 (.08) -.28† (.17) .29* (.14) -.04 (.07) .14 (.16) -.16 (.14) 
        Condition : 3 RA v. 4 .06 (.10) -.24 (.22) .30† (.17) -.05 (.09) .20 (.19) -.23 (.16) 
Random effects       
    By Subject - σ       
        Intercept .96 .78 .83 .96 .76 .83 
    Residual .28 .63 .51 .29 .64 .54 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .01 / .92 .02 / .61 .04 / .74 .02 / .92 .03 / .60 .04 / .71 
LogLik -236 -425 -375 -252 -461 -422 
AIC 492 870 770 525 942 865 
BIC 531 909 809 564 981 904 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 350 (MFQ) and 382 
(MFCT). RA – Ranks Apart. Fixed and random effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ and τ 
for ranks apart based on the MFQ and the MFCT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
Helmert coding compares each rank apart category to the mean of the subsequent categories. For 
condition: control is the reference level. For fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses. 
 
 
Figure 6.8. Condition and ranks apart on MFQ predicting RT (a), μ (b) and τ (c) for Study 2. Error bars 



















1rank 2rank 3rank 4rank
Ranks Apart
m





1rank 2rank 3rank 4rank
Ranks Apart
t
t by MFQ Ranks Apar tc
Condition Control Load
CHAPTER 6: COGNITIVE LOAD 
 82 
 
Figure 6.9. Condition and ranks apart on MFCT predicting RT (a), μ (b) and τ (c) for Study 2. Error bars 
denote 95% CIs, corrected for within-subject designs based on Morey (2008). 
 
These analyses replicate the noisy patterns found for Study 1, suggesting that 
foundations endorsement/preference is reflected in RTs on the MFCT. Figure 6.8 and 
Figure 6.9 suggest higher τ in the load condition, though this is not significant. 
Weighted ranks apart predicting RT 
The above ways of operationalising the difference in value between foundations 
do not account for how much value is placed on each foundation, and therefore, as for 
Study 1, we ran a number of analyses attempting to better account for this. We report 
all these analyses in Appendix 2. Here, we present models based on weighted ranks 
apart as the clearest means of accomplishing this. 
As in Study 1, we fit models (see Table 6.9) that included a bias term for the 
ranks in a choice to weight the number of ranks apart foundations are in each trial, 
with a higher mean rank for foundations in a choice indicating higher value.  
For ranks based on both MFQ and MFCT scores, RT is negatively predicted by 
mean rank, βs < -.05, ps < .01, and by number of ranks apart, βs < -.05, ps < .001, 
indicating that as the value, and the difference in value, of foundations in a choice 
increases, time to make the choice decreases. However, as in Study 1, there was no 
evidence of an interaction between these for ranks based on either MFQ or MFCT 
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There was a marginal interaction between condition and ranks apart on the MFCT, β = 
.03, p < .10, but this is a small effect (see Figure 6.10 and Figure 6.11). 
Table 6.9. Predicting RT from condition, mean rank, and ranks apart on the MFQ and MFCT for Study 2 
 Models 
 log RT 
 MFQ MFCT 
Fixed effects   
    Intercept -.02 (.08) -.02 (.08) 
    Condition (Load v. Control) .04 (.11) .04 (.11) 
    Mean Rank -.05** (.02) -.08*** (.02) 
    Ranks Apart -.05*** (.01) -.07*** (.01) 
    Condition : Mean Rank .001 (.02) -.004 (.02) 
    Condition : Ranks Apart .02 (.02) .03† (.02) 
    Mean Rank : Ranks Apart .01 (.02) -.02 (.02) 
    Condition : Mean Rank : Ranks Apart .04 (.02) .01 (.03) 
Random effects   
    By Subject - σ   
        Intercept .55 .55 
        Foundation Combination < .001 < .001 
        Valence < .001 < .001 
        Action .34 .33 
    Residual .76 .76 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .01 / .43 .01 / .42 
LogLik -19,431 -19,414 
AIC 38,887 38,855 
BIC 38,987 38,955 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 15,829. Fixed and random 
effects for separate models predicting log RT. Outcome variables and predictors have been 
standardised. Mean rank calculated as mean(Rank1, Rank2), of reversed ranks, such that higher mean 
rank indicates more valued foundations. For condition: control is the reference level. For fixed effects, 
SE is provided in parentheses. 
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Figure 6.10. Condition and (a) mean rank and (b) ranks apart on MFQ predicting RT for Study 2. Grey 
areas represent 95% CI boundaries. 
 
 
Figure 6.11. Condition and (a) mean rank and (b) ranks apart on MFCT predicting RT for Study 2. Grey 
areas represent 95% CI boundaries. 
 
Tone-Counting Performance 
Participants heard around 20 high tones per block, and tended to miscount 
tones, M = 2.77, SD = 1.41, with around 35% making errors of 5 or more in at least one 
block. There was a difference in accuracy between vice, M = 3.35, SD = 2.52, and virtue 
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between active, M = 2.72, SD = 2.66, and passive blocks, M = 2.81, SD = 2.18, t(97) = .28, 
p = .78. 
On completion of the MFCT, participants in the load condition were asked to 
evaluate the difficulty and accuracy of concurrently completing the MFCT and the tone-
counting exercise (see Table 6.10). On 1 to 10 scales, participants reported middling 
accuracy on counting the tones, M = 5.67, SD = 1.93, and felt that this had interfered 
with their ability to make choices on the MFCT, M = 7.73, SD = 1.25. These perceptions 
about performance did not correlate with actual performance on the tone-counting 
task, indicated by the number of errors made. Participants also generally found the 
joint task to be difficult, M = 6.76, SD = 1.73, but felt responses given on the MFCT were 
reflective of their beliefs and values, M = 7.14, SD = 1.50.  
In separate models predicting number of tone-count errors, there was a 
marginally significant effect of perceived accuracy, β = -.27, p < .10 (see Table 6.11), 
suggesting that participants tended to correctly assess their accuracy on the task. 
However, no other perceived aspects of performance predicted the number of errors 
actually made, βs < |.17|, ps > .10. Furthermore, the perceived extent to which 
responses on the MFCT reflected participants beliefs/values did not predict actual 
correlations between the MFCT and the MFQ, β = -.05, p > .10 (see Table 6.11). 
Table 6.10. Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations for tone count variables in Study 2  
 M SD 1 2 3 4 
1. How difficult did you find the decision making task?  6.76 1.73     
2. How much did having to count the tones interfere with your 
ability to choose between the words or phrases?  
7.73 1.25 .35†    
3. How accurate do you think you were in the counting tones?  5.67 1.93 -.20 -.17   
4. How much do you think your responses on the decision 
making task reflected your beliefs/values?  
7.14 1.50 -.41* -.06 .48**  
5. Error in tone count  2.77 1.41 .12 .12 -.27 -.17 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Questions 1 – 4 are on a 1 to 10 scale. Error in tone 
count is the difference between the number of high tones heard and the number of tones reported 
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Table 6.11. Predicting performance in tone-counting task in Study 2 
 Models 
 Error in tone count  
Correlation - 
MFQ and MFCT 
Fixed effects      














    
2. How much did having to count the tones 
interfere with your ability to choose 
between the words or phrases? 
 .12 
(.14) 
   






4. How much do you think your responses on 
the decision making task reflected your 
beliefs/values? 
   -.17 
(.14) 
-.05 (.15) 
R2 .02 .01 .07 .03 .002 
Adj. R2 -.01 -.01 .05 .01 -.02 
Resid. SE 1.00 1.00 .97 1.00 1.01 
F Statistic (1, 47) .73 .66 3.71† 1.38 .11 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 49. Separate models 
predicting error in tone counting tasks and correlation between  the MFQ and the MFCT. Variables 
have been standardised. SE is provided in parentheses. 
 
Together, this suggests that while participants subjectively found doing both 
tasks together difficult, they also felt that their responses on the MFCT reflected their 
values. Participants generally performed poorly on the tone-counting task, with 17 
(35%) off the correct count by more than five tones for at least one block, and were, to 
an extent, aware of this poor tone-counting performance. 
6.1.3 Discussion 
If trade-offs in the MFCT are mostly the result of deliberated cognitive work, 
then increasing cognitive load should interfere with these processes and thus alter 
responses, affecting the correlation between the MFCT and the MFQ. We did not find 
support for this – there was no evidence of consistent effects of condition in our 
analyses. In particular, the correlation between the two measures did not significantly 
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differ in the divided attention condition, suggesting that increased cognitive load did 
not affect responses on the MFCT. This was further supported by a Bayes factor 
indicating moderate evidence for this null hypothesis. 
There are several possible explanations for no effect of condition. First, it may 
be the case that completing both tasks concurrently – the MFCT and the tone-counting 
task – was too difficult, and the emphasis placed on providing gut reactions on the 
MFCT meant that participants neglected the tone-counting task in favour of the MFCT, 
and thus may not have been sufficiently dividing their attention. The fact that 
participants gave high difficulty ratings in the divided attention condition and were 
notably inaccurate in counting tones may support this explanation. Thus, though the 
tone-counting task has been previously applied to effectively divide attention (Skitka et 
al., 2002), it may be that its application here did not work. 
An alternative explanation is that the divided attention manipulation did not 
affect response patterns because responses on the MFCT do not necessitate cognitive 
effort. Specifically, that participants are making responses based on their fast, intuitive 
moral intuitions, and thus the MFCT is indeed an effective measure of implicit 
foundation endorsement. To tease these explanations apart, an alternative cognitive 
load manipulation is applied in Study 3. 
Similar to Study 1, we found that, collapsed across condition, foundation 
rankings measured on the MFQ and emerging from the MFCT correlated at r (99) = .56. 
We also broadly replicated response time analyses, finding that differences in both 
MFQ and MFCT scores predicted response times, such that a greater difference was 
associated with faster reaction time, although again these effects are weak. Modelling 
RT and Ex-Gaussian parameters based on ranks apart on participants’ rank orderings, 
we replicated predicted effects, such that response time and τ, isolating conflict in 
decision-making, decreased with increasing ranks apart. However, as in Study 1, 
models of RT leave a large proportions of variance unexplained, and effects are 
relatively weak. Further exploration of RT on the MFCT will benefit from larger sample 
sizes, a limitation addressed in Study 5.  
Overall, these replications support an argument that the MFCT is reliably 
measuring foundation endorsement. 
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6.2 Study 3 
Study 3 aims to apply an alternate cognitive load manipulation, alcohol, to 
examine whether the response patterns on the MFCT are affected by availability of 
cognitive resources, with a load manipulation that is less vulnerable to poor participant 
performance. Data for this study was collected in conjunction with Kunders (2017), and 
analysed and submitted independently for a masters thesis. 
As in Study 2, we are interested in whether the relationship between the 
intuitive responses on the MFCT and explicit responses on the MFQ would be affected 
by increasing cognitive load during the MFCT. Specifically, if responses on the MFCT are 
merely noisy and fast deliberated judgments, we would expect that increasing cognitive 
load would reduce the correlation between MFCT and MFQ scores. We would also 
expect greater conflict under cognitive load as unsuppressed intuitions clash, indicated 
by longer response times, and greater τ values.  
However, rather than using a concurrent task to divide attention, we 
administered a dosage of alcohol. Several prior studies on social cognitive processes 
have used alcohol as a manipulation that inhibits deliberative processing, leaving 
automatic thought largely unaffected, including work on the control of prejudice-
related responses (Bartholow, Dickter, & Sestir, 2006) and automatic preferences for 
hierarchy (Van Berkel et al., 2015). Load participants were given an alcohol dosage 
before completing the MFCT, calculated to raise blood alcohol content (BAC) to a level 
at which attention and judgment begins to diminish. This level is based on 
classifications of the symptoms caused by ethanol's effects on the central nervous 
system into stages of influence that correlate with overlapping ranges of BAC 
(Dubowski, 1980). By using this alternative manipulation of attention, we aim to 
address the limitations to Study 2 that we may have found no effects of condition 
because participants were performing the concurrent task poorly and therefore not 
sufficiently dividing their attention. 
6.2.1 Method 
Participants 
Sample size was identified on a similar basis as Study 2. Ninety participants 
were recruited through university networks across two concurrent recruitment drives, 
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one of which indicated that participation would require the consumption of alcohol, 
therefore determining whether participants would participate in either the control or 
alcohol condition. We opted to recruit to condition as a means of managing ethical 
considerations around the consumption of alcohol in the lab that required participants 
in this condition to satisfy additional requirements and complete a separate consent 
form. Participants in the alcohol condition had to confirm that they met with 
requirements drawn from a previous study on the effects of alcohol on decision-making 
(Bregu, Deck, Ham, & Jahedi, 2017), which included having previous experience with, 
and no health conditions that precluded, the consumption of alcohol. The control and 
alcohol groups were compensated 3 GBP and 5.50 GBP respectively to reflect the time 
required to complete participation. All participants were required to be fluent English 
speakers. 
 Figure 6.12 shows a histogram of the distribution of RTs. A total of sixty-one 
trials (<.01%) were removed across 9 subjects as they did not meet the RT criteria 
applied for Study 1 and 2. One subject was removed because more than 10% of their 
trials were eliminated, leaving a total of 14,224 trials (MRT Control = 2187ms; SDRT Control = 
1238ms; MRT Alcohol = 2421ms; SDRT Alcohol = 1364ms). The final sample comprised 89 
participants (64% females, Mage = 23.76; SD = 4.53), with 43 participants in the control 
condition, and 46 in the alcohol condition.  
 
 
Figure 6.12. Distribution of RTs across all trials in Study 3. Grey reference lines indicate cut-off points 
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Measures and Procedure  
As in Study 1 and 2, all participants completed the MFQ and MFCT. However, 
unlike the previous studies, the MFQ was completed online, up to one week before 
participants arrived at the lab. Subscale reliabilities on the MFQ were judged to be 
acceptable for all foundations in Study 3 (s: care = .77; fairness = .73; authority = .72; 
loyalty = .73; purity = .83) with alphas for care and fairness being notably higher than 
in Study 1 (s: care = .38; fairness = .55; authority = .63; loyalty = .71; purity = .79) and 
Study 2 (s: care = .58; fairness = .55; authority = .67; loyalty = .68; purity = .79). The 
MFCT was completed in a lab setting. 
Alcohol condition 
Participants in the alcohol condition were required to complete additional 
questions online, which included specifying how often they consumed alcohol (Once a 
month or less / 2 to 4 times a month / 2 to 3 times a week / Four or more times a 
week), and how much they consumed per week (One to 14 units / 14 to 20 units / 
More than 20 units). In addition, alcohol participants were asked to provide their 
bodyweight in kilograms for dosage calculations.   
Alcohol doses comprised 1 part vodka to 3 parts mixer (lemonade). Doses were 
calculated to achieve .03 BAC, a level at which attention and judgment begins to 
diminish (Dubowski, 1980). Doses were calculated for each participant based on 
bodyweight, with a dose of .20g/kg for female and .25g/kg for male participants. The 
vodka used contained 7.41g of alcohol in every 25ml (1 unit), and participants 
consumed an average of 42.78ml (females) and 66.41ml (males) of vodka. 
Alcohol doses were consumed on arrival at the lab, and were followed by a 20 
minute period to allow the alcohol to take effect. Participants were then asked to 
complete the MFCT. 
6.2.2 Results 
For Study 3, we replicate analyses for Study 1 and 2, separating analyses into 
three main sections, first assessing the effects of the structure of the MFCT, before 
exploring correlations between the MFCT and MFQ, and RTs on the MFCT as indicators 
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of conflict in decisions between foundations. To address hypotheses for Study 3, we 
replicate the approach applied in Study 2, examining differences in correlations and RT 
across conditions. Finally, we consider participants’ alcohol consumption habits in the 
alcohol condition. 
Results from analyses pertaining to the properties of items and block structure 
were consistent with those in previous studies. Similar to Study 2, we did not find any 
evidence of consistent effects of condition across analyses, including no evidence for a 
difference between conditions in the correlation between the MFQ and MFCT.  
Structure of MFCT 
We largely replicated previous effects of item valence score and length, and 
interpret them similarly (see Appendix 2). 
Effect of blocks 
Analyses assessed whether condition and blocks on the MFCT had any effect on 
responses and RT patterns. As in Study 2, there was no main effect for condition, β = -
.001, p > .10, nor any significant interactions between condition, valence, or action, βs < 
|.002|, p > .10, on MFCT scores. Contrary to Study 2, there was a main effect of 
condition on RT, β = .25, p < .05, with longer RTs in the alcohol condition, and an 
interaction between condition and valence on RT, β = -.11, p < .01, with a larger 
difference in RTs between vice and virtue blocks in the alcohol condition. There was no 
evidence of an interaction for RT between condition and action, β = -.03, p > .10.  
There was a larger difference in choosing between individuating and binding 
foundations, β = -.42, p < .05, and marginally between care and fairness, β = -.21, p < .10, 
in the alcohol condition. Other interactions between condition and foundation were not 
significant, βs < .17, ps > .10, as were all other interactions including condition, βs < 
|.40|, ps > .10. 
As in Study 1 and 2, neither the valence, nor the action formulation of items, nor 
the interaction between valence and action had an evident effect on MFCT scores. 
However, the interaction between valence and action did affect RT, β = -.30, p = < 
.001.with passive items being faster in the virtue block. 
Also as in Study 1 and 2, there was a significant effect of foundation on MFCT 
scores, with binding foundations being chosen less, β = -.85, p < .001, and slower, β = 
CHAPTER 6: COGNITIVE LOAD 
 92 
.21, p < .001, than individualising foundations. As in previous studies, this likely reflects 
that, as students, most participants were likely to be liberal, prioritising individualising 
foundations. Further significant interactions between valence, action, and foundation 
can be seen in Table 6.12, Figure 6.13 and Figure 6.14. 
Table 6.12. MFCT score and RT by condition, blocks, and foundation for Study 3 
 Models 
 MFCT Score log RT 
Fixed effects   
    Intercept -.002 (.05) .16* (.08) 
    Condition (Alcohol v. Control) -.001 (.07) .25* (.11) 
    Valence (Virtue v. Vice) -.001 (.08) -.03 (.03) 
    Action (Passive v. Active) -.00 (.08) -.28*** (.03) 
    Foundation   
        Binding v. Individualising -.85*** (.13) .21*** (.05) 
        Fairness v. Care -.30*** (.09) .15*** (.03) 
        Loyalty v. Authority .25* (.10) -.13*** (.04) 
        Purity v. Authority -.46*** (.10) .16*** (.04) 
    Condition : Valence .001 (.11) -.11** (.04) 
    Condition : Action -.00 (.11) -.03 (.04) 
    Valence : Action .002 (.11) -.30*** (.04) 
    Condition : Foundation   
        Condition : Binding v. Individualising -.42* (.18) .10 (.07) 
        Condition : Fairness v. Care -.21† (.12) .05 (.04) 
        Condition : Loyalty v. Authority .17 (.14) .08 (.05) 
        Condition : Purity v. Authority .09 (.14) -.07 (.06) 
    Valence : Foundation   
        Valence : Binding v. Individualising -.38* (.19) .01 (.07) 
        Valence : Fairness v. Care .60*** (.12) -.12** (.04) 
        Valence : Loyalty v. Authority .21 (.14) .15** (.05) 
        Valence : Purity v. Authority .53*** (.14) -.20*** (.06) 
    Action : Foundation   
        Action : Binding v. Individualising -.48* (.19) .06 (.07) 
        Action : Fairness v. Care -.11 (.12) -.04 (.04) 
        Action : Loyalty v. Authority .10 (.14) .13* (.05) 
        Action : Purity v. Authority .23† (.14) -.20** (.06) 
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    Condition : Valence : Action < .001 (.15) .06 (.06) 
    Condition : Valence : Foundation   
        Condition : Valence : Binding v. Individualising .13 (.26) -.13 (.10) 
        Condition : Valence : Fairness v. Care .14 (.17) -.06 (.05) 
        Condition : Valence : Loyalty v. Authority -.28 (.19) -.02 (.08) 
        Condition : Valence : Purity v. Authority -.00 (.19) .07 (.08) 
    Condition : Action : Foundation   
        Condition : Action : Binding v. Individualising .19 (.26) -.05 (.10) 
        Condition : Action : Fairness v. Care .24 (.17) -.04 (.05) 
        Condition : Action : Loyalty v. Authority -.21 (.19) -.08 (.08) 
        Condition : Action : Purity v. Authority -.03 (.19) .06 (.09) 
    Valence : Action : Foundation   
        Valence : Action : Binding v. Individualising .75** (.27) -.25** (.10) 
        Valence : Action : Fairness v. Care -.15 (.17) .01 (.06) 
        Valence : Action : Loyalty v. Authority -.88*** (.20) -.18* (.08) 
        Valence : Action : Purity v. Authority -.61** (.20) .29*** (.08) 
    Condition : Valence : Action : Foundation   
        Condition : Valence : Action : Binding v. 
Individualising 
-.18 (.37) .07 (.14) 
        Condition : Valence : Action : Fairness v. Care -.25 (.24) .03 (.08) 
        Condition : Valence : Action : Loyalty v. Authority .40 (.27) .04 (.11) 
        Condition : Valence : Action : Purity v. Authority -.24 (.27) -.15 (.12) 
Random effects   
    By Subject - σ   
        Intercept < .001 .50 
    Residual .78 .82 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .39 / .39 .08 / .33 
LogLik -2,087 -17,538 
AIC 4,258 35,161 
BIC 4,488 35,478 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 1,780 (MFCT Score) and 
14,224 (log RT). Fixed and random effects for separate models predicting MFCT score and log RT. 
Outcome variables have been standardised. For RT model, foundation represents the foundation of 
the item chosen in a given trial. Planned contrasts for foundation compare individualising to binding 
foundations (with the former as the reference level), and then compare Care to Fairness (former as 
reference level), and Authority to Loyalty and Purity (Authority as reference level). For condition, 
valence and action: control, vice and active are reference levels. For fixed effects, SE is provided in 
parentheses. 
 




Figure 6.13. MFCT score (a, c) and RT (b, d) for control (a, b) and alcohol (c, d) conditions by valence 
block and foundation in Study 3. Error bars denote 95% CIs, corrected for within-subject designs 
based on Morey (2008). 
 
 
Figure 6.14. MFCT score (a, c) and RT (b, d) for control (a, b) and alcohol (c, d) conditions by action 
block and foundation in Study 3. Error bars denote 95% CIs, corrected for within-subject designs 
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Within-subject mean RTs and Ex-Gaussian parameters were fit for each block 
(see Table 6.13 and Figure 6.15). Contrary to Study 2, there were significant effects of 
condition on mean RT, β = .42, p < .05, and marginally on τ, β = .37, p < .10, but not on μ, 
β = .13, p > .10. RTs were longer in the alcohol condition, with greater τ, and thus 
increased conflict, that is not reflected in processing speed, or μ. There was an 
interaction between condition and valence on τ, β = -.42, p < .05, with a larger 
difference between choices on vice and virtue trials in the alcohol condition. All other 
interactions with condition were not significant, βs = |.38|, ps > .10. 
The interaction between valence and action again predicted mean RT, β = -.46, p 
< .001, and marginally for μ, β = -.33, p < .10, indicating faster processing speed for 
passive virtue items. As in Study 1, but contrary to Study 2, this interaction was not 
significant for τ, β = -.29, p > .10. 
Table 6.13. RT, μ and τ by condition and blocks for Study 3 
 Models 
 log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects    
    Intercept .16 (.14) .25† (.14) -.05 (.15) 
    Condition (Alcohol v. Control) .42* (.20) .13 (.20) .37† (.21) 
    Valence (Virtue v. Vice) -.02 (.09) -.05 (.14) .09 (.13) 
    Action (Passive v. Active) -.42*** (.09) -.43** (.14) -.08 (.13) 
    Condition : Valence -.17 (.12) .17 (.19) -.42* (.18) 
    Condition : Action -.04 (.12) -.10 (.19) -.04 (.18) 
    Valence : Action -.46*** (.12) -.33† (.20) -.29 (.18) 
    Condition : Valence : Action .10 (.17) -.09 (.27) .38 (.25) 
Random effects    
    By Subject - σ    
        Intercept .82 .68 .79 
    Residual .40 .64 .59 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .17 / .84 .14 / .60 .03 / .65 
LogLik -305 -420 -410 
AIC 630 860 840 
BIC 669 899 879 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 356. Fixed and random 
effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ and τ. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
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For condition, valence and action: control, vice and active are reference levels. For fixed effects, SE 
is provided in parentheses. 
 
 
Figure 6.15. Mean RT (a, d), μ (b, e) and τ (c, f) for control (a-c) and alcohol (d-f) by blocks. Error bars 
denote 95% CIs, corrected for within-subject designs based on Morey (2008). 
 
Consistent with Study 1 and 2, these analyses indicate that the block structure 
of the task impacts response patterns and RTs on the MFCT. For RT, it is quicker and 
easier to make choices between virtue and passive items. In contrast with Study 2, 
there were significant effects of condition on RT, with slower response, and some 
greater differences between blocks, in the alcohol condition. This can be interpreted as 
an indication of the success of the alcohol condition as a manipulation of cognitive load, 
as we would expect this to slow responses.  
As in Study 1 and 2, we assessed internal reliability of the full MFCT and for 
each block, collapsing across conditions. Table 6.14 shows split-half reliability 
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Table 6.14. Bootstrapped split-half reliability across blocks for Study 3 
 rBoot Bias 95% CI of r SE rBoot 
Study 3 (N = 89) 
    Full Task .82  .01  [.77 , .85]  .02  
    Vice .81  .00  [.77 , .86]  .02  
    Virtue .71  .06  [.58 , .72]  .04  
    Active .74  .07  [.61 , .72]  .03  
    Passive .83  -.04  [.81 , .93]  .03  
Note. Bootstrapped with 5,000 iterations. 
 
Correlating MFQ and MFCT Scores 
Mean responses and correlations across foundations are shown in Table 6.15. 
Correlations for all foundations were significant: care, r = .58, p <. 001, fairness, r = .38, 
p < .01, authority, r = .52, p < .001, loyalty, r = .36, p < .01, and purity, r = .59, p < .001. 
Table 6.15. Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations for Study 3 variables 
 M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Care-MFQ  3.69  .79  -         
2. Fairness-MFQ  3.82  .66  .51***  -        
3. Authority-MFQ  2.33  .79  -.03  -.22  -       
4. Loyalty-MFQ  2.38  .83  -.04  -.13  .65***  -      
5. Purity-MFQ  1.68  1.02  .16  -.18  .63***  .66***  -     
6. Care-MFCT  .68  .15  .58***  .26  -.30*  -.33*  -.23  -    
7. Fairness-MFCT  .62  .15  -.07  .38**  -.48***  -.47***  -.59***  .16  -   
8. Authority-MFCT  .40  .12  -.33*  -.21  .52***  .23  .17  -.41***  -.31*  -  
9. Loyalty-MFCT  .45  .12  -.26  -.21  .08  .36**  .11  -.48***  -.43***  .00  - 
10. Purity-MFCT  .35  .15  -.03  -.29*  .29†  .32*  .59***  -.42***  -.55***  -.10  .08  
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. MFQ scores are on a 0 to 5 scale, MFCT scores are 
on a 0 to 1 scale. p-values corrected for multiple comparisons (Bonferroni). Correlations between 
the same foundations on the MFQ and on the MFCT have been highlighted in bold. 
 
Kendall rank correlation coefficients between MFCT to MFQ responses, 
calculated for each participant, ranged from -.32 to 1.00, with a mean of r (89) = .61. To 
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assess stability, this estimate was bootstrapped to give an estimate of rBoot = .64 (SE 
rBoot = .03, 95% CI [.60, .74]). As in Study 2, there was no evidence for a difference 
between correlations in the control, r (43) = .56, and alcohol conditions, r (46) = .65, 
95% CI [-.25, .06] (see Table 6.16). 
As in Study 2, given this comparison is a crucial test of our hypotheses, we 
conducted further analysis to interpret non-significance conducting a non-parametric 
Mann–Whitney U test with a Bayes factor. Following van Doorn et al. (2020), we 
confirmed non-significance, U = 886.00, Z = -.85, p = .40, r = .09, and calculated a BF10 of 
.38, interpreted as weak evidence for the null hypothesis applying conventional cut-offs 
(Jeffreys, 1939/1961; Lee & Wagenmakers, 2014). 
 
Also, as in Study 1 and 2, there was no evident difference in correlations 
between vice and virtue blocks, 95% CI [-.19, .04], nor between the active and passive 
blocks, 95% CI [-.12, .10], with CIs that include 0 indicating non-significant difference 
between correlations (see Table 6.17). 
Table 6.17. Correlations between MFQ and MFCT scores across blocks for Study 3 
 Sample r rBoot Bias 95% CI of r SE rBoot 95% CI of Difference 
Study 3 (N = 89)  
    Full Task .61  .64  -.027  [.60, .74]  .031   
    Vice  .49  .45  .042  [.34, .47]  .035  
[-.19 , .04] 
    Virtue .56  .56  -.010  [.50, .63]  .035  
    Active .53  .54  -.010  [.47, .61]  .035  
[-.12 , .10] 
    Passive  .54  .50  .034  [.41, .54]  .035  
Note. Bootstrapped with 5,000 iterations. CIs are the Bias Corrected Accelerated (BCa) intervals 
 
Table 6.16. Correlations between MFQ and MFCT scores across conditions for Study 3 
 Sample r rBoot Bias 95% CI of r SE rBoot 95% CI of Difference 
Control (N = 43)  .56  .56  .010  [.43, .65]  .054  
[-.25 , .06] 
Alcohol (N = 46) .65  .64  .010  [.56, .71]  .038  
Note. Bootstrapped with 5,000 iterations. CIs are the Bias Corrected Accelerated (BCa) intervals 
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Replicating a correlation of similar magnitude from Study 1 and 2, these results 
indicate a 61% match between the order, or ranks, of foundation endorsement 
measured by the MFQ and foundation preference expressed in the MFCT, stable across 
all blocks of the task. Furthermore, and consistent with results from Study 2, the 
correlation between MFCT scores and MFQ scores was not lower in the alcohol 
condition and there was no significant difference between conditions. 
Predicting RT on the MFCT 
Exploratory analyses conducted in Study 1 and 2 were replicated to explore RT 
as an indicator of conflict. As in Study 2, condition was included as a predictor to test 
predictions that there will be greater conflict in the alcohol condition, apparent in 
longer RTs, and greater τ values.  
Difference in foundation scores predicting RT 
As in previous studies, separate multilevel models (see Table 6.18) were fit to 
predict RT from the difference between MFQ and MFCT scores, entered into the models 
as linear (x) and quadratic (x2) terms, predicting that RT will be highest when the 
difference is 0 and two foundations are equally valued, and that this effect would be 
non-linear. Figure 6.16 plots these quadratic regressions. 
Contrary to Studies 1 and 2, though the linear and quadratic terms in both 
models were in the predicted direction, they were not significant, βs < |.07|, ps > .10. As 
in Study 2, there were no significant effects of condition, nor any interactions between 
condition and any other terms in the models, βs < |.18|, ps > .10. 
Table 6.18. Predicting RT from condition and difference in MFQ and MFCT scores for Study 3 
 Models 
 log RT 
Fixed effects   
    Intercept .003 (.08) -.002 (.08) 
    Condition (Alcohol v. Control) .15 (.11) .18 (.12) 
    Difference in MFQ Scores -.07 (.05)  
    Difference in MFQ Scores2 -.01 (.01)  
    Condition : Difference in MFQ Scores .05 (.06)  
    Condition : Difference in MFQ Scores2 -.004 (.02)  
    Difference in MFCT Scores  -.04 (.04) 
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    Difference in MFCT Scores2  -.02 (.01) 
    Condition : Difference in MFCT Scores  .04 (.06) 
    Condition : Difference in MFCT Scores2  -.01 (.02) 
Random effects   
    By Subject - σ   
        Intercept .50 .51 
        Foundation Combination < .001 < .001 
        Valence < .001 < .001 
        Action .35 .34 
    Residual .79 .79 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .02 / .39 .02 / .39 
LogLik -17,998 -17,979 
AIC 36,018 35,981 
BIC 36,102 36,064 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 14,224. Fixed and 
random effects for separate models predicting log RT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
Quadratic models fit terms for difference in scores (x) and squared difference in scores (x2) between 
foundations in a trial. In order to preserve a minimum value of 0 interpretable as no difference 
between scores for the quadratic term, difference predictors in these models were scaled by SD 




Figure 6.16. Predicting RT for Study 3 with quadratic models for (a) difference in MFQ scores and (b)  
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Ranks apart predicting RT 
Figure 6.17 and Figure 6.18 show histograms for within-subject mean RTs, μ 
and τ calculated for ranks apart categories in each condition based on the MFQ and 
MFCT, respectively. 
As in previous studies, multilevel models were fit to predict RT, μ and τ from 
number of ranks apart, with a set of planned contrasts (Helmert coding) to test 
whether the former increases with fewer ranks apart. A total of 37 participants had 
equally scored foundations on the MFQ, and 14 on the MFCT, and as in Study 1 and 2, 
these were dropped from models.  
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Figure 6.18. Distribution of RT (a), μ (b) and τ (c) across MFCT rank apart categories in Study 3 
 
Ranks apart on MFQ 
As in Study 1 and 2, a trend of decreasing RT and τ, as the number of ranks 
apart increases, can be seen in Figure 6.19 (panels a and c).  
All comparisons were significant for mean RT, βs > .12, ps < .05, reflecting the 
downward trend as ranks apart increases (see Table 6.19). There was higher τ in one 
rank apart, β = .31, p < .01, and three ranks apart choices, β = .37, p < .05, relative to 
further apart choices, also suggesting a downward trend. This was not reflected in μ, βs 
< |.12|, ps > .10.  
As in previous RT analyses, there were main effects of condition on mean RT, β 
= .40, p < .10, and τ , β = .41, p < .05, and an interaction for μ, β = .34, p < .05, that can be 
seen in Figure 6.19 (panel b), with a downward trend in the alcohol, but not the control 
condition. There were no other evident interactions between condition and ranks 



























































































CHAPTER 6: COGNITIVE LOAD 
 103 
Ranks apart on MFCT 
Contrary to Study 1 and 2, the expected decreasing trend in RT and τ is weaker 
when ranks apart based on the MFCT (see Figure 6.20), compared to when these are 
based on the MFQ. Mean RT is higher for one rank apart choices, β = .18, p < .001, and 
marginally for two rank choices, β = .10, p < .10. However there were no effects for τ, βs 
> .17, ps < .10, nor for μ, βs < |.06|, ps > .10.  
There was a marginal main effects of condition, βs = .36, p < .10, for mean RT, 
but not for τ and μ, βs < .28, ps > .10, and no evidence of interactions between condition 
and rank apart for mean RT, τ, or μ, βs < |.26|, ps > .10. 
Table 6.19. Predicting RT, μ and τ from condition and ranks apart on the MFQ and MFCT for Study 3 
 Models 
 MFQ MFCT 
 log RT log μ log τ log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects       
    Intercept -.25† (.15) -.04 (.13) -.26* (.13) -.19 (.14) -.08 (.13) -.14 (.13) 
    Condition (Alcohol v. 
Control) 
.40† (.20) .06 (.18) .41* (.18) .36† (.20) .14 (.18) .28 (.18) 
    Ranks Apart       
        1 RA v. 2, 3, 4 
.24*** 
(.05) 
-.08 (.12) .31** (.11) 
.18*** 
(.05) 
.06 (.11) .14 (.11) 
        2 RA v. 3, 4 .12* (.06) .08 (.14) .10 (.13) .10† (.06) -.0002 (.12) .17 (.12) 
        3 RA v. 4 .16* (.08) .12 (.18) .37* (.17) .01 (.07) .06 (.15) .08 (.14) 
    Condition : Ranks Apart       
        Condition : 1 RA v. 2, 3, 4 -.07 (.07) .34* (.17) -.20 (.16) .01 (.07) .19 (.16) -.06 (.15) 
        Condition : 2 RA v. 3, 4 .11 (.08) -.002 (.19) .08 (.17) .10 (.08) .12 (.17) -.19 (.16) 
        Condition : 3 RA v. 4 -.02 (.10) -.19 (.24) -.09 (.23) .11 (.09) -.26 (.20) .16 (.20) 
Random effects       
    By Subject - σ       
        Intercept .93 .75 .77 .93 .76 .77 
    Residual .28 .65 .61 .29 .62 .61 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .05 / .92 .01 / .57 .06 / .64 .04 / .91 .02 / .61 .03 / .62 
LogLik -207 -386 -370 -227 -407 -402 
AIC 434 791 759 473 833 823 
BIC 472 829 796 512 871 862 
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Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 312 (MFQ) and 340 
(MFCT). RA – Ranks Apart. Fixed and random effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ and τ 
for ranks apart based on the MFQ and the MFCT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
Helmert coding compares each rank apart category to the mean of the subsequent categories. For 
condition: control is the reference level. For fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses. 
 
 
Figure 6.19. Condition and ranks apart on MFQ predicting RT (a), μ (b) and τ (c) for Study 3. Error bars 
denote 95% CIs, corrected for within-subject designs based on Morey (2008). 
 
 
Figure 6.20. Condition and ranks apart on MFCT predicting RT (a), μ (b) and τ (c) for Study 3. Error 
bars denote 95% CIs, corrected for within-subject designs based on Morey (2008). 
 
These analyses broadly replicate the noisy patterns found for Study 1 and 2, 
suggesting that foundations endorsement/preference is reflected in RTs on the MFCT. 
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choice were is based on the task itself, which is contrary to results in Study 2.  Figure 
6.19 and Figure 6.20 suggest higher τ in the alcohol condition, though this is only 
significant when ranks are based on the MFQ. 
Weighted ranks apart predicting RT 
As in Study 1 and 2, we implemented a number of analyses to weight choices 
between foundations by how much value is placed on them. As for Study 2, we report 
these analyses in full in Appendix 2 and include here models (see Table 6.20) 
implementing a bias term to weight number of ranks apart by the mean rank for 
foundations in a choice.  
As in Study 1 and 2, for ranks based on both MFQ and MFCT scores, RT is 
negatively predicted by mean rank, βs < -.06, ps < .01, and by number of ranks apart, βs 
< -.05, ps < .001, indicating that as the value, and the difference in value, of foundations 
in a choice increases, time to make the choice decreases. However, as in Study 1 and 2, 
there was no evidence of an interaction between these for ranks based on either MFQ 
or MFCT scores, βs < |.01|, ps > .10.  
There were marginal main effects of condition, βs > .18, ps < .10, and a small but 
significant three-way interaction between condition, mean rank, and ranks apart on the 
MFCT, β = -.05, p < .05 (see Figure 6.21 and Figure 6.22). No other interactions with 
condition were significant, βs < |.03|, ps > .10. 
Table 6.20. Predicting RT from condition, mean rank, and ranks apart on the MFQ and MFCT for Study 3 
 Models 
 log RT 
 MFQ MFCT 
Fixed effects   
    Intercept -.10 (.08) -.10 (.08) 
    Condition (Alcohol v. Control) .19† (.11) .18† (.11) 
    Mean Rank -.06** (.02) -.07*** (.02) 
    Ranks Apart -.06*** (.01) -.05*** (.01) 
    Condition : Mean Rank .01 (.02) -.03 (.02) 
    Condition : Ranks Apart .001 (.02) -.02 (.02) 
    Mean Rank : Ranks Apart -.003 (.02) .01 (.02) 
    Condition : Mean Rank : Ranks Apart .01 (.03) -.05* (.03) 
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Random effects   
    By Subject - σ   
        Intercept .49 .49 
        Foundation Combination < .001 < .001 
        Valence < .001 < .001 
        Action .35 .34 
    Residual .79 .80 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .01 / .38 .02 / .38 
LogLik -17,994 -17,969 
AIC 36,014 35,964 
BIC 36,113 36,062 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 14,224. Fixed and random 
effects for separate models predicting log RT. Outcome variables and predictors have been 
standardised. Mean rank calculated as mean(Rank1, Rank2), of reversed ranks, such that higher mean 
rank indicates more valued foundations. For condition: control is the reference level. For fixed effects, 
SE is provided in parentheses. 
 
 
Figure 6.21. Condition and (a) mean rank and (b) ranks apart on MFQ predicting RT for Study 3. Grey 
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Figure 6.22. Condition and (a) mean rank and (b) ranks apart on MFCT predicting RT for Study 3. Grey 
areas represent 95% CI boundaries. 
 
Alcohol Consumption 
Analyses explored whether participants’ alcohol consumption habits, 
specifically how often, and how much alcohol they consumed, might impact the 
previous analyses. 
Reporting how often they consumed alcohol, 23.9% of participants indicated 2 
to 3 times per week, 50.0% reported 2 to 4 times per month, and 19.6% once a month 
or less. One participant reported drinking more than four times per week, and was 
removed from subsequent analyses of alcohol consumption, but not from main 
analyses for this study. Most participants reported consuming less than 14 units per 
week (80.4%), with the remaining participants consuming less than 20 units.  
Non-parametric tests were used to explore whether correlations between the 
MFQ and MFCT, and response times and Ex-Gaussian parameters in completing the 
MFCT, differed based on consumption habits. Any differences may indicate that the 
alcohol condition differentially affected performance on the MFCT based on 
participants’ experience with alcohol. There were differences in participants’ 
correlations between the MFQ and MFCT based on how often they drank, Kruskal 
Wallis H(2) = 6.52, p < .05, with pairwise comparisons indicating lower correlations (p  
= .05) when participants reported consuming alcohol once a month or less (M = .43, SD 
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month (M = .73, SD = .22). However, there were no other significant pairwise 
comparisons (ps > .19). This suggests that participants who drank most infrequently 
were less consistent in their responses on the MFQ and the MFCT. There were no 
evident differences in correlations based on how many units were consumed per week, 
Wilcoxon W = 116.00, p > .10. Furthermore, there were no evident differences based on 
how often, RT: H(2) = 1.00, μ: H(2) = 2.34, τ: H(2) = .27, or how much, RT: W = 85.00, μ: 
W = 95.00, τ: W = 80.00 (all ps > .10), alcohol tended to be consumed on participants’ 
aggregate RTs and Ex-Gaussian parameters. 
6.2.3 Discussion 
As in Study 2, we found that a cognitive load manipulation – alcohol 
consumption – did not affect the correlation between foundation endorsement on the 
MFQ and the MFCT. This was somewhat supported by a Bayes factor indicating weak 
evidence for the null hypothesis of no difference between mean participant 
correlations across conditions. Unlike for Study 2, response times tended to be longer 
in the alcohol condition, enhancing confidence that this condition effectively increased 
load when completing the MFCT.  
Similar to previous studies, we found that, collapsed across condition, 
foundation rankings measured on the MFQ and emerging from the MFCT correlated at 
r (89) = .61. We also broadly replicated response time effects in the preceding studies, 
although again these effects are weak, with models of RT leaving large proportions of 
variance unexplained. We found that differences in both MFQ and MFCT scores 
predicted response times, such that a greater difference was associated with faster 
reaction time, and that response time and τ decreased with increasing ranks apart on 
participants’ rank orderings on the MFQ. We interpret this as further support that 
responses on the MFCT are based on intuitive moral responses, and thus the MFCT is 
indeed an effective measure of intuitive foundation endorsement that captures 
variance not explained by the MFQ. To further explore the reliability of responses on 
the MFCT, we will compare responses on the normal version of the task to a version in 
which participants are encouraged to deliberate their choices in Study 4. 
There are a number of limitations to this study. We hypothesised that, if 
responses on the MFCT are mostly the result of deliberated cognitive processes, then 
alcohol should interfere with this and reduce the correlation between the MFQ and 
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MFCT. As discussed, we did not find this to be the case. However, we did find that the 
most infrequent drinkers (once a month or less) did have lower correlations than those 
who drank more frequently (2 to 4 times a month). This finding is consistent with the 
above hypothesis, but is difficult to interpret, particularly as this pattern does not 
continue for more regular drinkers. We calculated alcohol dosage for each participant 
to achieve .03 BAC, a level at which cognitive impairment begins (Dubowski, 1980), but 
did not actually measure what BAC had been achieved for each participant, e.g. by using 
a breathalyser. This information might have aided interpretation and provided further 
support for the effectiveness of the alcohol manipulation. 
Furthermore, we opted to recruit to condition, rather than by random 
assignment as in Study 2, in order to manage ethical considerations around requiring 
participants to consume alcohol in the lab. Thus, the alcohol condition was advertised 
separately, and participants were required to have previous experience with alcohol, 
and no health conditions that precluded drinking alcohol. However, no such 
requirements were placed on participants in the control condition. This recruitment 
method introduces a potential confound to this study, that would have been alleviated 
by placing the same requirements across conditions to avoid a drinkers vs. non-
drinkers selection effect. In addition, participants in the alcohol condition participated 
for a longer period – around 40 minutes compared to around 20 minutes in the control 
condition – and therefore received a higher payment amount to reflect this. Here, we 
might have included a filler task in the control condition to avoid the limitations 
introduced by varied time and payment schemes across conditions. 
Based on these three studies, we argue that there is sufficient evidence to 
conclude that scores on the MFCT can be collapsed across the structural blocks, that 
vary the valence and action formulation of items in the MFCT. Though there are some 
block differences, particularly in RT, these are consistent and reliable across multiple 
applications of the task and fairly stable to manipulations of cognitive load. Thus, for 
the remaining studies, we have omitted block-related analyses from the text and report 
these in Appendices. Additionally, we have shown that several methods of analysing RT 
and Ex-Gaussian parameters yield similar results across multiple samples. Though 
none of these methods show strong results, they support our interpretation that the 
MFCT is weakly, but consistently, tracking conflict in decisions between foundations. 




7 Chapter 7: Deliberation on the Moral Foundations 
Conflict Task 
7.1 Study 4 
In Study 2 and 3, we explored whether associations between explicit moral 
endorsements on the MFQ, and fast, and arguably intuitive, choices on the MFCT are 
moderated by the availability of cognitive resources. These studies included conditions 
with a concurrent tone-counting task (Study 2) and alcohol (Study 3) as attention 
manipulations. In these studies, there was no evidence that the correlation between 
foundation preferences on the MFQ and on the MFCT was affected by cognitive load, 
suggesting that the MFCT provides a good measure of intuitive value endorsement. 
Including Study 1, and collapsing across conditions for Study 2 and 3, correlations 
between the MFQ and MFCT were observed at r (75) = .50, r (99) = .56, and r (89) = 
.61, respectively. 
This study explores whether this correlation will shift when the MFCT is 
completed with deliberation, rather than under load. We edited instructions for the 
task to encourage participants to employ deliberative cognitive effort in their 
responses, in order to compare these to speeded responses collected in previous 
studies, under instructions to make choices quickly based on gut responses.  
To increase rigour, we preregistered the sample size, exclusion criteria, 
and hypotheses regarding correlations (https://osf.io/wxv5t). As observed in previous 
studies, we predicted a positive correlation between foundation preference in the 
deliberated version of the MFCT and the MFQ. However, we did expect a small 
difference between this correlation and that observed for normal speeded versions of 
the MFCT, such that the former would be higher: participants encouraged to make 
deliberated and considered choices between foundations on the MFCT will make 
responses that more closely match their responses on the MFQ. 




We preregistered a target sample size of 130, with an intention to recruit up to 
150, assuming that not all participants would complete all measures or satisfy attention 
and compliance checks. This sample size was identified on the basis of a G*power 
analysis, ɑ = .05 and β = .20, for a small effect size (Cohen’s q = .30) for a test of 
differences between two independent correlations, comparing correlations in a 
deliberated version of the MFCT to previously collected control participants (N = 172) 
completing the normal version of the task from three previous studies (Study 1: N = 78; 
Study 2: N = 50; Study 3: N = 44). Assuming correlations of ~.50 in these versions, this 
is equivalent to an increase of .13 in Kendall rank correlation coefficient, predicting that 
correlations in the deliberated version will be ~.63. 
We preregistered a number of exclusion criteria, mostly consistent with those 
applied in previous studies. We excluded participants who did not complete the MFQ. 
For the MFCT, we removed RTs shorter than 400ms, interpreting these as key presses 
before stimulus is processed. Contrary to previous studies which applied a 15 second 
cut-off, we removed long RT trials, interpreted as lapses in attention, by calculating a 
double Median Absolute Deviance (MAD) for values above (right MAD) the median, 
excluding trials more than 3 right MADs above median RT. Furthermore, participants 
were removed if the above exclusion criteria for RT data eliminated more than 10% of 
their trials.  
Participants were also excluded if they: (1) answered with ‘somewhat disagree’, 
‘disagree’, or ‘strongly disagree’ to the attention check item: ‘It is better to do good than 
to do bad’, widely used in the MFQ (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2008; Graham et al., 
2011); or (2) did not answer ‘most of the time’ or ‘all of the time’ to any of three 
compliance check items – ‘I gave this survey my undivided attention while I was 
completing it’, ‘I sometimes just made random responses in order to get through this 
survey as quickly as possible’ (reverse-coded), and ‘I conscientiously attempted to 
follow instructions to the best of my ability’. 
We were able to recruit one hundred and twenty-two participants from the 
participant pool in the Psychology Department at the University of Edinburgh. This 
pool is made up of first year Psychology students, and was that was limited to less than 
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the target 150 total sample size by the size of the cohort for the 2018/19 academic 
year. All participants were current students, and received course credit for 
participation. Median RT was 1978ms – lower than might be expected, considering that 
participants were instructed to deliberate their responses. It was estimated that 
participation would last around 30 minutes, however median overall participant time 
was 12.1 minutes, suggesting than many participants may not have been sufficiently 
complying with instructions. 
Applying our preregistered criteria, a total of 71 participants (57% of full 
sample) were excluded: Four participants due to missing data; a further 19 failed 
attention and compliance checks; and the final 48 participants were removed as RT 
criteria eliminated more than 10% of their trials. A total of 2,673 trials (16.9%) were 
removed across 119 subjects. This left a final sample size of 51 participants, a minimum 
RT of 479ms and a maximum of 5,836ms, and a total of 7,788 trials (MRT Deliberation = 
2024ms; SDRT Deliberation = 1034ms). The same RT criteria applied to control data from 
previous studies removed 2,053 trials (7.5%) across 127 subjects of participants, with 
44 participants losing more than 10% of their trials (26% of full sample), leaving a final 
sample of 127 (Study 1: N = 52; Study 2: N = 39; Study 3: N = 36), and a total of 26,844 
trials (MRT Control = 1935ms; SDRT Control = 824ms). See Table 7.1 for summary of samples 
that will be used for preregistered analyses. Sample sizes reduced power to .55, to 
detect a small effect size (Cohen’s q = .30). A sensitivity test conducted in G*Power 
indicated a required medium effect size (Cohen’s q) of .42, given ɑ = .05, β = .20, and 
sample size.  
Table 7.1. Samples used for preregistered analyses in Study 4 
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Course credit 4 
Note. Exclusions based on preregistered criteria. 
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Comparing within-subject mean RTs, by first calculating a mean for each 
participant and then comparing the mean of these values across the conditions, there 
was no evidence for a difference between the deliberation (MWithin-subject RT Deliberation = 
2026ms, SDWithin-subject RT Deliberation = 371ms) and control samples (MWithin-subject RT Control = 
1942ms, SDWithin-subject RT Control = 382ms), Wilcoxon W = 3588.00, p > .10. We would have 
expected that participants completing the deliberated version of the task would take 
longer to complete it. It is likely that, because a large portion of participants may not 
have been sufficiently complying with instructions to deliberate over their responses, 
the preregistered RT exclusion criteria based on double MAD actually served to 
eliminate longer RTs, and thus cases where participants were more likely to have been 
complying. 
To address this, we will run exploratory analyses with samples applying the 15 
second cut-off to longer RTs used in previous studies (see Table 7.2). In these samples, 
RT was longer in the deliberation (MWithin-subject RT Deliberation = 2725ms, SDWithin-subject RT 
Deliberation = 808ms) versus control sample (MWithin-subject RT Control = 2374ms, SDWithin-subject RT 
Control = 798ms), W = 9054.00, p < .05. Power achieved with this sample size is .72 to 
detect a small effect size. Here, a sensitivity test indicated a required effect size of .34. 
Table 7.2. Samples used for exploratory analyses in Study 4 
 



















3 GBP 1, 2, 3 








Course credit 4 
Note. Exclusions applying a 15 second cut-off for longer RTs instead of the preregistered 
criteria of more than 3 right MADs above median RT. Other preregistered exclusion 
criteria were maintained. 
 
Measures and Procedure 
All participants completed the MFQ and MFCT in randomised order. However, 
unlike the previous studies, participants completed both online.  
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Contrary to the normal speeded version of the MFCT used in Studies 1, 2 and 3, 
in which participants are instructed to make choices quickly based on gut feeling, the 
deliberated version of the MFCT instructed participants to take time to deliberate and 
make choices as accurately as they can. 
For the preregistered sample, subscale reliabilities for the deliberation sample 
(N = 51) on the MFQ were care ( = .71), fairness ( = .62), authority ( = .73), loyalty 
( = .63), and purity ( = .75). For the combined control sample (N = 127), reliabilities 
were care ( = .60), fairness ( = .61), authority ( = .66), loyalty ( = .67), and purity 
( = .78).  
For the larger exploratory samples, reliabilities on the MFQ were care ( = .72), 
fairness ( = .62), authority ( = .72), loyalty ( = .62), and purity ( = .74) for the 
deliberated version (N = 85); and care ( = .59), fairness ( = .62), authority ( = .65), 
loyalty ( = .67), and purity ( = .80) for the combined control sample (N = 168). 
All the above subscale reliabilities were judged to be acceptable, and were of 
similar magnitudes to those in previous studies (care = .38 < s < .77; fairness = .55 < 
s < .73; authority = .63 < s < .72; loyalty = .68 < s <  .73; purity = .79 < s <  .83). 
7.1.2 Results 
We separate results into preregistered analyses conducted on samples outlined 
in Table 7.1, and exploratory analyses applied to samples in Table 7.2. Preregistered 
analyses will test hypotheses regarding associations between responses in the MFCT 
and MFQ scores. Exploratory analyses will repeat these analyses. Models exploring 
differences in response or RT patterns across blocks on the MFCT, and RTs on the 
MFCT as indicators of conflict in decisions between foundations are reported in 
Appendix 3. 
In contrast with our hypothesis, we found no evidence for a difference between 
control and deliberation conditions in either the preregistered or exploratory analyses 
reported below. However, as discussed above and below in the discussion of this study, 
there are a number of substantial limitations to our deliberation manipulation that 
hinder interpretation of these results. Correlations between MFQ and MFCT foundation 
preferences were of similar magnitudes to that observed in previous studies, adding 
convergent support that this is a stable relationship.  
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Preregistered analysis 
 Correlating MFQ and MFCT 
Mean responses on the MFQ and the MFCT for the deliberated version of the 
task, are shown in Table 7.3, along with correlations. The correlations for care, r = .59, p 
<. 001, authority, r = .67, p < .001, and loyalty, r = .60, p < .001 are significant, with 
marginal significance for purity, r = .38, p < .10, however this was not the case for 
fairness, r = .31.  
Kendall rank correlation coefficients between deliberated MFCT and MFQ 
responses, calculated for each participant, ranged from -.32 to 1.00, and between -.74 
and 1.00 for the control. There was no evidence for a difference between correlations in 
the control, r (127) = .52, and deliberation versions of the MFCT, r (51) = .59, 95% CI [-
.07, .20] (see Table 7.4). Cohen’s q for a difference between these correlations is 
calculated to be .18, a small effect if present, and far lower than the required effect size 
of .42 indicated by a sensitivity test. 
Table 7.3. Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations for preregistered deliberated sample 
 M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Care-MFQ  3.82  .71           
2. Fairness-MFQ  3.88  .56  .54***          
3. Authority-MFQ  2.39  .81  -.20  -.15         
4. Loyalty-MFQ  2.60  .79  -.19  -.01  .63***        
5. Purity-MFQ  2.06  .86  -.11  -.19  .74***  .49**       
6. Care-MFCT  .75  .15  .59***  .24  -.49**  -.47**  -.28      
7. Fairness-MFCT  .56  .14  .14  .31  -.38*  -.32  -.58***  .00     
8. Authority-MFCT  .39  .10  -.43*  -.20  .67***  .39*  .43*  -.62***  -.22    
9. Loyalty-MFCT  .48  .10  -.19  -.21  .25  .60***  .32  -.44*  -.36†  .15   
10. Purity-MFCT  .32  .13  -.35  -.31  .28  .15  .38†  -.36†  -.64***  .07  .05  
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. MFQ scores are on a 0 to 5 scale, MFCT scores are 
on a 0 to 1 scale. p-values corrected for multiple comparisons (Bonferroni). Correlations between 
the same foundations on the MFQ and on the MFCT have been highlighted in bold. 
 
As in Study 2 and 3, we conducted a non-parametric Mann–Whitney U test with 
a Bayes factor to help interpret non-significance. This confirmed non-significance, U = 
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2956.00, Z = -.91, p = .40, r = .09, and with a Bayes factor, BF10 = .23, indicating 
moderate evidence for the null (Jeffreys, 1939/1961; Lee & Wagenmakers, 2014; van 
Doorn et al., 2020) 
Table 7.4. Correlations between MFQ and MFCT scores across preregistered versions of the MFCT 
for Study 4 
 Sample r rBoot Bias 95% CI of r SE rBoot 95% CI of Difference 
Control (N = 127)  .52  .53  -.016  [.48, .62]  .035  
[-.07, .20] 
Deliberation (N = 51) .59  .63  -.039  [.57, .74]  .046  
Note. Bootstrapped with 5,000 iterations. CIs are the Bias Corrected Accelerated (BCa) intervals 
 
These results show the predicted positive correlation between the deliberated 
version of the MFCT and the MFQ, of similar magnitude to that observed in previous 
studies. Contrary to our second prediction, there is no evidence for a difference 
between this correlation and that observed for normal speeded versions of the MFCT. 
However, this comparison was under-powered (1 – β = .55). Preregistered exclusion 
criteria reduced sample size more than expected, likely an indication that participants 
were not properly complying with instructions, and that the chosen criteria may 
instead serve to exclude longer trials on which participants were, in fact, complying 
with instructions to deliberate carefully over their responses.  
To explore, this we will replicate the above analyses, applying instead the 15 
second cut-off to longer RTs used in previous studies, and reported as exploratory 
below. 
Exploratory analysis 
Correlating MFQ and MFCT 
As above, mean responses and correlations for the deliberated version of the 
task are shown in Table 7.5. The correlations for care, r = .50, p <. 001, fairness, r = .36, 
p < .01, authority, r = .57, p < .001, loyalty, r = .57, p < .001 and purity, r = .38, p < .01, 
were all significant. 
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Table 7.5. Descriptive statistics an Pearson correlations for exploratory deliberated sample 
 M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Care-MFQ  3.79  .69           
2. Fairness-MFQ  3.84  .54  .64***          
3. Authority-MFQ  2.41  .80  -.19  -.11         
4. Loyalty-MFQ  2.57  .75  -.12  .05  .61***        
5. Purity-MFQ  2.13  .84  -.11  -.14  .69***  .50***       
6. Care-MFCT  .74  .14  .50***  .26  -.42***  -.40**  -.30*      
7. Fairness-MFCT  .55  .14  .19  .36**  -.43***  -.29†  -.47***  .15     
8. Authority-MFCT  .40  .12  -.39**  -.27  .57***  .24  .34*  -.62***  -.40**    
9. Loyalty-MFCT  .46  .10  -.16  -.16  .23  .57***  .23  -.37**  -.39**  .02   
10. Purity-MFCT  .34  .12  -.31*  -.32*  .25  .12  .38**  -.46***  -.60***  .20  .05  
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. MFQ scores are on a 0 to 5 scale, MFCT scores are 
on a 0 to 1 scale. p-values corrected for multiple comparisons (Bonferroni). Correlations between 
the same foundations on the MFQ and on the MFCT have been highlighted in bold. 
 
Kendall rank correlation coefficients between the deliberated MFCT and MFQ 
ranged from -.40 to 1.00, and between -.89 and 1.00 for the control. There was again no 
evidence for a difference between correlations in the control, r (168) = .52, and 
deliberation versions of the MFCT, r (85) = .57, 95% CI [-.06, .16] (see Table 7.6). 
Cohen’s q for a difference between these correlations is calculated to be .12, a smaller 
effect size than for preregistered versions. Though closer to adequate power (.80), this 
comparison was also under-powered (1 – β = .71).  
A non-parametric Mann–Whitney U test confirmed non-significance, U = 
6671.00, Z = -.86, p = .40, r = .09, and with a Bayes factor, BF10 = .18, indicating 
moderate evidence for the null (Jeffreys, 1939/1961; Lee & Wagenmakers, 2014; van 
Doorn et al., 2020). 
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Table 7.6. Correlations between MFQ and MFCT scores across exploratory versions of the MFCT for 
Study 4 
 Sample r rBoot Bias 95% CI of r SE rBoot 95% CI of Difference 
Control (N = 168)  .52  .51  .016  [.42, .55]  .030  
[-.06 , .16] 
Deliberation (N = 85) .57  .57  .001  [.50, .64]  .037  
Note. Bootstrapped with 5,000 iterations. CIs are the Bias Corrected Accelerated (BCa) intervals 
 
7.1.3 Discussion 
In this study, we attempt to test assumptions that the MFCT is an intuitive level 
of measurement by testing whether associations between it and the MFQ shift when 
choices were deliberated. To this effect, we sought to manipulate cognitive attention in 
the opposite direction to that in Studies 2 and 3, where the MFCT is completed under 
load. Specifically, we expected that participants encouraged to deliberate and carefully 
consider choices on the MFCT, thus engaging reflective processes, would make 
responses that more closely matched their responses on the MFQ. We predicted a small 
effect for a test of difference between this version of the MFCT, and the standard 
version of the task used in previous studies, predicting that correlations for the former 
would be higher. However, we found no such evidence for a difference, with Bayes 
factors in both a pre-registered and exploratory sample indicating moderate evidence 
for the null. 
Associations between foundation preferences on the MFCT and MFQ were of 
similar magnitude (preregistered sample: r (51) = .57; exploratory sample: r (85) =  
.59) to that observed in previous studies, adding convergent support that this is a 
stable relationship. However, there are a number of substantial limitations to this study 
that hinder any further interpretation. In particular, fast overall times to complete the 
deliberated version of the task suggest that it is unlikely that participants were 
complying with instructions to deliberate (despite reporting to be doing so in 
compliance checks), and thus that our manipulation likely failed. Due mostly to 
expectations that responding to the deliberated version of the task would take longer, 
our preregistered exclusion criteria eliminated a large portion of participants, and thus 
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our comparison was under-powered (1 – β = .55). When we applied less stringent RT 
criteria, though closer to adequate power (.80), this comparison remained under-
powered (1 – β = .71). 
There are a number of explanations for why our manipulation might have 
failed. The deliberated sample was collected online, in contrast to previous lab-based 
samples. Whilst replicating the stable association between the MFCT and MFQ in this 
study suggests that the MFCT may operate reliably online, this may have been 
inappropriate for this kind of manipulation of attention. Future studies that deliver this 
or similar manipulations in the lab may have more success. Furthermore, the task 
entails 160 choices between foundations, and therefore making each of these carefully 
is cognitively demanding. Thus, participants may be defaulting to intuitive responding, 
regardless of any instructions not to do so. To improve on this methodological 
limitation and encourage deliberation, we might have implemented a time window for 
each choice in the MFCT (e.g. 15 seconds), not permitting participants to respond 
before this time had elapsed. Furthermore, future work exploring links between 
cognitive style variables, such as need for cognition, and individual consistency 
between intuitive MFCT and explicit MFQ responses may present an alternative way of 
getting at this question. However, we turn away from this in Study 5, instead exploring 





8 Chapter 8: Predicting correlates of the Moral 
Foundations Questionnaire 
8.1 Introduction 
Studies 1 to 4 indicate that the MFCT, as a novel measure of fast intuitive 
choices between moral foundations, correlates reliably with the MFQ, an established 
measure of foundation endorsement, and hence increase confidence in the MFCT’s 
concurrent validity (Murphy & Davidshofer, 1988). We have found that they correlate 
at .50 < r < .61. One explanation of this magnitude of correlation is that the MFCT 
presents a noisy measure of foundation endorsement that is better measured by the 
MFQ. Another explanation is that, rather than merely noisily reflecting MFQ scores, the 
MFCT captures systematic, non-overlapping variance in foundation endorsement. In 
Study 5, we aim to distinguish between these two explanations by investigating 
whether responses on the MFCT predict established correlates of the MFQ.  
8.1.1 Correlates of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire 
The pragmatic validity of MFT, and the moral pluralism it theorises, have been 
argued for on the basis that MFT has produced a wealth of novel empirical findings 
(Graham et al., 2013). These findings include work on political ideology (Franks & 
Scherr, 2015; Frimer, Biesanz, Walker, & MacKinlay, 2013; Graham, 2010; Graham et 
al., 2009; Graham et al., 2012; Graham et al., 2011; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt et al., 
2009), political attitudes (Barnett & Hilz, 2018; Barnett, Öz, & Marsden, 2018; Dawson 
& Tyson, 2012; Day, Fiske, Downing, & Trail, 2014; Dickinson, McLeod, Bloomfield, & 
Allred, 2016; Federico et al., 2013; Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012; Kugler et 
al., 2014; Leone, Giacomantonio, & Lauriola, 2019; Low & Wui, 2016; Malka et al., 2016; 
McAdams et al., 2008; Milesi, 2016; Silver & Silver, 2017; Vainio & Mäkiniemi, 2016; 
Van de Vyver et al., 2016; Van Leeuwen & Park, 2009; Vecina & Chacon, 2019; Vecina & 
Pinuela, 2017), cross-cultural differences (Alsheddi, Russell, & Hegarty, 2019; Bulbulia, 
Osborne, & Sibley, 2013; Doğruyol et al., 2019; Iurino & Saucier, 2020; Matsuo, 
Sasahara, Taguchi, & Karasawa, 2019; Milesi, 2017; Nilsson & Erlandsson, 2015; Yilmaz 
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& Saribay, 2017a), and a number of other constructs (Bulbulia et al., 2013; Hirsh, 
Deyoung, Xiaowen, & Peterson, 2010; Koleva, Selterman, Iyer, Ditto, & Graham, 2014; 
Lewis & Bates, 2011; Nilsson, Erlandsson, & Västfjäll, 2016; O'Grady & Vandegrift, 
2019). This breadth of empirical applications provides convergent and discriminant 
validity for MFT. 
Although MFT is fundamentally an intuitionist account of morality and despite a 
number of other methods developed to test MFT, the MFQ (Graham et al., 2011) as a 
self-report survey measure, has been most widely applied (Graham et al., 2013). Within 
the empirical work cited above, foundation endorsement on the MFQ has been 
correlated with left-right political orientation (Franks & Scherr, 2015; Graham et al., 
2009; Graham et al., 2012; Graham et al., 2011), as well as a number of political and 
social attitudes including authoritarianism and social dominance orientation (Federico 
et al., 2013; Kugler et al., 2014; McAdams et al., 2008; Van Leeuwen & Park, 2009), 
prejudice (Van de Vyver et al., 2016), sexism (Vecina & Chacon, 2019; Vecina & Pinuela, 
2017), and attitudes towards the poor (Low & Wui, 2016), rape (Barnett & Hilz, 2018), 
homosexuality (Barnett et al., 2018), and climate change (Dawson & Tyson, 2012; 
Dickinson et al., 2016; Vainio & Mäkiniemi, 2016). In addition, foundation endorsement 
on the MFQ has been correlated with a number of other constructs and behaviours, 
including personality traits (Hirsh et al., 2010; Lewis & Bates, 2011), attachment style 
(Koleva et al., 2014), charitable giving (Nilsson et al., 2016; O'Grady & Vandegrift, 
2019), and religious orientation (Bulbulia et al., 2013).  
Political orientation 
Of these many and varied correlates, left-right political orientation remains the 
most widely replicated, and what MFT is best known for (Graham et al., 2013). Initially 
developed to explain variation in virtue concepts across cultures (Haidt & Joseph, 
2004) building on previous work in this domain (Shweder, 1990; Shweder et al., 1997; 
Turiel et al., 1991), MFT was not developed to account for ideological differences. 
However, the list of foundations mapped cleanly and easily to explain disagreement in 
the ‘culture wars’ between US liberals and conservatives, and MFT’s first empirical 
findings explains this intractability in moral disputes as a function of differences in 
foundation endorsement (Haidt & Graham, 2007). Restating these differences, liberals 
endorse the individualising moral foundations of care and fairness, focusing on moral 
concern for individuals, more strongly than the binding foundations of authority, 
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loyalty, and purity, focusing on moral concern for groups. Conservatives, on the other 
hand, value foundations relatively equally. These systematic ideological differences in 
foundation endorsement (Franks & Scherr, 2015; Graham et al., 2009; Graham et al., 
2012; Graham et al., 2011) have been widely captured by the MFQ (Graham et al., 
2011), and though there are some contexts in which they do not replicate (Davis et al., 
2016), have been observed across cultures (Graham et al., 2009; Milesi, 2016, 2017; 
Nilsson & Erlandsson, 2015; Van Leeuwen & Park, 2009).   
Conservative morality and critiques 
On the basis of core differences in foundation endorsement, liberal-
conservative moral disagreement occurs because conservatives value moral 
foundations that liberals do not. Thus, reconciling the moral intractability between 
ideological camps would require liberals to recognise moral foundations (i.e. binding 
foundations) that they do not value, but which are important for conservatives (Haidt, 
2015). According to Haidt (2015), liberals are ‘moral monists’, with a narrower 
morality than that of conservatives. As an extension of this, scientific understanding of 
morality has focused too narrowly on ‘liberal’ values aligned with classic approaches to 
moral psychology in Kohlberg’s (1971, 1973) ethics of justice and Gilligan’s (1982) 
ethics of care (Haidt & Graham, 2007, 2009; Haidt et al., 2009). In contrast, MFT defines 
morality in a way that “does not exclude conservative and non-Western concerns’’ 
(Graham et al., 2009, p.1030). 
This effort to broaden scientific conceptions of morality has been met with 
criticism that centres on the status of binding foundations as ‘moral’. Here, critics argue 
that though MFT presents itself as a descriptive theory about the content of people’s 
moral concerns, it makes clear normative prescriptions about what should be 
considered as moral (Jacobsin, 2008; Jost, 2012; Kugler et al., 2014), and can be 
situated in a wider agenda to incorporate conservative ideas in social psychology 
(Duarte et al., 2015; Tetlock, 2012). On this basis, there is a need to scrutinise the 
validity of the conservative ‘morality’ packaged in the binding foundations.  
Kugler et al. (2014) argue that the, supposedly ‘moral’, binding foundations are 
manifestations of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation 
(SDO), two established dimensions that predict conservatism (Adorno, Frenkel-
Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Altemeyer, 1996, 1998; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 
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2009; Jost et al., 2003; Jost, West, & Gosling, 2009; Napier & Jost, 2008; Pratto, Sidanius, 
Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996; 
Stone & Smith, 1993). This is predicated by decades of work showing associations 
between RWA and SDO, both separately and in conjunction, with a number of 
unsavoury social and political attitudes, including ingroup favouritism, sexism, racism, 
classism, homophobia, prejudice, discrimination against disadvantaged groups, and 
punishment of social deviants (Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1996, 1998; Duckitt, 
2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; McFarland, 2010; Napier & Jost, 2008; Sidanius & Pratto, 
1999; Sidanius et al., 1996; Whitley Jr & Lee, 2000; Wilson & Sibley, 2013). On this 
basis, Kugler et al. (2014) argue for scientific grounds for doubting MFT claims that 
binding foundations should be considered as ‘moral values’.  
RWA, SDO and binding foundations 
Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) is broadly conceptualised as a personality 
dimension comprised of a preference for strong leaders and deference to authorities, 
respect for the social conventions endorsed by authorities, and hostility toward 
outgroup members and those who violate social conventions (Altemeyer, 1996, 1998). 
Social dominance orientation (SDO), on the other hand, is a personality dimension 
comprised of a preference for group-based inequality and dominance versus equality 
and inclusion (Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).  
A number of studies have found associations between foundation endorsement 
on the MFQ, and RWA and SDO. McAdams et al. (2008) found that themes relating to 
loyalty, authority, and purity were significantly more common in the narratives of 
individuals who scored high (vs. low) on RWA and, to a lesser extent, SDO. Federico et 
al. (2013) observed that endorsement of loyalty, authority, and purity on the MFQ were 
strongly correlated with RWA – along with other measures of preferences for openness 
versus social conformity (i.e. dangerous-world beliefs) – while endorsement of care 
and fairness were negatively correlated with SDO, and other measures of preference 
for equality versus inequality (i.e. competitive-jungle beliefs). Hadarics and Kende 
(2017) replicated these associations, showing that RWA correlates positively, and SDO 
negatively, with binding and individualising foundations. In a large representative 
sample, Milojev et al. (2014) found that RWA and SDO were both positively correlated 
with the endorsement of loyalty, authority, and purity, while SDO was negatively 
correlated with the endorsement of care and fairness. Furthermore, Van Leeuwen and 
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Park (2009) found that RWA, SDO, and endorsement of binding foundations share 
psychological antecedents, such as perceptions of a dangerous world, consistent with 
conceptions of political conservatism as motivated social cognition (Jost et al., 2003; 
Wright & Baril, 2013). 
To this effect, Kugler et al. (2014) found that liberal-conservative differences in 
foundation endorsement are partially attributable to, i.e. mediated by, differences in 
RWA and SDO. In a combined student and online sample (total N = 351), Kugler et al. 
(2014) fit a mediation model (see Figure 8.1) showing that liberal-conservative 
differences in endorsement of the binding foundations of loyalty (labelled as ingroup 
loyalty), authority (obedience to authority), and purity is mediated by positive 
associations with RWA and, in part, with SDO, and is thus attributable to the fact that 
conservatives tend to be higher than liberals on these dimensions. Furthermore, 
liberal-conservative differences in endorsement of the individualising foundations of 
care (harm avoidance) and fairness is attributable to the fact that liberals tend to be 
lower than conservatives on social dominance orientation.  
Figure 8.1. Mediation model from Kugler et al. (2014, p.423) illustrating that RWA and SDO mediate 
the relationship between political orientation and moral foundations. Path coefficients are 
standardised regression coefficients of a trimmed path model. Broken lines indicate non-significant 
paths at p < .05. 
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8.1.2 The present study 
Measuring foundation endorsement on the MFQ, previous literature has found 
that: (a) liberals score high in the two individualising foundations (care and fairness) 
and low in the three binding foundations (authority, loyalty and purity), whereas 
conservatives score highly across all five; (b) RWA positively correlates with the 
endorsement of binding concerns; and (c) SDO positively correlates with endorsement 
of binding foundations and negatively with the endorsement of individualising 
foundations. Furthermore, Kugler et al. (2014) found that liberal-conservative 
differences in foundation endorsement are partially mediated by RWA and SDO.  
We seek to replicate the mediation model fit by Kugler et al. (2014) that sets 
foundation endorsement measured by the MFQ in a framework that examines their 
empirical connections to political orientation, RWA, and SDO, as three key correlates 
crucial to debates about moral foundations. In particular, we seek to explore whether 
these structured empirical connections are replicated with response patterns on the 
MFCT, and if foundation endorsement on the MFCT might capture unique variance with 
these correlates, over and above the MFQ. 
It is not our intention here to speak directly to the outlined debate on the 
nature and status of binding foundations. However, we argue that exploration into the 
structure and nature of moral foundations is hindered by the reliance on the MFQ as a 
self-report measure. As highlighted by Jost (2012), a ‘conservative’ moral profile on the 
MFQ is characterised with high agreement, and answering ‘yes’, on all items. This opens 
the MFQ up to the criticism that conservative patterns of responding are driven by a 
greater acquiescence bias, linked to more intuitive thinking (Knowles & Condon, 1999). 
Therefore, liberal-conservative differences on the MFQ may merely result from 
differences in propensities for analytic thought (Yilmaz & Saribay, 2017a), related to 
wider ideological differences in epistemic motives (Jost et al., 2003). The MFCT is 
robust to this methodological critique, measuring foundation endorsement by how 
often foundations are chosen when in conflict with other foundations. Furthermore, we 
have found no evidence that the MFCT is affected by manipulations of cognitive load 
(see Chapter 6), and thus it may be better adapted to probe questions regarding liberal-
conservative differences. 
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Hypotheses 
In this study, as in previous, we will measure foundation endorsement on both 
the MFQ and the MFCT. Alongside this, we will also include measures of political 
orientation, RWA, and SDO. We preregistered sample size, exclusion criteria, 
and hypotheses (https://osf.io/nbwz4). We predicted a positive correlation between 
the MFCT and MFQ, of similar magnitude to that observed in previous studies. We also 
predicted, with small effects as in previous studies, greater conflict in decisions 
between closely-valued foundations, as measured by raw RT scores and fitted τ 
parameters (but not necessarily μ parameters).  
With correlates, we hypothesised that: higher conservatism would be weakly 
negatively correlated with MFQ and MFCT scores for individualising foundations (care 
and fairness) and moderately positively correlated with binding scores (authority, 
loyalty and purity); social dominance would be moderately negatively correlated with 
individualising scores and moderately positively correlated with binding scores; and 
authoritarianism would be moderately to strongly positively correlated with binding 
scores. We also expected to replicate Kugler et al. (2014), with the effect of political 
orientation on MFQ scores and MFCT scores mediated by social dominance and 
authoritarianism. We did not have specific predictions about whether this mediation 
will be stronger for MFCT scores compared to MFQ scores. 
Finally, we expected that higher conservatism would predict: lower consistency 
in associations between MFQ scores and MFCT scores; and higher average RT and τ 
values in the task indicating greater levels of conflict.  
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8.2 Study 5 
8.2.1 Method 
Participants 
We preregistered a target sample size of 700, with an intention to recruit up to 
850, assuming that not all participants would complete all measures or satisfy attention 
and compliance checks. This sample size was identified to double the sample size (N = 
351) used by Kugler et al. (2014).  
A total 854 participants were recruited online (prolific.ac) and were required to 
be UK residents, over 18 years of age, and native English speakers – only those who 
met these criteria were able to access the study. Participants were compensated £1.85.  
In line with preregistered criteria, 90 participants were removed due to missing 
data, and a further 32 failed attention and compliance checks (as applied in Study 4). As 
data was collected online, we expected higher numbers of error trials than in previous 
lab-based studies. Therefore, we calculated Median Absolute Deviance (MAD) for 
values below the median (left MAD = 391ms), excluding trials more than 3 left MADs 
below median RT (1550ms) to give a lower threshold of 377ms. In line with previous 
studies, we excluded RT trials longer than 15 seconds (not based on MAD above 
median as this clips RT distribution tails and limits Ex-Gaussian analyses). A total of 
1864 trials (1.4%) were removed across 129 subjects. A further 32 subjects were 
removed because more than 10% of their trials were eliminated, leaving a total of 
111,709 trials (MRT = 1843ms; SDRT = 1043ms). Figure 8.2Figure 5.1 shows a histogram 
of the distribution of RTs across all trials. The final sample consisted of seven hundred 
participants (61% females; Mage = 37.50; SDage = 12.06).  
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Figure 8.2. Distribution of RTs across all trials in Study 5. Grey reference lines indicate cut-off points 
of 377ms and 15,000ms. 
  
Measures and Procedure 
Participants completed five main measures online in randomised order. This 
included the MFQ and MFCT. Subscale reliabilities for the MFQ were judged to be 
acceptable – care ( = .62), fairness ( = .65), authority ( = .79), loyalty ( = .73), and 
purity ( = .81) – and were of similar magnitudes to those in previous studies (care = 
.38 < s < .77; fairness = .55 < s < .73; authority = .63 < s < .73; loyalty = .62 < s <  
.73; purity = .74 < s <  .83). 
Political ideology 
To measure political ideology, we administered three items used by Carney, 
Jost, Gosling, and Potter (2008): (1) ‘Where on the following scale of political 
orientation (from extremely liberal to extremely conservative) would you place 
yourself (overall, in general)?’; (2) ‘In terms of social and cultural issues in particular, 
how liberal or conservative are you?’; and (3) ‘In terms of economic issues in particular, 
how liberal or conservative are you?’. Responses were provided on a 7-point scale 
ranging from 1 (Very liberal) to 7 (Very conservative). These three items formed a 
highly reliable index ( = .93). We took the mean as an estimate of overall political 

















CHAPTER 8: CORRELATES OF THE MFQ 
 129 
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) 
We administered the 16-item social dominance orientation Scale (SDO-6) 
developed by Pratto et al. (1994). Sample items include ‘To get ahead in life, it is 
sometimes necessary to step on other groups’, and ‘No one group should dominate in 
society’ (reverse-coded). For the combined sample, scale reliability was again high ( = 
.94), with responses ranging from 1 to 6.13 (M = 2.42, SD = 1.05). 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) 
 We administered the 8-item version of the right-wing authoritarianism scale 
used by Sibley and Duckitt (2009). Sample items include ‘The only way our country can 
get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our traditional values, put some tough 
leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad ideas’, and ‘Our country 
will be destroyed some day if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our 
moral fiber and traditional beliefs’. Scale reliability was high ( = .80), with responses 
ranging from 1 to 7 (M = 2.71, SD = 1.07).  
8.2.2 Results 
We separate results into analyses regarding associations between MFCT 
responses and scores on the MFQ, political orientation, SDO and RWA, and analyses on 
RTs on the MFCT as indicators of conflict in decisions between foundations. Within 
these sections, we have identified preregistered and exploratory analyses. In addition, 
we also replicated exploratory analyses looking at response and RT patterns across 
blocks on the MFCT, which were largely consistent with previous studies and are 
reported in Appendix 4.  
Relating to our hypotheses, in the following analyses we confirm the positive 
correlation between the MFCT and MFQ with a similar magnitude to that observed in 
previous studies. We also find the expected associations between political orientation, 
SDO and RWA and foundation endorsement with both the MFQ – and importantly – the 
MFCT. In separate mediation models with MFQ and MFCT scores, we successfully 
replicate Kugler et al. (2014), showing the effect of political orientation is mediated by 
social dominance and authoritarianism. Furthermore, we find that a mediation model 
with MFCT scores explains more variance than a model fit to MFQ scores. In 
exploratory mediation models, we further show that, by removing variance shared by 
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the two measures, unique variance in MFCT scores accounts for unique structured 
relationships in these models. Additionally, we found that higher conservatism 
predicted lower consistency in associations between MFQ and MFCT scores, as 
expected. However, we also found that higher conservatism predicted  lower RT and τ 
values indicating less conflict in decisions in the MFCT, rather than more as 
hypothesised. Finally, we also replicate previous effects in RT patterns, with evidence 
of greater conflict – though with small effects – in decisions between closely-valued 
foundations. 
Responses on the MFCT 
Preregistered analysis 
Regarding responses on the MFCT, we tested the following preregistered 
predictions. Firstly, we predicted that patterns of responses on the MFCT will positively 
correlate with patterns of MFQ scores. This correlation will be moderate in size, and 
approximately .50, given past studies. Furthermore, we predicted that higher 
conservatism, and thus endorsement of a wider array of values, would predict lower 
consistency, and thus lower correlations between MFCT and MFQ scores. We had no 
specific predictions about the size of this effect. 
With political orientation, social dominance, and authoritarianism, we expected 
to replicate previous findings with both MFQ and MFCT scores (predicted magnitudes 
of effects indicated in brackets). We expected that political orientation (medium), SDO 
(medium), and RWA (medium to large) would be positively correlated with the 
endorsement of authority, loyalty, and purity scores. We also expected that political 
orientation (small) and SDO (medium) would be negatively correlated with care and 
fairness scores. 
In addition, we expected to replicate mediation models in Kugler et al. (2014) 
with both MFQ and MFCT scores, with individual differences in SDO and RWA 
mediating the effect of political orientation on the endorsement of moral foundations.  
Correlations 
Mean responses on the MFQ and the MFCT are shown in Table 8.1, along with 
correlations across foundations. Correlations were significant for all foundations (care: 
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r = .37, p <. 001; fairness: r = .35, p < .001; loyalty: r = .32, p < .001; authority: r = .59, p < 
.001; and purity: r = .38, p < .001). 
Kendall rank correlation coefficients ranged from -1.00 to 1.00, with a mean of 
r (700) = .47. To assess stability, this estimate was bootstrapped to give an estimate of 
rBoot = .46 (SE rBoot = .01, 95% CI [.43, .49]). These results show the predicted positive 
correlation between the MFCT and the MFQ, of similar magnitude to that observed in 
previous studies. 
In line with our predictions, authority, loyalty and purity positively correlated,  
tending towards medium effects, with political orientation, .22 < rs < .50, ps < .001, and 
SDO, .29 < rs < .43, ps < .001, and with large effects with RWA, .37 < rs < .69, ps < .001, 
with the exception of loyalty on the MFCT, r = .19, p < .001. Care and fairness were 
negatively correlated with SDO, -.33 > rs > -.54, ps < .001, with predicted medium 
effects, and also with political orientation, -.24 > rs > -.47, ps < .001, and SDO, -.33 > rs > 
-.54, ps < .001, though we had predicted small effects for the latter. In addition, RWA 
also negatively correlated with care and fairness, more so on the MFCT, rs = -.37 and -
.55, ps < .001, than on the MFQ, -.11 > rs > -.19, ps < .05.  
Mediation models 
We built two sets of path analyses (saturated and trimmed models) to test 
whether the effect of political orientation on foundation scores on (a) the MFQ and (b) 
the MFCT, are mediated by SDO and RWA. Models for (a) are a direct replication of 
analyses in Kugler et al. (2014). Trimmed models excluded non-significant pathways 
between SDO/RWA and foundation scores. Confidence intervals were estimated for 
indirect paths. Mediation models were fit with the sem function in the lavaan package 
(version .6-5) (Rosseel, 2012). 
Predicting MFQ scores 
Saturated model 
We built the saturated model illustrated in Figure 8.3, RMSEA of 0, and TLI of 1. 
Replicating previous effects, this model yielded positive associations between political 
orientation and SDO, β = .52, SE = .03, p < .001, and RWA, β = .50, SE = .03, p < .001. 
Political orientation explained 27.5% of the variance in SDO and 24.7% of the variance 
in RWA.  
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SDO was positively associated with authority (β = .09, SE = .03, p < .01), and 
negatively with concerns for care (β = -.44, SE = .04, p < .001) and fairness (β = -.56, SE 
= .04, p < .001). However, SDO was not significantly associated with either loyalty (β = 
.05, SE = .04, p = .23) or purity (β = -.04, SE = .03, p = .29). RWA was positively 
associated with loyalty (β = .41, SE = .04, p < .001), authority (β = .52, SE = .03, p < .001), 
and purity (β = .69, SE = .03, p < .001). However, it was also positively related to 
concerns for care (β = .12, SE = .04, p < .01) and fairness (β = .09, SE = .04, p < .05), 
suggesting that those higher in their endorsement of authoritarianism, also endorsed 
care and fairness on the MFQ. 
The saturated model yielded significant associations between political 
orientation and loyalty (β = .13, SE = .04, p < .001), and authority (β = .20, SE = .03, p < 
.001), but not with care (β = -.07, SE = .04, p = .10), fairness (β = -.05, SE = .04, p = .18), 
nor purity (β = .04, SE = .03, p = .22). 
After adjusting for all other variables in the model, residual variances among 
foundations remained significantly correlated. The model explained 18.9% of the 
variance in care, 30.2% in fairness, 26.7% in loyalty, 47.6% in authority, and 47.8% in 
purity.  
 
Figure 8.3. Saturated path model showing relationships between political orientation, SDO, RWA, and 
foundations on the MFQ. Path coefficients are standardised regression coefficients of the full model. 
Broken lines indicate non-significant paths at p > .05. 
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Trimmed model 
To determine whether direct associations between political orientation and 
MFQ scores were mediated by RWA and SDO, we trimmed non-significant pathways 
between SDO and concerns for loyalty and purity. This model is illustrated in Figure 
8.4. 
The resulting model provided a good fit to the data, TLI = .99 and RMSEA = .04 
(Kugler et al., 2014: RMSEA = .02). In the trimmed model, the direct effects of political 
orientation on concern for loyalty (β = .15, SE = .04, p < .001) and authority (β = .20, SE 
= .04, p < .001) remained significant. Thus, liberals were less concerned about loyalty 
and authority than conservatives even after adjusting for the effects of RWA and SDO. 
 
Figure 8.4. Trimmed path model showing SDO and RWA mediate the relationship between political 
orientation and foundations on the MFQ. Path coefficients are standardised regression coefficients of 
the trimmed model. Broken lines indicate non-significant paths at p > .05. 
 
Mediation analyses  
Table 8.2 shows direct and indirect paths of political orientation on foundations 
on the MFQ. Indirect paths, and 95% confidence intervals, were estimated by 
bootstrapping (Kugler et al., 2014; Preacher & Hayes, 2008; Shrout & Bolger, 2002).  
As in Kugler et al. (2014), we observed that RWA mediated the effects of 
political orientation on loyalty, β = .21, 95% CI [.16, .26], p < .001, authority, β = .26, 
95% CI [.22, .30], p < .001, and purity, β = .34, 95% CI [.29, .39], p < .001. It also weakly 
CHAPTER 8: CORRELATES OF THE MFQ 
 135 
mediated the effects of political orientation on care, β = .06, 95% CI [.01, .10], p < .05, 
and fairness, β = .04, 95% CI [.00, .09], p < .10. 
We did not observe mediation effects with all of the binding foundations for 
SDO, which only weakly mediated the effects of political orientation on authority, β = 
.04, 95% CI [.01, .07], p < .01. However, as predicted, SDO did mediate the effects of 
political orientation on care, β = -.23, 95% CI [-.28, -.18], p < .001, and fairness, β = -.29, 
95% CI [-.35, -.23], p < .001.  
These results, indicate a partial replication of the mediation effects observed by 
Kugler et al. (2014). 
Predicting MFCT scores 
Saturated model 
We built the saturated model illustrated in Figure 8.5, RMSEA of 0, and TLI of 1. 
As expected, SDO was positively associated with authority (β = .15, SE = .04, p < .001), 
loyalty (β = .23, SE = .04, p < .001), and purity (β = .18, SE = .04, p < .001), and negatively 
associated with care (β = -.22, SE = .04, p < .001) and fairness (β = -.24, SE = .04, p < 
.001). RWA was positively associated with the endorsement of authority (β = .40, SE = 
.04, p < .001), and purity (β = .28, SE = .04, p < .001). However, it was not associated 
with loyalty (β = .06, SE = .04, p = .18), and was also negatively related to concerns for 
care (β = -.27, SE = .04, p < .001) and fairness (β = -.36, SE = .04, p < .001).  
Political orientation was negatively associated with fairness (β = -.17, SE = .04, p 
< .001) and positively associated with authority (β = .11, SE = .04, p < .01), but 
associations with all other foundations were not significant (care: β = .01, SE = .04, p = 
.80; loyalty: β = .07, SE = .05, p = .14; purity: β = .03, SE = .04, p = .49). 
After adjusting for other variables in the model, residual variances among 
foundations on the MFCT remained significantly correlated, with the exception of care 
and fairness (β = -.05, SE = .03, p = .07), and loyalty and authority (β = -.04, SE = .03, p = 
.16). The model explained 17.0% of the variance in care, 39.5% of the variance in 
fairness, 9.2% of the variance in loyalty, 31.3% of the variance in authority, and 17.0% 
of variance in purity. 
  
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We trimmed the non-significant pathways between RWA and concerns for 
loyalty. This model is illustrated in Figure 8.6. 
The resulting model provided a good fit to the data, TLI = 1.00 and RMSEA = .03. 
In the trimmed model, the direct effects of political orientation on concerns for fairness 
(β = -.17, SE = .04, p < .001), authority (β = .11, SE = .04, p < .01), and loyalty (β = .09, SE 
= .04, p < .05) were significant. Thus, liberals were more concerned about fairness, and 
less about authority and loyalty, than conservatives even after adjusting for the effects 
of SDO and RWA.  
 Mediation analyses  
Table 8.4 shows direct and indirect paths of political orientation on foundations 
on the MFCT. As in the above model with MFQ scores and in Kugler et al. (2014), RWA 
mediated the effects of political orientation on authority, β = .20, 95% CI [.16, .24], p < 
.001, and purity, β = .14, 95% CI [.10, .19], p < .001, but we did not observe the same 
effects for loyalty. Furthermore, it also more strongly mediated the effects of political 
orientation on care, β = -.13, 95% CI [-.17, -.09], p < .001, and fairness, β = -.17, 95% CI [-
.21, -.13], p < .001, than when these were based on MFQ scores. 
Figure 8.5. Saturated path model showing relationships between political orientation, SDO, RWA, and 
foundations on the MFCT. Path coefficients are standardised regression coefficients of the full model. 
Broken lines indicate non-significant paths at p > .05. 
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Figure 8.6. Trimmed path model showing SDO and RWA mediate the relationship between political 
orientation and foundations on the MFCT. Path coefficients are standardised regression coefficients 
of the trimmed model. Broken lines indicate non-significant paths at p > .05. 
 
Also in contrast to the MFQ model, we observed mediation effects with all of the 
binding foundations for SDO, which mediated the effects of political orientation on 
loyalty, β = .13, 95% CI [.08, .18], p < .001, authority, β = .08, 95% CI [.04, .12], p < .001, 
and purity, β = .09, 95% CI [.05, .14], p < .001. However, we did see similar mediation 
effects for SDO on care, β = -.12, 95% CI [-.16, -.07], p < .001, and fairness, β = -.13, 95% 
CI [-.17, -.09], p < .001.  
These results suggest a closer replication of the mediation effects observed by 
Kugler et al. (2014), compared to models predicting foundation scores based on the 
MFQ. Comparing the trimmed models, we found that a model based on MFCT 
foundation scores has better fit (see Table 8.3). 
Table 8.3. Comparison of model fits as indicated by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and Log-Likelihood 
Model AIC BIC LogLik 
Trimmed MFQ 11225.44 11375.62 -5577.58 
Trimmed MFCT 6022.29 6177.03   -2976.25 
Note. LogLik is for unrestricted model, MFQ model has 33 free parameters, MFCT has 34 free 
parameters. 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































To explore differences in the variance explained in models based on the MFQ 
and on the MFCT, we fit two further sets of exploratory models. Here, we regressed 
MFQ scores on MFCT scores, and vice versa, storing the residuals as new variables. The 
residuals represent unique variance in MFQ scores not explained by the MFCT, as well 
as unique variance in MFCT scores not explained by the MFQ, respectively.  
Predicting unique variance in MFQ scores 
We again built a saturated model (see Figure 8.7). Associations between RWA 
and care (β = .22, SE = .04, p < .01), fairness (β = .22, SE = .04, p < .05), loyalty (β = .40, 
SE = .04, p < .001), authority (β = .28, SE = .03, p < .001), and purity (β = .58, SE = .03, p < 
.001) remained significant, with associations for care and fairness increasing in 
strength, relative to their counterparts in the main MFQ model (Figure 8.3), suggesting 
that the unique variance in MFQ scores for these foundations, not explained by the 
MFCT, is more strongly positively associated with RWA.  
Associations between SDO and care (β = -.36, SE = .04, p < .001) and fairness (β 
= -.47, SE = .04, p < .001) also remained significant. However, authority was no longer 
significantly predicted by SDO, β = -.001, SE = .03, p = .98, suggesting that the variance 
in endorsement of authority that had been explained in the main MFQ model is also 
captured by the MFCT. Whereas purity had not been significant in the main MFQ model, 
it was significant in this model in the opposite direction to that we might have 
expected, β = -.10, SE = .03, p < .01, suggesting that SDO predicts unique variance in 
purity MFQ scores.  
Associations between political orientation and loyalty (β = .11, SE = .04, p < .01), 
and authority (β = .13, SE = .03, p < .001), remained significant, and became marginally 
significant for care, (β = -.07, SE = .04, p = .07). The model explained 14.3% of the 
variance in care, 20.0% in fairness, 22.1% in loyalty, 20.4% in authority, and 36.0% in 
purity. 
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We trimmed the non-significant pathways between SDO and loyalty and 
authority (see Figure 8.8). The resulting model provided a good fit, TLI = 1.01 and 
RMSEA = .00. In the trimmed model, the direct effects of political orientation on loyalty 
(β = .10, SE = .04, p < .05) and authority (β = .13, SE = .03, p < .001) remained significant, 
while care remained marginally significant, (β = -.08 SE = .04, p = .07). 
 
Figure 8.8. Trimmed path model showing relationships between political orientation, SDO, RWA, and 
unique variance in foundations on the MFQ. Path coefficients are standardised regression 
coefficients of the full model. Broken lines indicate non-significant paths at p > .05. 
Figure 8.7. Saturated path model showing relationships between political orientation, SDO, RWA, and 
unique variance in foundations on the MFQ. Path coefficients are standardised regression coefficients 
of the full model. Broken lines indicate non-significant paths at p > .05. 
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Table 8.5 shows direct and indirect paths of political orientation on unique 
variance in foundations on the MFQ. RWA mediated the effects of political orientation 
on all five foundations, whilst SDO mediated effects on care, fairness, and purity.  
Predicting unique variance in MFCT scores 
We built a saturated model for unique variance in MFCT scores (see Figure 8.9). 
SDO remained positively associated with authority (β = .10, SE = .04, p < .01), loyalty (β 
= .21, SE = .04, p < .001), and purity (β = .19, SE = .04, p < .001), suggesting that the 
MFCT captures unique variance in the these foundation that is predicted by SDO. 
However, there were no significant associations between SDO and care (β = -.05, SE = 
.04, p = .18) or fairness (β = -.04, SE = .04, p = .23), suggesting that the variance in these 
foundations predicted by SDO is also captured in the MFQ. 
Associations between RWA and care (β = -.32, SE = .04, p < .001), fairness (β = -
.39, SE = .04, p < .001), and authority (β = .09, SE = .04, p < .01) remained significant, 
suggesting that RWA predicts unique variance in MFCT scores for these foundations, 
not explained by the MFQ. Whereas loyalty had not been significant in the main MFCT 
model (Figure 8.5), it was marginally significant in this model in the opposite direction 
to that we might have expected, β = -.07, SE = .04, p = .08. However, purity was no 
longer significantly predicted by RWA, β = .02, SE = .04, p = .69, suggesting that the 
variance in purity that had been explained by RWA is also captured by the MFQ. 
The association between political orientation and fairness (β = -.15, SE = .04, p < 
.001) remained significant, but this was not the case for loyalty (β = .03, SE = .04, p = 
.56), nor authority (β = -.01, SE = .04, p = .88). The model explained 12.5% of the 
variance in care, 29.3% in fairness, 4.6% in loyalty, 4.1% in authority, and 5.1% in 
purity. 
We trimmed the non-significant pathway between RWA and purity, and 
between SDO and care and fairness, and the marginal pathway from RWA to loyalty,  
(see Figure 8.10). The resulting model provided a good fit, TLI = .99 and RMSEA = .03. 
In the trimmed model, the direct effects of political orientation on fairness (β = -.17, SE 
= .03, p < .001) remained significant. 
 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 8.9. Saturated path model showing relationships between political orientation, SDO, RWA, and 
unique variance in foundations on the MFCT. Path coefficients are standardised regression 
coefficients of the full model. Broken lines indicate non-significant paths at p > .05. 
 
 
Figure 8.10. Trimmed path model showing relationships between political orientation, SDO, RWA, 
and unique variance in foundations on the MFCT. Path coefficients are standardised regression 
coefficients of the full model. Broken lines indicate non-significant paths at p > .05. 
 
Table 8.7 shows direct and indirect paths of political orientation on unique 
variance in foundations on the MFCT. RWA mediated the effects of political orientation 
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on care, fairness and authority, whilst SDO mediated effects on loyalty, authority and 
purity.  
Comparing models of the unique variance in foundation scores measures on the 
MFQ and MFCT, we see that fit is similar in both models, with slightly better fit for the 
MFQ model (see Table 8.6). Though fit is similar for the two models, they account for 
different associations. RWA is associated positively with unique variance in binding 
foundations in MFQ, but not in MFCT scores. There is a dissociation for individualising 
foundations, with RWA positively associated in unique MFQ scores, but negatively in 
MFCT scores. There are also differences in SDO, which is associated negatively with 
unique variance in individualising foundations in unique MFQ scores, and positively 
with binding foundations in MFCT scores, with little overlap. These patterns thus 
suggest that there is systematic non-overlapping variance between the two measures 
of foundation endorsement. 
Furthermore, model fit for unique variance in the MFQ does not change 
substantially from the full MFQ model, whereas excluding the variance shared with the 
MFQ worsens fit for the MFCT models. Method variance may provide a partial 
explanation for this drop in the variance explained by the MFCT. The MFQ has a 
measurement advantage, being similar in nature to the self-report scales used for 
political orientation, RWA and SDO. Regardless, and crucially, even after accounting for 






Table 8.6. Comparison of model fits as indicated by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and Log-Likelihood 
Model AIC BIC LogLik 
Trimmed MFQ Unique 11192.48 11342.67 -5562.97 
Trimmed MFCT Unique 11999.48 12140.56 -5965.68 
LogLik is for unrestricted model, MFQ model has 33 free parameters, MFCT has 31 free 
parameters 
Responses on the MFCT 
Preregistered analysis 
 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We preregistered two hypotheses specific to effects of political orientation. We 
expected that higher conservatism, and thus endorsement of a wider array of 
foundations, would predict: (a) lower correlations between MFQ and MFCT scores, 
indicating lower consistency in foundation endorsement; and (b) higher mean RT and τ 
values in the MFCT, indicating greater levels of conflict across trials. We did not have 
estimates of the magnitude of these effects. 
We fit separate linear regressions to address these predictions (see Table 8.8). 
Predicting Kendall rank correlation coefficients, we found that, as predicted, the 
correlation between participants’ MFQ and their MFCT scores decreased with higher 
conservatism, β = -.25, p < .001, indicating decreasing consistency between these two 
measures of foundation endorsement. There are a number of explanations that might 
account for this. As more conservative individuals endorse all five foundations as 
morally relevant, it may be that noise in the MFCT systematically increases, making 
foundation rankings on the MFCT less reliable. However, it may also be that, by pitting 
foundations against one another, the MFCT is capturing unique variance in foundation 
endorsement that is more apparent when individuals have more endorsed moral 
values. A third, and related, possibility is that more conservative individuals are simply 
more morally inconsistent across these kinds of choices. These analyses are unable to 
disentangle these alternatives. 
Contrary to our prediction, more conservative participants tended to have 
marginally lower mean RT, β = -.06, p < .10, and significantly lower mean τ, β = -.11, p < 
.001, suggesting that they experience less conflict in decisions between foundations on 
the MFCT. This might indicate that more conservative individuals endorse all five 
foundations as morally relevant, and therefore find decisions between them less 
difficult, rather than more difficult. However, it may also be a result of other 
mechanisms that quickly resolve these kinds of moral judgments. We will return to 
these points in the discussion of this study and in the general discussion (see Chapter 
9). 
  
CHAPTER 8: CORRELATES OF THE MFQ 
 148 
Table 8.8. Predicting correlation coefficients between MFQ and MFCT, and RT and τ on the MFCT, 
from political orientation for Study 5 
 Models 
 Correlation coefficient (r) log RT log τ 
Intercept -.00 (.04) -.00 (.04) -.00 (.04) 
Political Orientation -.25*** (.04) -.06† (.04) -.11** (.04) 
R2 .06 .004 .01 
Adj. R2 .06 .003 .01 
Residual SE (df = 698) .97 1.00 .99 
F (1, 698) 46.80*** 2.83† 8.34** 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 700. Separate models 
predicting correlation coefficient (r) between the MFQ and the MFCT, and log RT and log τ on the 
MFCT. All variables have been standardised. SE is provided in parentheses. 
 
Predicting RT on the MFCT 
Preregistered analysis 
As observed in previous studies, we predicted that differences in foundation 
endorsement, measured both on the MFQ and on the MFCT itself would predict greater 
conflict in decisions between closely-valued foundations, as measured by mean RT 
scores and fitted τ parameters, but not necessarily in μ. We anticipated that these 
effects would be small for models based on MFQ scores, and small to moderate for 
models based on MFCT scores. 
To test these predictions, we preregistered a number of analyses that 
operationalise the difference in value between foundations in a number of ways, and 
replicate the RT analyses conducted in other studies. Firstly, we built a multilevel 
model predicting RT from both a linear and quadratic term of difference in 
standardised MFQ and MFCT scores between foundations. Secondly, we fit within-
subject Ex-Gaussian parameters to RT distributions based on how many ranks apart 
foundations in each trial are based on each participant’s rank order of MFQ and MFCT 
scores, and fit two sets of multilevel models predicting RT, τ, and μ.  
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Difference in foundation scores predicting RT 
Separate multilevel models (see Table 8.9) were fit to predict RT from the 
difference between MFQ and MFCT scores, entered into the models as both linear (x) 
and quadratic (x2) terms, predicting that RT will be highest when the difference is 0 
indicating that two foundations are equally valued, and that the effect on RT would be 
non-linear. Figure 8.11 plots these quadratic regressions. 
For these models, both linear, βs = -.04, ps < .001, and quadratic terms, βs > 
|.01|, ps < .01, were significant and in the predicted direction. In previous the studies 
with smaller samples, we had found (with the exception of Study 3) that the linear 
term, but not the quadratic, was significant when difference is based on MFQ scores, 
and vice versa for a difference in MFCT scores. As in previous studies, these effects are 
small.  
Table 8.9. Predicting RT from difference in MFQ and MFCT scores for Study 5 
 Models 
 log RT 
Fixed effects   
    Intercept .06* (.02) .11*** (.03) 
    Difference in MFQ Scores -.04*** (.01)  
    Difference in MFQ Scores2 -.01** (.003)  
    Difference in MFCT Scores  -.04*** (.01) 
    Difference in MFCT Scores2  -.02*** (.003) 
Random effects   
    By Subject - σ   
        Intercept .63 .64 
        Foundation Combination < .001 < .001 
        Valence < .001 < .001 
        Action .34 .33 
    Residual .70 .70 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .004 / .52 .01 / .52 
LogLik -129,617 -129,152 
AIC 259,251 258,319 
BIC 259,328 258,396 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 111,709. Fixed and 
random effects for separate models predicting log RT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
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Quadratic models fit terms for difference in scores (x) and squared difference in scores (x2) between 
foundations in a trial. In order to preserve a minimum value of 0 interpretable as no difference 
between scores for the quadratic term, difference predictors in these models were scaled by SD 
without centring. For fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses. Models that included a random 
intercept for item pairings failed to converge and this term was thus excluded. 
 
 
Figure 8.11. Predicting RT for Study 5 with quadratic models for (a) difference in MFQ scores and (b)  
difference in MFCT scores between foundations in a trial. Grey areas represent 95% CI boundaries. 
 
Ranks apart predicting RT 
As in previous studies, we applied Ex-Gaussian decomposition of RT 
distributions from the MFCT, based on how many ranks apart foundations in each trial 
are, based on either MFQ or MFCT scores. A total of 316 participants had equally scored 
foundations on the MFQ, and 145 had equally scored foundations on the MFCT.  Figure 
8.12 and Figure 8.13 show histograms for within-subject mean RTs, μ and τ calculated 
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Figure 8.12. Distribution of RT (a), μ (b) and τ (c) across MFQ rank apart categories in Study 5 
 
 
Figure 8.13. Distribution of RT (a), μ (b) and τ (c) across MFCT rank apart categories in Study 5 
 
We predict that it would take longer and be more difficult to choose between 
foundations fewer ranks apart (i.e. more closely matched in value), and as such that 
fewer ranks apart will result in greater overall RT and τ, as a measure of decision 
conflict. Multilevel models were fit to predict RT, μ and τ from ranks apart based on the 
MFQ and the MFCT, with a set of planned contrasts (Helmert coding), testing whether 
the former increases with fewer ranks apart (see Table 8.10). In contrast to previous 
studies with smaller samples, we included equally valued choices (0 ranks apart). 
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Ranks apart on MFQ 
For choices between closely valued foundations, based on rank order on the 
MFQ, we would expect longer RTs and greater τ, but not necessarily greater μ. 
Decreasing trends in RT and τ, and partially in μ, can be seen as the number of ranks 
apart increases (see Figure 8.14). This decreasing trend was significant for mean RT in 
all comparisons, βs > .10, ps < .001, and in one, two and three rank apart choices in τ, βs 
> .09, ps < .05, relative to further apart choices. μ was higher in equally valued, and one 
rank apart choices, βs > .07, ps < .01, relative to further apart choices, but this trend 
was not significant for other comparisons, βs = .03, ps > .10. Unlike in mean RT and μ, τ 
was lower in equally valued choices, β = -.13, p < .01, relative to further apart choices, 
indicating lower conflict in these choices.  
Ranks apart on MFCT 
Decreasing trends in RT and τ, as well as in μ, have larger effects for ranks apart 
based on the MFCT itself (see Figure 8.15). As for ranks based on the MFQ, this 
decreasing trend was significant for mean RT in all comparisons, βs > .16, ps < .001, and 
in one, two and three rank apart choices in τ, βs > .20, ps < .001, relative to further 
apart choices. Unlike when based on the MFQ, τ was not higher in equally valued 
choices on the task, β = -.01, p > .10. μ was also higher in equally valued, one, and two 
rank apart choices, βs > .09, ps < .01, relative to further apart choices. 
Table 8.10. Predicting RT, μ and τ from ranks apart on the MFQ and MFCT for Study 5 
 Models 
 MFQ MFCT 
 log RT log μ log τ log RT log μ log τ 
 
Fixed effects       
    Intercept -.02 (.04) .004 (.03) -.03 (.03) .03 (.04) .04 (.03) -.02 (.03) 
    Ranks Apart       
        0 RA v. 1, 2, 3, 4 .13*** (.02) .20*** (.03) -.13** (.04) .25*** (.02) .27*** (.05) -.01 (.06) 
        1 RA v. 2, 3, 4 .14*** (.01) .07** (.02) .19*** (.03) .21*** (.01) .15*** (.02) .20*** (.03) 
        2 RA v. 3, 4 .13*** (.01) .03 (.03) .20*** (.03) .20*** (.01) .09*** (.02) .23*** (.03) 
        3 RA v. 4 .10*** (.02) .03 (.03) .09* (.04) .16*** (.01) .04 (.03) .25*** (.04) 
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Random effects       
    By Subject - σ       
        Intercept .97 .87 .75 .96 .87 .76 
    Residual .26 .51 .65 .25 .48 .64 
Marginal R2 / Conditional 
R2 
.01 / .94 .01 / .74 .01 / .57 .02 / .94 .01 / .77 .02 / .60 
LogLik -1,560 -2,914 -3,353 -1,539 -2,842 -3,366 
AIC 3,135 5,843 6,719 3,091 5,698 6,746 
BIC 3,176 5,884 6,761 3,133 5,739 6,788 
 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 2,738 (MFQ) and 2,793 
(MFCT). RA – Ranks Apart. Fixed and random effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ and τ 
for ranks apart based on the MFQ and the MFCT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
Helmert coding compares each rank apart category to the mean of the subsequent categories. For 
fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses. 
 
 
Figure 8.14. Ranks apart on MFQ predicting RT (a), μ (b) and τ (c) for Study 5. Error bars denote 95% 
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Figure 8.15. Ranks apart on MFCT predicting RT (a), μ (b) and τ (c) for Study 5. Error bars denote 95% 
CIs, corrected for within-subject designs based on Morey (2008). 
 
These analyses replicate those in previous studies, indicating that foundation 
endorsement/preference is reflected in RTs on the MFCT, and that this tracks expected 
conflict in decisions between more closely valued foundations. With a larger sample 
size, these patterns are less noisy, and are also apparent, but to a lesser extent, in μ, as 
an indicator of the time required to physically make responses.  
In addition, a larger sample size allows us to include choices between equally 
valued foundations. Here, we see higher μ, but lower τ, suggesting that though longer 
time required to physically make these choices, they incur lower conflict. However, this 
dissociation is only significant when ranks are based on the MFQ, and thus its 
implications for the cognitive processes of conflict resolution involved in the MFCT task 
are questionable. 
Exploratory analysis 
The above ways of operationalising the difference in value between foundations 
do not account for how much value is placed on each foundation, and therefore, as for 
previous studies, we ran a number of exploratory analyses attempting to better account 
for this. We report all these analyses in Appendix 4. Here, we present models based on 
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Weighted ranks apart predicting RT 
We fit models to include a bias term for the ranks in a choice, calculated as 
mean(Rank1, Rank2), to weight the number of ranks apart foundations are in each trial. 
As in previous studies, ranks were reversed, so that the most valued foundation ranks 
as 5, and the least valued ranks as 1, so that a higher mean rank for foundations in a 
choice indicates higher value.  
Models (see Table 8.11) tested effects for the bias term for the mean rank of 
foundations in a given trial, their ranks apart, and the interaction between these. For 
ranks based on both MFQ and MFCT scores, RT is negatively predicted by mean rank, 
βs < -.07, ps < .001, and by number of ranks apart, βs < -.04, ps < .001, indicating that as 
the value, and the difference in value, of foundations in a choice increases, time to make 
the choice decreases. There was no evidence of an interaction between these for ranks 
based on the MFQ, β = .004, p > .10. However this interaction was significant for ranks 
based on the MFCT, β = -.03, p < .001. 
Table 8.11. Predicting RT from mean rank and ranks apart on the MFQ and MFCT for Study 5 
 Models 
 log RT 
 MFQ MFCT 
Fixed effects   
    Intercept -.001 (.02) -.002 (.02) 
    Mean Rank -.07*** (.004) -.09*** (.004) 
    Ranks Apart -.04*** (.003) -.07*** (.003) 
    Mean Rank : Ranks Apart .004 (.004) -.03*** (.005) 
Random effects   
    By Subject - σ   
        Intercept .62 .63 
        Foundation Combination < .001 < .001 
        Valence < .001 < .001 
        Action .34 .33 
    Residual .70 .70 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .01 / .51 .01 / .51 
LogLik -129,450 -129,165 
AIC 258,919 258,348 
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BIC 259,005 258,435 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 111,709. Fixed and random 
effects for separate models predicting log RT. Outcome variables and predictors have been 
standardised. Mean rank calculated as mean(Rank1, Rank2), of reversed ranks, such that higher mean 
rank indicates more valued foundations. For fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses. 
 
8.2.3 Discussion 
The preceding studies have relied on student samples, and thus these samples 
were likely to be politically liberal. In contrast, this study uses a larger, and more 
politically and morally diverse, general sample. Thus, we further consolidate support 
for the MFCT as a stable and reliable measure of intuitive preferences for foundations, 
finding a correlation between the MFCT and MFQ, of similar magnitude to that 
observed in previous studies (r = .47). We also replicate previous evidence of expected 
patterns of conflict in analyses of RT.  
Moreover, in this study, we sought to test the external validity of the MFCT, 
directly comparing its performance against that of the MFQ. To do this, we replicated a 
mediation model (Kugler et al., 2014) that predicts foundation endorsement on the 
MFQ from three well-established correlates – political orientation, right-wing 
authoritarianism, and social dominance orientation. We find that the MFCT produces 
associations with these variables in line with our predictions, and relative to models fit 
to foundations measured on the MFQ, explains more variance. Furthermore, we show 
that removing variance shared by the two measures, foundation preferences on the 
MFCT account for unique structured relationships with these variables that are distinct 
from those uniquely explained by the MFQ. In doing so, it is worth noting that the MFCT 
is overcoming a method disadvantage in that, unlike the MFQ, it is a different kind of 
measure than the scales used for these variables. Furthermore, we found that more 
conservative individuals had less consistency between their MFCT and MFQ foundation 
preferences, but also had – in contrast to our expectations – less conflict evident in 
their response times. 
These findings highlight the contribution that the MFCT, in the way it measures 
moral foundations, can make to literature on ideological differences in moral judgment. 
They demonstrate the potential to explore differences in cognitive processes more 
directly than has previously been carried out (see Chapter 2.3). Though right-wing 
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authoritarianism and social dominance orientation are often measured and discussed 
as individual difference measures of stable traits, they are also differences in cognitive 
style and processing that are theorised to motivate political conservatism (e.g. Jost et 
al., 2003; Van Leeuwen & Park, 2009), and are likely subject to similar kinds of cultural 
and social learning as foundations (e.g. Graham et al., 2013; Haidt & Joseph, 2004, 
2007). The MFCT has been developed to tap into different, though related, cognitive 
mechanisms than those which underlie explicit self-reported responses on the MFQ, 
and we expect that this may account for some of the differences in their respective 
contributions in this study. Further to this, our findings regarding political orientation 
serve to crystallise a number of pertinent questions about the link between ideology 
and moral foundations, arising from these underlying processes, that we are unable to 
clarify in this study. These implications are further explored in a general discussion 





9 Chapter 9: General Discussion 
In this thesis, we sought to develop and validate a novel task designed to 
capture intuitive preferences for moral foundations, as they come into conflict with one 
another. In doing so, we demonstrate the value of exploring such intuitive conflicts in 
order to address theoretical and methodological gaps – and inform debate – in a 
literature that tends to measure foundations in isolation. Thus, in Chapter 3, we present 
the Moral Foundations Conflict Task – the MFCT – a forced-choice, trade-off task that 
requires quick and intuitive choices between foundations, that tracks preferences 
based on how often they are chosen, and how long it takes to choose them. To validate 
this task, we pit it against the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011), 
as the widely accepted, and widely used, standard of measurement. 
In Chapter 5, we showed that the self-reported and explicit endorsements of 
moral foundations measured in the MFQ are reflected in the intuitive foundation 
preferences on the MFCT, correlating at r  = .50. We find that this association is stable 
across further studies in Chapters 6 to 8 (.47 < r < .61). In Chapter 6, we tested our 
claim that the MFCT is an intuitive level of measurement by exploring whether this 
association with the MFQ would shift under cognitive load. Here, we found that 
foundation preferences measured on the MFCT are not altered under two 
manipulations of cognitive load. We take this as evidence that the quick choices on the 
MFCT are the result of decision processes that resolve intuitive-level conflict between 
foundations. In Chapter 7, we manipulated attention in the other direction, and found 
that foundation preferences on the MFCT also do not shift when participants were 
instructed to deliberate their choices. However, our interpretation of these findings is 
hindered by the limitations of this study discussed in this chapter. Finally, in Chapter 8, 
we showed that foundation preferences on the MFCT replicate well-established 
associations between foundations measured on the MFQ and three key corelates – left-
right political orientation, right-wing authoritarianism, and social dominance 
orientation. Here, we showed that a model fitting responses on the MFCT not only 
replicates, but outperforms, a model fit to MFQ responses, evidencing that the MFCT 
captures unique and non-overlapping variance. To further probe our assumptions 
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about the task, we conducted exploratory analyses of response times, applying an Ex-
Gaussian approach alongside analyses of mean RT. Ex-Gaussian decomposition isolates 
a τ parameter in RT distributions that corresponds to conflict resolution in decision 
processes (Heathcote et al., 1991; Luce, 1986; McGill, 1963). Across Chapters 5 to 8, we 
find that both mean RT and τ generally decrease as the value – measured on both the 
MFQ and on the task itself – of the foundations in a choice increases, and these choices 
become less difficult. Though these effects are consistently small, we take this as 
support that the MFCT is tapping into intuitive-level conflict.  
Taken together, we believe that the empirical work laid out in this thesis 
provides sufficient evidence to conclude that our task – the MFCT – is a stable and 
reliable measure of intuitive inter-foundation conflicts, and makes a unique 
contribution – separate to that of the MFQ – in capturing preferences for moral 
foundations. In the following discussion, we expand on key contributions, and identify 
limitations and future directions of this research.   
9.1  Contributions 
We identify four key contributions of this work that are jointly theoretical and 
methodological. Firstly, it develops the MFCT as the first way to systematically trigger 
and measure intuitive preferences for moral foundations when in conflict with one 
another. Secondly, it validates this task against the criterion measure in the literature 
on moral foundations, the MFQ. Thirdly, it shows that the MFCT is stable over multiple 
manipulations that are directly relevant to the claims of an intuitive level of 
measurement, enhancing confidence in its construct validity. Finally, it demonstrates 
that the task makes a unique, and substantive, contribution in capturing foundation 
preference that is separate from that of the MFQ.  
9.1.1 Intuitive moral foundation conflicts 
Moral foundations are theorised as multiple, distinct and differentially-
activated moral intuitions that drive our moral judgments, beliefs and actions (Haidt & 
Joseph, 2007). If this is the case, then these moral intuitions may dynamically compete, 
as they come into conflict with one another, and we might expect that this conflict is 
systematically related to our deliberated moral values. To the best of our knowledge, 
this question has never been directly addressed. While MFT literature suggests that 
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foundation-relevant intuitions and emotions can be manipulated (Horberg et al., 2009; 
Inbar et al., 2009; Schnall, Benton, et al., 2008; Schnall, Haidt, et al., 2008; Wheatley & 
Haidt, 2005; Zhong et al., 2010), and thus that situational factors can differentially 
trigger moral foundations, even within individuals, it does not make attempts to isolate 
the inter-foundation conflicts that might inform such effects. Nor has this question been 
addressed in the wider moral literature. A wide variety of work on dual-process models 
of morality (Crockett, 2013; Cushman, 2013; Cushman & Greene, 2012; Greene et al., 
2004; Haidt, 2001; Kahane, 2012; Moore et al., 2008; Moore et al., 2011) has predicted 
why, and when, instances of cognitive conflict arise in moral judgments, and how that 
conflict may be resolved by engaging deliberative and reflective processes. However, 
relatively little is understood about whether conflict between moral intuitions might 
occur and be resolved at the intuitive level, prior to the recruitment of deliberative and 
reflective cognition. Instead, foundations as moral intuitions have typically been 
conceived of as co-existing in parallel (e.g. Haidt, 2001), with any conflict arising 
between them being resolved through reasoned and deliberate reflection. Thus, conflict 
detection and resolution are often defined as strictly System 2-type processes.  
We are not applying this definition of moral conflict in this research. Instead, we 
operationalise conflict between moral foundations by measuring preferences for 
foundations when they are pitted against one another in quick intuitive judgments. In 
doing so, we rely on speed as one of several aspects of intuitive judgment in the 
literature on dual-process models (e.g. Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Greene et al., 2001; 
Haidt, 2001; Kahneman, 2011). This focus on quick judgments allows us to tap into the 
relative ‘strengths’ of foundation intuitions directly, by minimising the role of 
deliberation and System 2 processes in these judgments. As such, our claim is not that 
the resolution of conflict between moral foundations occurs only – or even mostly – at 
the intuitive-level. Neither do we claim that conflict resolution captured in the MFCT 
always occurs at the intuitive-level (we include discussion below of future work that 
may determine the mechanisms underpinning decisions in the task and thus 
distinguish between instances of more intuitively versus more reflectively driven 
choices). Instead, we seek to demonstrate that intuitive conflict between moral 
foundations can be meaningfully triggered and measured. 
We contrast our approach to the widely accepted approaches of asking 
participants to report how important each foundation is in isolation, as on the MFQ 
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(Graham et al., 2011), or by triggering the intuitive base of individual foundations 
(Horberg et al., 2009; Inbar et al., 2009; Schnall, Benton, et al., 2008; Schnall, Haidt, et 
al., 2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005; Zhong et al., 2010). We also contrast our approach 
with (the few) previous foundation trade-off approaches that either take a composite of 
two foundations measured individually (Monroe & Plant, 2018, Studies 1 & 2; Waytz et 
al., 2013, Study 1), or isolated foundations in trade-offs against non-moral goods 
(Graham et al., 2009, Study 3; Monroe & Plant, 2018, Study 3). One exception is a task 
used by Graham (2010, Study 2) that does capture trade-offs between foundations in 
similar dyads to those used in the MFCT. However, this task was not intended to be a 
psychometrically valid measure of inter-foundation conflicts themselves, and is instead 
applied to explore ideological differences in intuitive foundation responses. It includes 
only active foundation violating/vice behaviour. In contrast, and to address prior 
asymmetries in a literature that tends to maintain this focus (e.g. Clifford, Iyengar, 
Cabeza, & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2015; Garvey & Ford, 2014; Graham et al., 2009, Study 3; 
Landy, 2016; Royzman et al., 2014; Schein & Gray, 2015), the MFCT includes both vices 
and virtues, and both active and passive formulations of foundations. Overall the MFCT 
remains stable across these formulations, and can be analysed at the global level, 
enhancing confidence in its content validity in covering multiple facets of foundation 
intuitions.  
In sum, the first major contribution of this research is in showing that intuitive 
inter-foundation conflicts can be triggered and effectively measured, and are reliably 
related to deliberated endorsements of foundations.  
9.1.2 Validation against the Moral Foundations Questionnaire 
The MFQ was developed as an individual differences measure of the first five 
foundations in the theoretical framework of MFT (Graham et al., 2011), and its earliest, 
and most common, application, is in testing a key hypotheses about ideological 
differences in foundation endorsement (Graham, 2010; Graham et al., 2013; Graham et 
al., 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007). This hypothesis predicts that intractability of 
ideological disputes is explained by differences in patterns of the five foundations: 
liberals focus on individualising foundations of care and fairness, while conservatives 
place emphasis on all five foundations, including the binding foundations of authority, 
loyalty and purity (Graham, 2010; Graham et al., 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007). 
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However, this hypothesis, and the five-factor structure it relies on, is contested on 
multiple fronts (Jacobsin, 2008; Jost, 2012; Kugler et al., 2014; Schein & Gray, 2015, 
2018). Thus, the internal and external validity of the MFQ has been closely connected to 
the  internal validity of the MFT model itself.  
In this regard, there is strong support for the validity of the MFQ as a measure 
of five, distinct, moral foundations. In large samples, Graham et al. (2011) found that 
five-factors fit better than alternative three-factor, two-factor and single factor models, 
and the five-factor model has been replicated in both WEIRD (Davies et al., 2014; 
Métayer & Pahlavan, 2014; Nilsson & Erlandsson, 2015) and non-WEIRD (Berniūnas et 
al., 2016; Yilmaz, Harma, et al., 2016; Zhang & Li, 2015) cultures, and is stable 
(Doğruyol et al., 2019). However, a number of studies find that the five-factor structure 
is a poor fit in non-WEIRD contexts (Davis et al., 2016; Yalçındağ et al., 2017) and does 
not cross-culturally replicate (Iurino & Saucier, 2020), or advocate a two-factor 
structure instead (Napier & Luguri, 2013; Van Leeuwen & Park, 2009; Wright & Baril, 
2011; Yilmaz, Harma, et al., 2016). As such, there has been sufficient contradictory 
evidence on the structure of moral foundations to fuel debate, and some of this debate 
is tied to measurement properties of the MFQ. Furthermore, a lot of this debate centres 
on whether these five factors correspond to five distinct kinds of ‘moral’ intuition (e.g. 
Jost, 2012; Kugler et al., 2014; Schein & Gray, 2015, 2018), posing important theoretical 
questions about the intuitive base of moral judgment. The MFQ is an explicit self-report 
measure, and thus is unable to adequately address to these questions. 
In this research, we develop the MFCT as a task that maps intensities of moral 
intuitions by measuring them in conflict with one another. In doing so, it provides 
indices of individual differences in intuitive foundation preferences that can be directly 
compared to the MFQ. We find that patterns of foundation endorsement on the MFCT 
and MFQ are reliably and stably associated, though not perfectly matched. We then 
show that, rather than indicating the MFCT presents a noisy measure of foundations 
better measured by the MFQ, this mismatch indicates systematic and non-overlapping 
variance between the two measures, by demonstrating that the MFCT independently 
predicts established correlates of the MFQ. Thus, this research provides a validated tool 
of foundation preferences, that compares favourably with the best established measure 
in the literature.   
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9.1.3 An intuitive-level measure of moral foundations  
MFT is fundamentally an intuitionist theory of morality, and thus evidence for 
distinct foundation intuitions is crucial. Several methods have been previously used to 
evidence the intuitive bases of foundations. However this literature is marked by three 
limitations that hinder its ability to address questions about the nature of distinct 
foundation intuitions. Firstly, it either tends to focus on implicitly triggering or 
manipulating single foundations, and has overwhelmingly focused on purity (Horberg 
et al., 2009; Inbar et al., 2009; Schnall, Benton, et al., 2008; Schnall, Haidt, et al., 2008; 
Wheatley & Haidt, 2005; Zhong et al., 2010). This approach is unable to address 
questions about how multiple foundation intuitions operate, and may also be 
vulnerable to concerns about the robustness of social priming effects (Doyen et al., 
2012; Schimmack et al., 2017; Shanks et al., 2013). Secondly, it tends to rely on 
manipulating cognitive resources or style, and then testing effects on explicitly-
reported foundations (Garvey & Ford, 2014; Napier & Luguri, 2013; Pennycook et al., 
2014; Royzman et al., 2014; Van Berkel et al., 2015; Van de Vyver et al., 2016; Wright & 
Baril, 2011; Yilmaz & Saribay, 2017a). This approach is not directly measuring 
foundation intuitions, and remains reliant on explicit self-report. Thirdly, it tends to 
explore foundation intuitions primarily as a means of addressing hypotheses about 
ideological differences (Garvey & Ford, 2014; Graham, 2010; Haidt & Graham, 2007; 
Wright & Baril, 2011).  
In the context of this third point, this literature has conflicting answers to 
questions about which foundations have distinct, moral, intuitive bases, and how these 
might relate to explicit foundations. There are cases for, against, each of three 
contradictory claims about ideological differences in intuitive foundations: (1) that 
these appear at both intuitive and explicit levels (e.g. Graham et al., 2009); (2) there are 
universal intuitions based on all five foundations, and liberals selectively correct for 
those that are inconsistent with their explicit values (e.g. Skitka et al., 2002); or (3) 
there are universal intuitions based on foundations of care and fairness, but 
conservatives selectively enhance the importance of binding foundations to satisfy 
other ‘non-moral’ motives (e.g. Wright & Baril, 2011). The majority of this work is also 
subject to the second limitation discussed above, either manipulating cognitive load 
(e.g. Van Berkel et al., 2015; Wright & Baril, 2011) or analytic and reflective thought 
(e.g. Napier & Luguri, 2013; Yilmaz & Saribay, 2017a) and measuring effects on explicit 
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foundation judgments. In a set of studies that more directly target intuitive-level 
foundations, Graham (2010) found that, in general, liberals and conservatives differ at 
the intuitive-level in the same directions that they differ in explicit foundations, but 
that liberals also had automatic responses to all foundations similar to that of 
conservatives, reconciling elements of both proposals (1) and (2). However, this 
approach too, explores foundation intuitions through political ideology. There may be 
means of reconciling elements of all three proposals. Work on ‘morality shifting’ 
(Leidner & Castano, 2012) indicates that groups may automatically shift from 
individualising concerns about care and fairness to binding concerns when under 
threat. As such, it may be that everyone has moral intuitions beyond those of care and 
fairness, may differ in the relative strengths of these intuitions, and that certain 
contexts result in motivations to either suppress or enhance particular foundations. 
However, at present, this question suffers from an adequate way of more directly 
measuring intuitive-level foundation preferences.  
This research presents the MFCT as a means to address these limitations, and 
begin to disentangle these conflicting proposals, by more directly tapping into intuitive 
preferences for foundations, and allowing for comparison with explicit foundations. We 
show that foundation preferences on the task remain under cognitive load, enhancing 
confidence that the task is measuring decisions between foundations that arise at the 
intuitive-level. In doing so, we find that explicit foundation endorsement is consistently 
and substantially (.47 < r < .61) reflected in intuitive preferences on the MFCT. 
Considering foundations individually, we consistently found medium to large 
correlations (.30 < rs < .59) between intuitive and explicit preferences for all five (with 
the exception of fairness in Studies 1 and 2). This suggests a reliable, but imperfect, 
match between foundation intuitions, as they manifest in choices on the MFCT, and 
explicit foundations. We further show that, in part, this mismatch explains unique 
structured relationships across both individualising and binding foundations. 
9.1.4 Unique contribution in capturing moral foundations 
MFT has produced a wealth of novel empirical findings (Graham et al., 2013), 
that span work that not only includes political ideology, but also social and political 
attitudes, cross-cultural differences, and a range of other constructs (see Chapter 8.1). 
Many of these findings apply the MFQ as the measure of foundation preference, and 
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thus there is strong support for not only its internal validity – discussed above – but 
also for its external validity as a measure of moral foundation endorsement. However, 
also discussed above, the MFQ has been criticised and, as an explicit self-report 
measure, there are limits to the questions it is able to address. In particular it is not 
suitable for exploring how foundations dynamically interact with one another. 
However, ‘real world’ moral judgment often requires decisions between values (Jost, 
2012), and thus the discussed tendency to measure foundations in isolation – as on the 
MFQ – misses out theoretically important information about how foundations operate 
in these kinds of judgments. A small handful of studies have put forward a ‘moral trade-
off hypothesis’ to address this, predicting that as foundations conflict, whichever is 
more strongly endorsed will guide moral judgment and behaviour. These studies 
demonstrate that interactions between foundations – and individual differences in how 
these are traded off – is predictive in a number of contexts, including whistleblowing 
and prejudice towards sexual minorities (Dungan et al., 2014; Monroe & Plant, 2019; 
Waytz et al., 2013). Though even in this work, foundations are mostly measured in 
isolation, with relative values calculated as composites of these scores (see Chapter 
2.3).  
In contrast, in the MFCT, we capture relative preferences for foundations 
directly based on intuitive trade-offs between them. Taking three correlates that have 
both well-established, and controversial (see Chapter 8.1), associations with 
foundation endorsement of the MFQ, we replicate a model fit by Kugler et al. (2014) 
with foundation preferences captured on the MFCT. The MFCT not only replicates but 
also outperforms, explaining more variance overall than a model fit to MFQ foundation 
preferences (Study 5 – Chapter 8.2). Furthermore, partialling-out that which is 
uniquely explained by each measure, we show that the MFCT and MFQ explain similar 
amounts of variance. As such, we demonstrate the external validity of the MFCT, whilst 
also showing that what it measures is distinct from the MFQ. Thus, we demonstrate 
that the MFCT makes a unique contribution – separate from that of the MFQ – in 








We identify a number of important methodological and conceptual limitations 
to this research. Firstly, we did not carry out pretesting of the items included in the 
MFCT. In the task’s development (Ahluwalia, 2015), items were adapted from the Moral 
Foundations Dictionary (MFD) (Graham et al., 2009). To create the MFD, Graham et al. 
(2009) identified words felt to best exemplify foundation virtues and vices from 
“thesauruses and conversations with colleagues” (p.1039), and it was constructed a 
priori as a list of isolated words and phrases that does not account for the granularity 
and context specificity of real-world usage. While the MFD has been applied in a 
number of settings (Brady, Wills, Jost, Tucker, & Van Bavel, 2017; Clifford & Jerit, 2013; 
Hoover, Mooijman, Lin, Ji, & Dehghani, 2018; Sagi & Dehghani, 2014; Weber et al., 2018; 
Wheeler, McGrath, & Haslam, 2019), it has also been criticised with regards to its scope, 
theoretical validity, and utility (Garten et al., 2018; Hopp, Fisher, Cornell, Huskey, & 
Weber, 2020; Sagi & Dehghani, 2014; Weber et al., 2018). Of particular relevance to the 
MFCT, as a trade-off task, is the critique that the MFD takes a ‘winner-takes-all’ 
approach in assigning words to discrete foundation categories (Hopp et al., 2020), 
compounded by a lack of the context and content specificity found in real-world moral 
language. In adapting from the MFD, we inherit these concerns: many items in the 
MFCT similarly lack specificity (e.g. ‘Do something illegal’, ‘Act with integrity’) and may 
thus be invoking multiple foundations. Though we find that the MFCT is stable and 
reliable, and explains more variance, relative to the MFQ, it remains to be seen whether 
these concerns are adding noise to this correlation. To confirm that MFCT items are 
targeting the purported foundations, we might have conducted a pre-study requiring 
participants to rate the relevance of items for each foundation. In addition, emerging 
work that seeks to develop more ecologically valid, data-driven versions (e.g. the 
extended Moral Foundations Dictionary: Hopp et al., 2020) may be used to highlight 
words most indicative of particular foundations, and thus better inform future 
development of the task. 
A second methodological limitation relates to the design of studies in this 
research applying conditions that manipulate cognitive load/attention (Studies 2 to 4). 
We consider specific limitations, and ways of addressing these, in the discussion of each 
study in Chapters 6 and 7. In all of these studies, the main tests of difference between 
conditions yields a nonsignificant p value, and thus we are challenged with interpreting 
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this non-significance. To aid this interpretation, we calculate Bayes factors for these 
comparisons, and hence show weak (Study 3) to moderate (Study 2 and 4) evidence for 
the null hypotheses that there is no difference between conditions in these studies. 
However, it is difficult to exclude the possibility that the null effects in these studies is 
attributable to an ineffectiveness of the manipulations. In Studies 2 and 3, we identified 
two alternative manipulations of cognitive attention that have been successfully shown 
to divide attention (tone counting task: Skitka et al., 2002; alcohol dosage to achieve .03 
BAC: Dubowski, 1980), and argue for their effectiveness on this basis. However, the 
designs of these studies would have benefitted from manipulation checks, or a further 
condition that used a matched but non-moral task, to determine with certainty that our 
manipulations of attention were effective. 
We now turn to a number of conceptual limitations. We propose that the MFCT 
captures intuitive conflict between foundations and operationalise this in quick 
judgments to determine which foundation-related virtue/vice is ‘better’/’worse’. We 
have previously justified our choice to emphasise the speed of these decisions as a 
means of getting at moral intuitions. However, this conception of intuitive ‘conflict’ is 
different from that applied in literature that employs high-stake, sacrificial moral 
dilemmas (Crone & Laham, 2015; Cushman & Greene, 2012; Greene et al., 2008; Greene 
et al., 2004; Greene et al., 2001; Haidt, 2001; Moore et al., 2008; Moore et al., 2011; 
Piazza, Sousa, & Holbrook, 2013), in which participants are asked to choose an action 
that upholds one virtue or moral principle at the cost of another. Relative to this, 
choices on the MFCT may not be incurring much of a decision ‘conflict’. This may 
explain weak trends in Ex-Gaussian analyses, in which we found consistent, but small, 
indicators of conflict (in τ) on the task – revisited below. One means of addressing this 
issue may be to modify instructions to emphasise higher stakes in the trade-off choices 
in the task, e.g. ‘Imagine you can only perform one final good deed before you die. Which 
of the following would you choose?’ (for virtue actions). However, it may also be that the 
choices between foundations captured in the MFCT are made more through processes 
of evidence accumulation – discussed further in future directions – than via processes 
of conflict resolution. 
Furthermore, it is at present beyond the scope of this body of research to 
address the key challenges put forward against MFT (see Chapter 2.2). We have instead 
argued that this debate is fuelled by ambiguities in measuring foundation intuitions. 
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These challenges centre around whether foundations are five multiple, distinct, and 
differentially activated ‘moral’ intuitions, or whether they might instead reduce to a 
single intuitive moral template (Schein & Gray, 2015, 2018), or be including non-moral, 
or even amoral, cognitive processes and motives (e.g. Kugler et al., 2014; Van Leeuwen 
& Park, 2009; Wright & Baril, 2011). In this research, we have remained relatively 
agnostic to both of these challenges. With regards to the former critique, the MFCT, as 
we have applied it here, does not test this hypothesis. Relevant to the latter critique, we 
replicate a model that is used by Kugler et al. (2014) to argue the binding foundations 
are manifestations of right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation, 
both of which have established links to political conservatism, as well as a number of 
unsavoury social and political attitudes (e.g. Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1996, 
1998; Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Jost et al., 2003; Pratto et al., 1994; 
Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Sidanius et al., 1996). We primarily use this model as a 
nomological network of key variables relevant to moral foundations, for purposes of 
validating the MFCT. In contrast to Kugler et al. (2014), we do not interpret our 
replication as grounds for doubting the moral status of binding foundations, but rather 
as evidence that capturing intuitive-level foundation conflict has predictive value. In 
sum, we developed, and measured, foundations on the MFCT as five distinct kinds of 
competing intuitive concerns, and find that it is stable and reliable. However, this does 
not preclude that ultimately these concerns reduce to into harm, or are not in fact 
inherently moral-type concerns. Rather this research shows that capturing foundation 
preferences in this way makes a unique contribution to this literature.  
The final, though related, limitation of this work is that it is not able to specify 
the cognitive mechanisms that underpin intuitive judgments between moral 
foundations. Instead, we have sought to show that these judgments are made at the 
intuitive level and that the MFCT, as a task, captures the result of these processes in 
choices made between foundations, and that these choices are related to how much 
value is placed on each foundation reported explicitly on the MFQ. Further to this, we 
have also sought to evidence that how much value, and the difference in value, of 
foundations in a choice, are reflected in the time to make these choices, and were also 
reflected in τ values, as a metric of demand for conflict resolution in decision-making. 
These analyses of response time data support our interpretation that the MFCT is 
tapping into cognitive conflict, however these effects were generally weak across all 
studies. However, alongside patterns of decreasing τ, we found inconsistent and 
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varying patterns in μ across trials for individual participants – as the transduction 
component, we would not expect μ to differ on a trial-by-trial basis. Thus, other analytic 
methods will be required to provide further exposition into the cognitive processes 
underlying choices on the MFCT, and more specifically how the relative values placed 
on multiple moral foundations play a role in these processes. These are discussed as 
avenues for future research below. 
9.3  Future Directions 
There are several avenues for future research that we wish to highlight. First, 
the MFCT provides a dynamic tool that can be adapted and extended for a wide range 
of applications to explore moral judgments and their impacts on other psychological 
constructs, and behaviours. A number of studies have begun to explore the impacts of 
trade-offs on moral foundations across individuals (Dungan et al., 2014; Monroe & 
Plant, 2019; Waytz et al., 2013), finding that individual differences in tendencies to 
value one foundation over another are predictive in domains in which multiple 
foundations appear to be relevant, including in whistleblowing (loyalty vs. fairness - 
Waytz et al., 2013) and in attitudes toward sexual minorities (care vs. purity – Monroe 
& Plant, 2018). The MFCT provides a direct measure of these kinds of trade-offs that 
can be applied to probe these individual differences.  
In addition, the MFCT could provide insights into moral inconsistency within 
individuals. In Chapter 8, we highlight ambiguities in findings showing that more 
conservative individuals have less consistency between their MFCT and MFQ 
responses, On the one hand this might be because conservatives endorse all five 
foundations as morally relevant, and thus their choices are less reliable. It may also be 
that, in measuring foundations in conflict, the MFCT captures unique aspects that 
becomes more apparent when individuals have more endorsed moral values. It may 
also be that conservatives are simply more morally inconsistent, and this is 
underpinned by cognitive processes that also result in the endorsement of all five 
foundations. At the same time, we find that more conservative individuals also appear 
to find it easier to make choices between foundations. This might be because in 
endorsing all five foundations, they find decisions between them less difficult, rather 
than more difficult. However, it may also be a result of other mechanisms that quickly 
resolve these kinds of moral judgments. Future research on the cognitive processes 
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that operate in these judgments will be crucial in weighing these alternatives. One 
potential avenue may be connect to literature on metacognition and error-monitoring, 
which shows that people can effortlessly and accurately evaluate their decisions 
(Colombo, Iannello, & Antonietti, 2010; Yeung & Summerfield, 2012), by adapting the 
MFCT to ask participants to evaluate their certainty about each choice. We would 
expect high metacognitive certainty to correspond to stronger intuitions, and provide a 
more nuanced means of exploring consistency in these decisions. Furthermore, future 
research may also seek to establish the test-retest validity of the MFCT, and its 
association with ideological and cognitive style variables when it is administered to the 
same individuals multiple times. 
In addition, future work may explore alternative methods of evaluating 
consistency both within the MFCT and between the MFCT and MFQ. In this research, 
we have used rank correlation coefficients as indicators of how relative foundation 
preferences measured on the MFCT corresponds to the MFQ. An alternative means may 
be to implement a Levenshtein distance style analysis (Levenshtein, 1966; Navarro, 
2001) to quantify the match between these via ‘edit distance’, i.e. how many edits away 
they are from being coherent. In addition, variations of Levenshtein distance, e.g. the 
Needleman-Wunch measure, allow for more fine-grained score modelling (Doan, 
Halevy, & Ives, 2012) that could implement a set of weights to account more sensitively 
for the relative value placed on each foundation. 
Finally, recent work has applied computational models to explore mechanisms 
in moral decisions (Baron & Gürçay, 2017; Kim et al., 2018; Pärnamets, Richardson, & 
Balkenius, 2014). To provide a sense of approaches in this literature: Kim et al. (2018) 
implement a computational model of binary moral dilemmas with a utility function that 
trades off outcomes based on weights of morally-relevant features of the dilemmas. 
Here, these value weights are inferred from a Bayesian model of group norms. Drift 
diffusion models (DDMs) (Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008) have additionally 
been used to explore moral decisions as functions of relative value and visual fixation 
on binary moral choices (Pärnamets et al., 2014) and as features of dilemmas (Baron & 
Gürçay, 2017). DDMs model the cognitive processes in binary decisions, as an 
accumulation of evidence for a response, supposing a stochastic process of drift until 
this reaches a decision-threshold, and a responses is made (Baron & Gürçay, 2017; 
Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008). They account for behavioural data in these decisions, such as 
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accuracy (which could be implemented as the expected response based on explicitly 
reported foundations) and response times, and could thus be applied to address 
hypotheses about the cognitive mechanisms that generate responses on the MFCT. The 
MFCT provides rich foundation choice data, making these avenues possible.   
9.4 Conclusion 
So what is worse: turning away vulnerable refugees, or taking support away 
from fellow citizens by overloading social services? In 2020, and amid the COVID-19 
crisis, we are currently living through a time of particularly heated political, and moral, 
disagreement that makes it clear that people can have very different moral responses 
to seemingly similar content. How are judgments made about these moral conflicts? If 
these judgments are largely determined by distinct moral intuitions, these intuitions 
may compete with one another. We set out to capture this intuitive conflict. In doing so, 
we have developed the Moral Foundations Conflict Task, measuring moral values 
through fast trade-offs between them. We have sought to show that the MFCT 
measures foundation intuitions stably and reliably, and more deeply than the best 
established measure of foundation endorsement – the Moral Foundations 
Questionnaire – and in ways that are distinctly meaningful, and can thus contribute to 
understandings of morality that will help move theoretical development forward.  
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11 Appendix 1: Chapter 3 
Table 11.1. Items from the MFCT, split by foundation and formulation 
Foundation Formulation Item 
Care 






Care for vulnerable people 
Show compassion when others suffer 
Defend vulnerable people 
Protect defenceless animals 






Do something cruel 
Hurt others' feelings 
Harm defenceless animals 
Make other people suffer 
Fairness  






Treat everyone fairly 
Treat everyone equally 
Be openminded about other people 
Protect others' rights 






Treat some people differently 
Deny someone their rights* 
Discriminate against a group of people* 
Cheat to get ahead 
Authority 





Virtue Active Obey elders 
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Comply with people in authority 
Respect the traditions of society 
Obey the law 






Show a lack of respect for authority 
Cause chaos or disorder 
Do something illegal 
Act in an obstructive manner 
Loyalty 






Show loyalty to friends 
Show love for your country 
Put family before yourself 
Act for the good of the group 






Betray a friend 
Commit treason 
Insult your country 
Act for selfish reasons 
Purity 






Act with integrity 
Act in ways that God would approve of* 
Maintain a clean reputation 
Act in a modest manner 







Act in an obscene manner 
Do something disgusting* 
Act in an ungodly way 
Note. * Omitted from final inter-foundation pairs. 
  APPENDIX 1 
 196 
 
Table 11.2. List of item pairs from the MFCT 
Item 1 Item 2 Foundation 1 Foundation 2 
Virtue Active    
Comply with people in 
authority 
Protect defenceless animals Authority Care 
Obey elders Protect defenceless animals Authority Care 
Protect defenceless animals Respect the traditions of society Care Authority 
Obey the law Protect defenceless animals Authority Care 
Comply with people in 
authority 
Treat everyone equally Authority Fairness 
Obey elders Treat everyone equally Authority Fairness 
Be openminded about other 
people 
Comply with people in authority Fairness Authority 
Be openminded about other 
people 
Obey elders Fairness Authority 
Comply with people in 
authority 
Put family before yourself Authority Loyalty 
Obey elders Put family before yourself Authority Loyalty 
Obey the law Show love for your country Authority Loyalty 
Put family before yourself Respect the traditions of society Loyalty Authority 
Act in a modest manner Comply with people in authority Purity Authority 
Act in a modest manner Obey elders Purity Authority 
Maintain a clean reputation Obey the law Purity Authority 
Act in a modest manner Respect the traditions of society Purity Authority 
Be openminded about other 
people 
Care for vulnerable people Fairness Care 
Care for vulnerable people Protect others' rights Care Fairness 
Defend vulnerable people Treat everyone equally Care Fairness 
Care for vulnerable people Treat everyone fairly Care Fairness 
Protect defenceless animals Show loyalty to friends Care Loyalty 
Act for the good of the 
group 
Protect defenceless animals Loyalty Care 
Show compassion when 
others suffer 
Show loyalty to friends Care Loyalty 
Act for the good of the 
group 
Show compassion when others 
suffer 
Loyalty Care 
Act with integrity Care for vulnerable people Purity Care 
Act with integrity Defend vulnerable people Purity Care 
Act with integrity Show compassion when others 
suffer 
Purity Care 
Act in a modest manner Protect defenceless animals Purity Care 
Show loyalty to friends Treat everyone equally Loyalty Fairness 
Be openminded about other 
people 
Show loyalty to friends Fairness Loyalty 
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Protect others' rights Show loyalty to friends Fairness Loyalty 
Act for the good of the 
group 
Treat everyone equally Loyalty Fairness 
Act with integrity Be openminded about other 
people 
Purity Fairness 
Act with integrity Protect others' rights Purity Fairness 
Act with integrity Treat everyone fairly Purity Fairness 
Act with integrity Treat everyone equally Purity Fairness 
Act in a modest manner Put family before yourself Purity Loyalty 
Maintain a clean reputation Show love for your country Purity Loyalty 
Act for the good of the 
group 
Act in a modest manner Loyalty Purity 
Maintain a clean reputation Put family before yourself Purity Loyalty 
Virtue Passive    
Respectful Nurturing Authority Care 
Respectful Sympathetic Authority Care 
Lawful Sympathetic Authority Care 
Disciplined Caring Authority Care 
Respectful Tolerant Authority Fairness 
Lawful Tolerant Authority Fairness 
Respectful Unprejudiced Authority Fairness 
Disciplined Fair Authority Fairness 
Respectful Loyal Authority Loyalty 
Obedient Patriotic Authority Loyalty 
Respectful Dutiful Authority Loyalty 
Disciplined Patriotic Authority Loyalty 
Disciplined Clean Authority Purity 
Respectful Virtuous Authority Purity 
Lawful Pure Authority Purity 
Obedient Pious Authority Purity 
Caring Tolerant Care Fairness 
Sympathetic Fair Care Fairness 
Compassionate Tolerant Care Fairness 
Sympathetic Unbiased Care Fairness 
Sympathetic Devoted Care Loyalty 
Caring Loyal Care Loyalty 
Compassionate Loyal Care Loyalty 
Compassionate Dutiful Care Loyalty 
Compassionate Virtuous Care Purity 
Sympathetic Clean Care Purity 
Caring Pure Care Purity 
Compassionate Pure Care Purity 
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Tolerant Devoted Fairness Loyalty 
Fair Loyal Fairness Loyalty 
Unbiased Loyal Fairness Loyalty 
Unbiased Dutiful Fairness Loyalty 
Unbiased Virtuous Fairness Purity 
Tolerant Clean Fairness Purity 
Fair Pure Fairness Purity 
Unbiased Pure Fairness Purity 
Patriotic Pure Loyalty Purity 
Loyal Clean Loyalty Purity 
Dutiful Pious Loyalty Purity 
Patriotic Virtuous Loyalty Purity 
Vice Active 
   
Do something cruel Do something illegal Care Authority 
Do something illegal Harm defenceless animals Authority Care 
Cause chaos or disorder Do something cruel Authority Care 
Cause chaos or disorder Harm defenceless animals Authority Care 
Do something illegal Treat some people differently Authority Fairness 
Cause chaos or disorder Treat some people differently Authority Fairness 
Act in an obstructive 
manner 
Treat some people differently Authority Fairness 
Cheat to get ahead Do something illegal Fairness Authority 
Act for selfish reasons Cause chaos or disorder Loyalty Authority 
Act for selfish reasons Act in an obstructive manner Loyalty Authority 
Commit treason Do something illegal Loyalty Authority 
Act for selfish reasons Do something illegal Loyalty Authority 
Act in an obstructive 
manner 
Behave indecently Authority Purity 
Act in an obscene manner Do something illegal Purity Authority 
Behave indecently Show a lack of respect for 
authority 
Purity Authority 
Behave indecently Cause chaos or disorder Purity Authority 
Cheat to get ahead Make other people suffer Fairness Care 
Cheat to get ahead Hurt others' feelings Fairness Care 
Do something cruel Treat some people differently Care Fairness 
Harm defenceless animals Treat some people differently Care Fairness 
Betray a friend Do something cruel Loyalty Care 
Betray a friend Harm defenceless animals Loyalty Care 
Commit treason Do something cruel Loyalty Care 
Commit treason Harm defenceless animals Loyalty Care 
Act in an obscene manner Do something cruel Purity Care 
Act in an obscene manner Harm defenceless animals Purity Care 
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Act in an obscene manner Hurt others' feelings Purity Care 
Behave indecently Do something cruel Purity Care 
Commit treason Treat some people differently Loyalty Fairness 
Betray a friend Treat some people differently Loyalty Fairness 
Betray a friend Cheat to get ahead Loyalty Fairness 
Act for selfish reasons Treat some people differently Loyalty Fairness 
Act in an obscene manner Treat some people differently Purity Fairness 
Behave indecently Treat some people differently Purity Fairness 
Act in an obscene manner Cheat to get ahead Purity Fairness 
Behave indecently Cheat to get ahead Purity Fairness 
Act in an ungodly way Insult your country Purity Loyalty 
Act for selfish reasons Behave indecently Loyalty Purity 
Act in an obscene manner Commit treason Purity Loyal 
Act for selfish reasons Act in an obscene manner Loyalty Purity 
Vice Passive 
   
Undisciplined Cruel Authority Care 
Undisciplined Neglectful Authority Care 
Subversive Cruel Authority Care 
Disobedient Harmful Authority Care 
Undisciplined Biased Authority Fairness 
Undisciplined Intolerant Authority Fairness 
Subversive Biased Authority Fairness 
Rebellious Unfair Authority Fairness 
Undisciplined Unpatriotic Authority Loyalty 
Undisciplined Unfaithful Authority Loyalty 
Disobedient Disloyal Authority Loyalty 
Subversive Unfaithful Authority Loyalty 
Rebellious Dirty Authority Purity 
Disobedient Promiscuous Authority Purity 
Undisciplined Sinful Authority Purity 
Rebellious Promiscuous Authority Purity 
Cruel Unfair Care Fairness 
Aggressive Biased Care Fairness 
Harmful Biased Care Fairness 
Harmful Intolerant Care Fairness 
Cruel Disloyal Care Loyalty 
Neglectful Disloyal Care Loyalty 
Cruel Selfish Care Loyalty 
Aggressive Unfaithful Care Loyalty 
Cruel Promiscuous Care Purity 
Neglectful Promiscuous Care Purity 
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Aggressive Sinful Care Purity 
Harmful Sinful Care Purity 
Biased Disloyal Fairness Loyalty 
Intolerant Disloyal Fairness Loyalty 
Biased Selfish Fairness Loyalty 
Unfair Unfaithful Fairness Loyalty 
Biased Promiscuous Fairness Purity 
Intolerant Promiscuous Fairness Purity 
Unfair Sinful Fairness Purity 
Unjust Sinful Fairness Purity 
Unfaithful Promiscuous Loyalty Purity 
Disloyal Sinful Loyalty Purity 
Selfish Sinful Loyalty Purity 







12 Appendix 2: Chapter 6 
12.1 Study 2 
Valence score and length of items 
As in Study 1, we fit a logistic model predicting whether or not an item was 
chosen based on valence score and length (Table 12.1). As in Study 1, items with higher 
valence scores and longer in length are more likely to be chosen.  
Table 12.1. Choice by valence score and length for Study 2 
 Model 
  OR 
Fixed effects   
    Intercept .02 (.25) 1.02 
    Valence Score 1.37*** (.03) 3.94 
    Length .42*** (.03) 1.52 
    Valence Score : Length .37*** (.02) 1.44 
Random effects - σ   
        Condition < .001  
        Subject < .001  
        Item Pair 1.13  
        Valence .11  
        Action .31  
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .27 / .46  
LogLik -20,349  
AIC 40,717  
BIC 40,792  
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 31,714. OR – Odds 
ratios. Fixed and random effects for logistic model predicting choice. Predictors have been 
standardised. For fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses. Pseudo R2 calculated using the delta 
method (Nakagawa et al., 2017).  
 
 
Also as in Study 1, valence scores were higher for individualising foundations 
than for binding foundations, and this is reflected in separate models predicting 
valence score for choices (Table 12.2). For both chosen, β = -1.86, p < .001, and not 
chosen items, β = -1.74, p < .001, binding foundations had lower valence scores than 
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individualising foundations, and were also shorter in length for both chosen, β = -.16, p 
< .001, and not chosen items, β = -.22, p < .001. 
Table 12.2. Valence score and length of items by foundation for Study 2 
 Models 
 Valence Score Length 
 Chosen Not Chosen Chosen Not Chosen 
Fixed effects     
    Intercept -.20*** (.01) .18*** (.01) -.02* (.01) .03*** (.01) 
    Foundation     
        Binding v. Individualising -1.86*** (.01) -1.74*** (.02) -.16*** (.02) -.22*** (.02) 
        Fairness v. Care .09*** (.01) .05*** (.01) .02† (.01) -.14*** (.02) 
        Loyalty v. Authority .37*** (.01) .32*** (.01) .04** (.02) -.08*** (.01) 
        Purity v. Authority -.18*** (.01) -.01 (.01) -.08*** (.02) -.16*** (.01) 
Random effects     
    By Condition - σ     
        Intercept < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 
    By Subject - σ     
        Intercept < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 
        Item Pair < .001 < .001 > .99 < .001 
        Valence .62 .72 < .001 .98 
        Action < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 
    Residual < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 
Marginal R2/ Conditional R2 .61 / .99 .48 / .99 .01 / .99 .03 / .99 
LogLik -14,459.00 -16,775.00 -21,900 -21,680 
AIC 28,940 33,571 43,823 43,382 
BIC 29,024 33,656 43,907 43,466 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 15,829. Fixed and 
random effects for separate models predicting valence score and length of chosen and not chosen 
items in a given trial. Outcome variables have been standardised. Individualising, care and authority 
are reference levels. For fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses.  
 
The difference in valence score for the items in a given trial also had an effect on 
RT, β = -.12, p < .001, with quicker choices as the difference in valence score between 
items in a trial increased (Table 12.3). There was also an effect for the difference in the 
length of items on RT, β = .08, p < .001, with slower choices between items with a larger 
difference in length. 
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Table 12.3. RT by difference in valence score and length for Study 2 
 Models 
 log RT 
Fixed effects   
    Intercept -.0001 (.06) -.0003 (.06) 
    Difference in Valence Score -.12*** (.01)  
    Difference in Length  .08*** (.01) 
Random effects   
    By Condition - σ   
        Intercept < .001 < .001 
    By Subject - σ   
        Intercept .55 .55 
        Item Pair .48 .45 
        Valence .15 .01 
        Action .66 .69 
    Residual < .001 < .001 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .01 / .99 .01 / .99 
LogLik -19,094 -19,180 
AIC 38,203 38,376 
BIC 38,265 38,438 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 15,829. Fixed and 
random effects for separate models predicting standardised log RT from standardised absolute 
differences in valence score and length between items in a given trial. For fixed effects, SE is 
provided in parentheses. 
 
The effects of valence score and length found in Study 1 are replicated in Study 
2. Items that are more positive (for foundation virtues) or negative (vices) are more 
likely to be chosen as better (virtues) or worse (vices), with slower choices when the 
two items in a trial are more closely matched on valence score. Items longer in length 
were also more likely to be chosen, with a greater difference in length between two 
items in a trial predicting longer RTs. Also as in Study 1, these effects are likely 
impacted by differences across foundations, with items for individualising foundations 
tending to be rated as are more positive/negative, and be slightly longer in length. 
Weighted difference scores predicting RT 
As in Study 1, a difference score was created for each inter-foundation 
combination to weight the difference between foundation scores by the mean score of 
the two foundations in a choice, such that higher scores would indicate higher value 
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choices closer in value. Difference scores based on the MFQ and on the MFCT correlated 
at r = .65, p <.001, 95% CI [.61, .68]. 
Separate multilevel models (see Figure 12.4) were fit to predict RT from 
difference scores based on MFQ and MFCT scores. There is a marginal effect for MFQ 
difference scores, β = -.03, p < .10, which contrary to expectation that an increased 
difference score would predict lower RT, shows a weak trend in the opposite direction. 
There is no effect for MFCT difference scores, β = -.003, p > .10. 
There are no main effects of condition, βs < .04, ps > .10, and no evidence of an 
interaction between condition and MFQ difference scores, β = -.03, p > .10, however 
there is a marginal interaction for MFCT difference scores, β = -.03, p < .10, with a 
steeper downward trend in RT in the load condition (see Figure 12.1, panel b). 
However, these effects are small, which may indicate that the weighted difference score 
does not adequately capture differences in value. 
Table 12.4. Predicting RT from condition and difference score based on MFQ and MFCT 
 Models 
 log RT 
Fixed effects   
    Intercept -.02 (.08) -.02 (.08) 
    Condition (Load v. Control) .03 (.11) .04 (.11) 
    Difference Score MFQ -.03† (.02)  
    Condition : Difference Score MFQ -.03 (.02)  
    Difference Score MFCT  -.003 (.01) 
    Condition : Difference Score MFCT  -.03† (.02) 
Random effects   
    By Subject - σ   
        Intercept .55 .55 
        Foundation Combination < .001 < .001 
        Valence < .001 < .001 
        Action .34 .34 
    Residual .76 .76 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .002 / .42 .001 / .42 
LogLik -19,464 -19,468 
AIC 38,946 38,955 
BIC 39,015 39,024 
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Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 15,829. Fixed and 
random effects for separate models predicting log RT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
Difference score calculated as mean(Score1, Score2) * (1 - abs(Score1 - Score2)). For condition: 
control is the reference level. For fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses. 
 
 
Figure 12.1. Condition and difference scores on MFQ (a) and the MFCT (b) predicting RT for Study 2. 
Scale on x-axis is derived from minimum and maximum differences scores, 0 – 1 for differences 
scores on the MFQ, and .11 – .88 for difference scores on the MFCT, where foundation scores are 
inter-dependent. Grey areas represent 95% CI boundaries. 
 
As for Study 1, a further set of models were fit, collapsing RT and fitting within-
subject Ex-Gaussian parameters to RT distributions for each inter-foundation 
combination (see Table 12.5). Here, difference scores based on neither MFQ nor MFCT 
scores, βs < |.03|, ps > .10, were significant for mean RT. However there were effects for 
μ, βs < -.09, ps < .01, and τ, βs > .06, ps < .10, with difference scores based on both the 
MFQ and MFCT, suggesting a potential dissociation between time to physically make 
decisions, and conflict in these decisions. 
There are no main effects of condition, βs < |.23|, ps > .10, and no evidence of an 
interaction between condition and MFQ difference scores for mean RT, β = -.06, p > .10, 
however there are interactions between condition and MFQ difference scores for τ, β = 
-.12, p < .05, and MFCT difference scores for mean RT, β = -.08, p < .05, with steeper 
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Table 12.5. Predicting RT, μ and τ from condition and diff. score based on MFQ and MFCT for Study 
2 
 Models 
 MFQ MFCT 
 log RT log μ log τ log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects       
    Intercept 
-.004 
(.13) 
.08 (.10) -.11 (.11) -.01 (.13) .08 (.10) -.11 (.11) 
    Condition (Load v. Control) .01 (.18) -.17 (.14) .23 (.15) .01 (.18) -.16 (.14) .23 (.15) 
    Difference Score MFQ -.03 (.03) 
-.16*** 
(.04) 
.07† (.04)    
    Condition : Difference Score MFQ -.06 (.04) .10 (.06) -.12* (.05)    




    Condition : Difference Score 
MFCT 
   -.08
* 
(.03) 
.02 (.05) -.07 (.05) 
Random effects       
    By Subject - σ       
        Intercept .88 .65 .73 .88 .65 .73 
        Foundation Combination .42 .69 .62 .42 .69 .62 
    Residual .21 .29 .27 .21 .29 .27 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .01 / .96 .02 / .92 .02 / .93 .002 / .96 .01 / .92 .02 / .93 
Log Likelihood -829 -1,219 -1,139 -831 -1,222 -1,140 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,671 2,453 2,291 1,676 2,458 2,293 
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 1,706 2,487 2,326 1,710 2,492 2,327 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 990. Fixed and random 
effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ and τ, estimated for each foundation combination. 
Outcome variables have been standardised. Difference score calculated as mean(Score1, Score2) * (1 
- abs(Score1 - Score2)). For condition: control is the reference level. For fixed effects, SE is provided 
in parentheses. 
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Figure 12.2. Condition and difference scores on MFQ predicting RT (a), μ (b) and τ (c) for Study 2. 
Scale on x-axis is derived from minimum and maximum differences scores, 0 – 1 for differences 
scores on the MFQ. Grey areas represent 95% CI boundaries. 
 
 
Figure 12.3. Condition and difference scores on MFCT predicting RT (a), μ (b) and τ (c) for Study 2. 
Scale on x-axis is derived from minimum and maximum differences scores, .11 – .88 for difference 
scores on the MFCT, where foundation scores are inter-dependent. Grey areas represent 95% CI 
boundaries. 
 
Ranks apart split by rank chosen predicting RT 
Multilevel models were fit to predict RT, μ and τ for each rank, based on the 
MFQ and the MFCT, that was chosen (1st rank to 5th rank) from the rank not chosen 
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equally ranked choices were dropped, and a set of planned contrasts compare each 
rank category to the mean of the subsequent rank categories. 
Ranks apart split by split by rank chosen on MFQ 
Figure 12.4 shows plots for RT, μ and τ for each rank chosen, based on MFQ 
scores. For mean RT, μ and τ, there were no main effects of condition, βs < |.32|, ps > 
.10, with the exception of higher τ in the load condition for 4th, β = .28, p < .10 (see 
Table 12.9), and 5th rank choices, β = .49, p < .05 (see Table 12.10).  
For mean RT, there were effects of ranks apart for 1st rank choices when the 2nd 
rank was not chosen, β = .15, p < .05 (see Table 12.6), and marginal effects for 2nd rank 
choices when the 3rd rank was not chosen, β = .17, p < .10 (see Table 12.7), and for 4th 
rank choices when the 2nd rank was not chosen, β = -.21, p < .10 (see Table 12.9). There 
were no other significant effects for ranks apart, βs < |.20|, ps > .10, nor interactions 
between condition and ranks apart, βs < |.24|, ps > .10 (see Table 12.6 – Table 12.10). 
As in Study 1, there is a weak downward trend in μ. For 2nd rank choices, μ was 
higher against 4th ranked, compared to 5th ranked foundations, β < .35, p < .05 (see 
Table 12.7). Similarly, for 4th rank choices, μ was higher when the 3rd ranked was not 
chosen relative to 5th ranked foundations, β < .32, p < .10 (see Table 12.9). For τ, an 
opposite trend can be seen, with lower τ when the 1st ranked foundation was not 
chosen in 2nd rank, β = -.36, p < .01 (see Table 12.7), 3rd rank, β = -.34, p < .05 (see Table 
12.8), and 4th rank choices, β = -.45, p < .05 (see Table 12.9), as well as when the 3rd 
versus the 5th rank, β = -.69, p < .001, and 4th rank is not chosen, β = -.36, p < .10, for 4th 
and 5th rank choices, respectively (see Table 12.9 and Table 12.10). There were no other 
significant effects for ranks apart for μ, βs < |.26|, ps > .10, nor τ, βs < |.33|, ps > .10. 
There were a number of significant interactions between ranks apart and 
condition. In μ, when 3rd ranked foundations were chosen,  there is a larger difference, 
with higher μ in the control condition, when the 5th rank was not chosen versus 
compared to when the 4th rank was not chosen, β < .46, p < .10 (see Table 12.8). An 
interaction can also be seen for 5th rank choices, with a larger difference, and higher μ 
in the control condition, when the 2nd rank was not chosen relative to lower ranks, β < 
.48, p < .10 (see Table 12.10). In τ, there is a marginally larger difference, with higher τ 
in the load condition, when 3rd ranked foundations were not chosen, compared to lower 
ranks, in both 1st rank, β = .29, p < .10, and 4th rank choices, β = .47, p < .10 (see Table 
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12.6 and Table 12.9). No other interactions were significant for μ, βs < |.29|, ps > .10, nor 
τ, βs > |.50|, ps > .10. 
As in Study 1, these models suggest a weak pattern with μ decreasing, and τ 
increasing, for choices between lower ranked foundations. There were no consistent 
differences in mean RT, μ and τ, across conditions. 
Ranks apart split by split by rank chosen on MFCT 
Figure 12.5 shows plots for RT, μ and τ for each rank chosen, based on MFCT 
scores. For mean RT, there were no significant main effects of condition, βs < .11, ps > 
.10. There were marginal effects for μ and τ, with lower μ, β = -.26, p < .10, for 1st rank 
choices (see Table 12.6), and higher τ in the load condition for 1st rank, β = .30, p < .10 
(see Table 12.6), 2nd rank, β = .30, p < .10 (see Table 12.7), and 4th rank choices, β = .27, p 
< .10 (see Table 12.9). 
There were some main effects of ranks apart on mean RT, with significantly 
higher RT for 1st rank choices against 2nd ranked compared to lower ranked 
foundations, β = .21, p < .01 (see Table 12.6), and lower RT for 4th rank choices against 
1st ranked compared to lower ranked foundations, β = -.24, p < .05 (see Table 12.9). 
Furthermore, there were significant interactions for 1st and 4th rank choices, with a 
larger difference in RT between conditions, with longer RT in the control condition, 
against 2nd ranked foundations in the former, β = -.26, p < .01 (see Table 12.6), and with 
a larger difference, and longer RT in the load condition, against 1st ranked foundations 
in the latter, β = .26, p < .10 (see Table 12.9). There were no other significant effects for 
ranks apart, βs < |.18|, ps > .10, nor interactions, βs < |.17|, ps > .10 (see Table 12.6 – 
Table 12.10). 
For 1st rank choices, μ was higher, β = -.25, p < .05, and τ marginally lower, β = 
.22, p < .10, against 3rd ranked foundations. τ was also lower against 2nd ranked 
foundations, β = .22, p < .10 (see Table 12.6). For 2nd ranked choices, τ was lower against 
1st ranked, β = .22, p < .10, and 3rd ranked, β = .22, p < .10, compared to lower ranked 
foundations (see Table 12.7). Similarly for 3rd ranked choices, τ was lower against 2nd 
ranked, β = -.35, p < .01, and μ was higher, β = -.33, p < .05, and τ lower, β = .37, p < .05, 
against 4th versus 5th ranked foundations (see Table 12.8). For 4th rank choices against 
2nd ranked foundations, μ was marginally higher, β = -.25, p < .10, and τ was lower, β = 
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.52, p < .001, relative to lower ranked foundations (see Table 12.9). There were no other 
main effects for μ, βs < |.25|, ps > .10, nor τ, βs < |.25|, ps > .10.  
As for ranks apart based on the MFQ, there were a number of significant 
interactions between ranks apart and condition. In μ, for 1st rank choices , there was a 
marginally smaller difference for 3rd ranked relative to lower ranked foundations, β = 
.31, p < .10, with a higher μ in the control condition for lower ranks. This was also the 
case in 4th rank choices, where the 1st ranked foundation was not chosen, β = .41, p < 
.10. In τ, there were interactions for 3rd rank choices, with a smaller difference between 
conditions in choices against 1st ranked foundations compared with lower ranks, β = -
.35, p < .10, and a larger difference for 4th versus 5th ranked foundations, β = .50, p < .05, 
with higher τ in the load condition. No other interactions were significant for μ, βs < 
|.38|, ps > .10, nor τ, βs > |.28|, ps > .10. 
Similar to previous, these models suggest weakly decreasing μ, and increasing τ, 
for choices between lower ranked foundations, patterns which are not reflected in 
mean RT. As for ranks based on the MFQ, there were no consistent differences in mean 
RT, μ and τ, across conditions. 
 
Figure 12.4. Condition and ranks chosen on MFQ, split by ranks not chosen, predicting RT (a), μ (b) 
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Figure 12.5. Condition and ranks chosen on MFCT, split by ranks not chosen, predicting RT (a), μ (b) 
and τ (c) for Study 2. Error bars denote 95% CIs, corrected for within-subject designs based on Morey 
(2008). 
 
Table 12.6. Predicting RT, μ and τ for 1st Rank choices on the MFQ and MFCT for Study 2 
 Models 
 MFQ MFCT 
 log RT log μ log τ log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects       
    Intercept -.09 (.13) .05 (.12) -.10 (.12) -.08 (.13) .13 (.11) -.16 (.11) 
    Condition (Load v. Control) .12 (.19) -.13 (.17) .18 (.17) .13 (.19) -.26† (.16) .30† (.16) 
    Ranks Apart       
        2 RNC v. 3, 4, 5 .15* (.07) .08 (.12) .09 (.11) .21** (.07) .19 (.12) .22† (.11) 
        3 RNC v. 4, 5 .05 (.08) .15 (.13) -.06 (.12) -.01 (.07) -.25* (.13) .22† (.12) 
        4 RNC v. 5 .03 (.10) .23 (.17) -.16 (.16) .10 (.09) -.15 (.15) .09 (.14) 
    Condition : Ranks Apart       
        Condition : 2 RNC v. 3, 4, 5 -.15 (.10) -.06 (.16) -.17 (.16) 
-.26** 
(.10) 
-.20 (.17) -.23 (.16) 
        Condition : 3 RNC v. 4, 5 .15 (.11) -.05 (.18) .29† (.17) .02 (.11) .31† (.18) -.16 (.17) 
        Condition : 4 RNC v. 5 .07 (.14) -.20 (.23) .22 (.22) -.11 (.13) -.03 (.21) .06 (.20) 
Random effects       
    By Subject - σ       
        Intercept .90 .74 .76 .91 .68 .72 
    Residual .41 .66 .64 .42 .71 .67 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .01 / .83 .01 / .56 .02 / .59 .01 / .83 .03 / .50 .03 / .55 
LogLik -328 -432 -426 -354 -486 -473 
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BIC 715 922 910 768 1,031 1,005 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 348 (MFQ) and 382 
(MFCT). RNC – Rank not Chosen. Fixed and random effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ 
and τ for ranks apart based on the MFQ and the MFCT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
For condition: control is the reference level. Helmert coding compares each rank category to the 
mean of the subsequent categories. For fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses. 
 
Table 12.7. Predicting RT, μ and τ for 2nd Rank choices on the MFQ and MFCT for Study 2 
 Models 
 MFQ MFCT  
 log RT log μ log τ log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects       
    Intercept -.01 (.13) .08 (.12) -.04 (.11) -.04 (.13) .04 (.11) -.16 (.11) 
    Condition (Load v. Control) .02 (.19) -.20 (.17) .11 (.16) .08 (.19) -.10 (.16) .30† (.16) 
    Ranks Apart       
        1 RNC v. 3, 4, 5 .01 (.09) .11 (.12) -.36** (.13) .04 (.08) .14 (.12) .22† (.11) 
        3 RNC v. 4, 5 .17† (.09) -.002 (.13) .12 (.14) .03 (.09) -.004 (.13) .22† (.12) 
        4 RNC v. 5 .13 (.12) .35* (.17) -.19 (.19) .01 (.10) -.01 (.15) .09 (.14) 
    Condition : Ranks Apart       
        Condition : 1 RNC v. 3, 4, 5 -.18 (.12) .22 (.17) -.08 (.19) -.17 (.12) .18 (.18) -.23 (.16) 
        Condition : 3 RNC v. 4, 5 -.12 (.13) .24 (.18) -.26 (.20) -.02 (.12) -.02 (.18) -.16 (.17) 
        Condition : 4 RNC v. 5 -.09 (.17) -.23 (.23) .18 (.25) -.04 (.14) .20 (.22) .06 (.20) 
Random effects       
    By Subject - σ       
        Intercept .88 .72 .64 .88 .69 .60 
     Residual .48 .68 .74 .48 .72 .78 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .01 / .77 .03 / .55 .04 / .45 .003 / .77 .02 / .49 .03 / .39 
LogLik -358 -429 -443 -386 -481 -473 
AIC 736 879 905 791 983 965 
BIC 774 917 944 830 1,022 1,005 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 340 (MFQ) and 375 
(MFCT). RNC – Rank not Chosen. Fixed and random effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ 
and τ for ranks apart based on the MFQ and the MFCT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
For condition: control is the reference level. Helmert coding compares each rank category to the 
mean of the subsequent categories. For fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses. 
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Table 12.8. Predicting RT, μ and τ for 3rd Rank choices on the MFQ and MFCT for Study 2 
 Models 
 MFQ MFCT  
 log RT log μ log τ log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects       
    Intercept -.02 (.13) .09 (.11) -.07 (.11) -.05 (.13) .04 (.11) -.09 (.11) 
    Condition (Load v. Control) .06 (.18) -.17 (.15) .16 (.15) .11 (.18) -.05 (.16) .15 (.15) 
    Ranks Apart       
        1 RNC v. 2, 4, 5 -.07 (.10) .12 (.15) -.34* (.16) -.07 (.09) -.01 (.15) -.13 (.15) 
        2 RNC v. 4, 5 -.08 (.10) -.17 (.16) -.12 (.16) -.07 (.09) .10 (.14) -.35** (.14) 
        4 RNC v. 5 -.05 (.13) -.24 (.20) .02 (.20) -.02 (.10) .33* (.16) -.37* (.16) 
    Condition : Ranks Apart       
        Condition : 1 RNC v. 2, 4, 5 .07 (.14) -.02 (.22) -.03 (.22) .10 (.14) .29 (.21) -.35† (.21) 
        Condition : 2 RNC v. 4, 5 -.03 (.14) .13 (.22) 
-.004 
(.23) 
.04 (.12) .04 (.19) .04 (.19) 
        Condition : 4 RNC v. 5 .24 (.17) .46† (.27) -.05 (.27) .14 (.15) -.38 (.23) .50* (.23) 
Random effects       
    By Subject - σ       
        Intercept .85 .60 .58 .87 .65 .61 
    Residual .50 .79 .80 .48 .76 .75 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .01 / .75 .02 / .37 .03 / .36 .01 / .76 .02 / .43 .06 / .43 
LogLik -342 -422 -424 -367 -464 -456 
AIC 704 864 868 754 947 933 
BIC 742 902 906 793 986 972 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 315 (MFQ) and 351 
(MFCT). RNC – Rank not Chosen. Fixed and random effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ 
and τ for ranks apart based on the MFQ and the MFCT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
For condition: control is the reference level. Helmert coding compares each rank category to the 
mean of the subsequent categories. For fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses. 
 
Table 12.9. Predicting RT, μ and τ for 4th Rank choices on the MFQ and MFCT for Study 2 
 Models 
 MFQ MFCT  
 log RT log μ log τ log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects       
    Intercept -.01 (.14) .07 (.13) -.15 (.11) -.04 (.13) .08 (.11) -.15 (.10) 
    Condition (Load v. Control) .03 (.19) -.14 (.17) .28† (.16) .10 (.19) -.16 (.15) .27† (.14) 
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    Ranks Apart       
        1 RNC v. 2, 3, 5 -.04 (.12) .07 (.17) -.45* (.18) -.24* (.11) -.25 (.18) -.12 (.19) 
        2 RNC v. 3, 5 -.21† (.11) -.26 (.16) -.19 (.18) .04 (.09) .25† (.14) 
-.52*** 
(.15) 
        3 RNC v. 5 -.09 (.13) .32† (.18) 
-.69*** 
(.20) 
.01 (.10) .12 (.16) -.21 (.17) 
    Condition : Ranks Apart       
        Condition : 1 RNC v. 2, 3, 5 -.10 (.16) -.11 (.22) .06 (.24) .26† (.15) .41† (.24) -.16 (.26) 




        Condition : 3 RNC v. 5 .13 (.17) .05 (.24) .47† (.27) -.02 (.15) .21 (.23) .002 (.25) 
Random effects       
    By Subject - σ       
        Intercept .85 .70 .57 .87 .61 .51 
    Residual .49 .70 .77 .48 .76 .82 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .01 / .76 .03 / .51 .09 / .41 .01 / .77 .04 / .41 .06 / .32 
LogLik -299 -359 -366 -338 -423 -431 
AIC 617 737 752 697 867 883 
BIC 653 773 788 735 904 920 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 278 (MFQ) and 321 
(MFCT). RNC – Rank not Chosen. Fixed and random effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ 
and τ for ranks apart based on the MFQ and the MFCT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
For condition: control is the reference level. Helmert coding compares each rank category to the 
mean of the subsequent categories. For fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses. 
 
Table 12.10. Predicting RT, μ and τ for 5th Rank choices on the MFQ and MFCT for Study 2 
 Models 
 MFQ MFCT 
 log RT log μ log τ log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects       
    Intercept -.01 (.18) .22 (.15) -.28* (.14) .01 (.14) .12 (.13) -.09 (.11) 
    Condition (Load v. Control) .13 (.24) -.32 (.20) .49* (.19) .08 (.20) -.18 (.18) .16 (.16) 
    Ranks Apart       
        1 RNC v. 2, 3, 4 -.20 (.14) -.14 (.21) -.33 (.22) .06 (.17) .04 (.23) .01 (.26) 
        2 RNC v. 3, 4 .10 (.15) .05 (.21) -.08 (.23) -.01 (.11) -.08 (.16) -.17 (.18) 
        3 RNC v. 4 -.15 (.13) -.05 (.20) -.36† (.22) -.18 (.12) -.16 (.16) -.25 (.19) 
    Condition : Ranks Apart       
         Condition : 1 RNC v. 2, 3, 4 .01 (.20) -.24 (.29) .50 (.31) -.15 (.21) -.05 (.30) -.28 (.34) 
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        Condition : 2 RNC v. 3, 4 .05 (.19) .48† (.28) -.36 (.30) .03 (.16) -.09 (.23) .26 (.27) 
        Condition : 3 RNC v. 4 .03 (.18) .16 (.27) .20 (.29) .09 (.17) .35 (.23) .08 (.27) 
Random effects       
    By Subject - σ       
        Intercept .86 .66 .55 .83 .65 .45 
    Residual .48 .71 .78 .53 .75 .88 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .02 / .76 .06 / .49 .09 / .40 .01 / .72 .02 / .44 .02 / .23 
LogLik -209 -251 -258 -300 -352 -369 
AIC 438 522 536 621 725 757 
BIC 471 555 569 657 761 793 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 196 (MFQ) and 267 
(MFCT). RNC – Rank not Chosen. Fixed and random effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ 
and τ for ranks apart based on the MFQ and the MFCT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
For condition: control is the reference level. Helmert coding compares each rank category to the 
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12.2 Study 3 
Gender differences in alcohol consumption 
Due to low expected frequencies, a Fisher’s Exact test were used to explore 
gender effects. We found that how often participants consumed alcohol, p > .10, and 
how much consumed per week, p > .10, did not differ by gender.  
Valence score and length of items  
As in Study 1 and 2, we fit a logistic model predicting whether an item was 
chosen based on valence score and length (Table 12.11). As in Study 1 and 2, items with 
higher valence scores and longer in length are more likely to be chosen.  
Table 12.11. Choice by valence score and length for Study 3 
 Model 
  OR 
Fixed effects   
    Intercept .02 (.22) 1.02 
    Valence Score 1.37*** (.03) 3.93 
    Length .38*** (.04) 1.46 
    Valence Score : Length .34*** (.02) 1.40 
Random effects - σ   
        Condition < .001  
        Subject < .001  
        Item Pair 1.12  
        Valence .10  
        Action .27  
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .27 / .45  
LogLik -18,267  
AIC 36,553  
BIC 36,627  
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 28,448. OR – Odds 
ratios. Fixed and random effects for logistic model predicting choice. Predictors have been 
standardised. For fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses. Pseudo R2 calculated using the delta 
method (Nakagawa et al., 2017).  
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Also as in Study 1 and 2, valence scores were higher for individualising 
foundations than for binding foundations, and this is reflected in separate models 
predicting valence score for choices (Table 12.12). For both chosen, β = -1.84, p < .001, 
and not chosen items, β = -1.77, p < .001, binding foundations had lower valence scores 
than individualising foundations, and were shorter in length for both chosen, β = -.15, p 
< .001, and not chosen items, β = -.21, p < .001. 
Table 12.12. Valence score and length of items by foundation for Study 3 
 Models 
 Valence Score Length 
 Chosen Not Chosen Chosen Not Chosen 
Fixed effects     
    Intercept -.20*** (.01) .18*** (.01) -.02* (.01) .03** (.01) 
    Foundation     
        Binding v. Individualising -1.84*** (.01) -1.77*** (.02) -.15*** (.02) -.21*** (.02) 
        Fairness v. Care .09*** (.01) .04*** (.01) .01 (.01) -.11*** (.02) 
        Loyalty v. Authority .32*** (.01) .35*** (.01) .06*** (.02) -.10*** (.01) 
        Purity v. Authority -.15*** (.01) -.03** (.01) -.08*** (.02) -.16*** (.01) 
Random effects     
    By Condition - σ     
        Intercept < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 
    By Subject - σ     
        Intercept < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 
        Item Pair .24 .52 .55 .60 
        Valence .28 .35 .60 .52 
        Action .52 .34 .57 .58 
    Residual .01 .01 .02 .03 
Marginal R2/ Conditional R2 .59 / >.99 .50 / >.99 .005 / >.99 .03 / >.99 
LogLik -13,798 -15,320 -20,144 -19,939 
AIC 27,617 30,661 40,310 39,901 
BIC 27,700 30,744 40,393 39,984 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 14,224. Fixed and 
random effects for separate models predicting valence score and length of chosen and not chosen 
items in a given trial. Outcome variables have been standardised. Individualising, care and authority 
are reference levels. For fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses.  
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Also as in Study 1 and 2, the difference in valence score for the items in a given 
trial also had an effect on RT, β = -.06, p < .001, with quicker choices as the difference in 
valence score between items in a trial increased (Table 12.13). There was also an effect 
for the difference in the length of items on RT, β = -.02, p < .05, however this was in an 
opposite direction to previous studies with faster choices between items with a larger 
difference in length. 
Table 12.13. RT by difference in valence score and length for Study 3 
 Models 
 log RT 
Fixed effects   
    Intercept -.001 (.07) -.001 (.07) 
    Difference in Valence Score -.06*** (.01)  
    Difference in Length  -.02* (.01) 
Random effects   
    By Condition - σ   
        Intercept .05 .05 
    By Subject - σ   
        Intercept .47 .47 
        Valence < .001 < .001 
        Action .33 .35 
    Residual .81 .81 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .003 / .34 < .001 / .35 
LogLik -17,619 -17,643 
AIC 35,253 35,300 
BIC 35,306 35,352 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 14,224. Fixed and 
random effects for separate models predicting standardised log RT from standardised absolute 
differences in valence score and length between items in a given trial. For fixed effects, SE is 
provided in parentheses. Models that included item pair as a random effect failed to converge and 
this term was therefore dropped from analysis. 
 
Effects of valence score and length found in Study 1 and 2 are largely replicated 
in Study 3. More positive (for foundation virtues) or negative (vices) items are more 
likely to be chosen, with slower choices when the two items are more closely matched 
on valence score. Longer items are also more likely to be chosen, but contrary to Study 
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1 and 2, a greater difference in length between two items predicted shorter RTs in 
Study 3. Also as in the preceding studies, this is likely impacted by differences across 
foundations, with items for individualising foundations tending to be rated as are more 
positive/negative, and be longer in length. 
Weighted difference scores predicting RT 
As in Study 1 and 2, a difference score was created for each inter-foundation 
combination to weight by the mean score of foundations in a choice. Difference scores 
based on the MFQ and on the MFCT correlated at r = .71, p < .001, 95% CI [.68, .75]. 
Separate multilevel models (see Table 12.14) were fit to predict RT from 
difference scores based on MFQ and MFCT scores. There were no effects for MFQ or 
MFCT difference scores, βs = .19, ps < .10. Consistent with previous analyses, there 
were marginal main effects of condition, βs = .04, ps > .10, but no evidence of an 
interaction between condition and MFQ or MFCT  difference scores, βs = .01, ps > .10. 
As in Study 1 an 2, these results may indicate that the weighted difference score does 
not adequately capture differences in value. 
Table 12.14. Predicting RT from condition and difference score based on MFQ and MFCT for Study 3 
 Models 
 log RT 
Fixed effects   
    Intercept -.10 (.08) -.10 (.08) 
    Condition (Alcohol v. Control) .19† (.11) .19† (.11) 
    Difference Score MFQ -.02 (.02)  
    Condition : Difference Score MFQ .01 (.02)  
    Difference Score MFCT  -.02 (.01) 
    Condition : Difference Score MFCT  .01 (.02) 
Random effects   
    By Subject - σ   
        Intercept .49 .49 
        Foundation Combination < .001 < .001 
        Valence < .001 < .001 
        Action .35 .35 
    Residual .79 .79 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .01 / .38 .01 / .38 
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LogLik -18,025 -18,025 
AIC 36,069 36,068 
BIC 36,137 36,136 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 14,224. Fixed and 
random effects for separate models predicting log RT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
Difference score calculated as mean(Score1, Score2) * (1 - abs(Score1 - Score2)). For condition: 
control is the reference level. For fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses. 
 
A further set of models were fit, collapsing RT and fitting within-subject Ex-
Gaussian parameters for each inter-foundation combination (see Table 12.15). Here, 
there were no significant effects for difference scores based on either MFQ or MFCT 
scores, βs < |.07|, ps > .10. Again, there were marginal main effects of condition for 
mean RT, βs = .33, ps < .10, and τ, β = .30, p < .10, but no evidence of interactions 
between condition and MFQ or MFCT  difference scores, βs < |.08|, ps > .10. 
Table 12.15. Predicting RT, μ and τ from condition and diff. score based on MFQ and MFCT for 
Study 3 
 Models 
 MFQ MFCT 
 log RT log μ log τ log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects       
    Intercept -.17 (.13) -.06 (.11) -.15 (.11) -.17 (.13) -.06 (.11) -.15 (.11) 
    Condition (Alcohol v. Control) .33† (.18) .11 (.15) .30† (.15) .33† (.18) .10 (.15) .30† (.15) 
    Difference Score MFQ -.03 (.03) .03 (.05) -.07 (.05)    
    Condition : Difference Score 
MFQ 
.01 (.05) -.07 (.07) .08 (.06)    
    Difference Score MFCT    -.02 (.03) -.01 (.04) -.02 (.04) 
    Condition : Difference Score 
MFCT 
   .02 (.04) -.05 (.05) .03 (.05) 
Random effects       
    By Subject - σ       
        Intercept .84 .65 .68 .84 .65 .68 
        Foundation Combination .45 .70 .66 .45 .69 .66 
    Residual .22 .29 .28 .22 .29 .28 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .03 / .95 .004 / .91 .03 / .92 .03 / .95 .01 / .91 .02 / .92 
Log Likelihood -796 -1,096 -1,059 -797 -1,095 -1,060 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,607 2,205 2,132 1,607 2,204 2,134 
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 1,640 2,238 2,165 1,641 2,237 2,168 
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Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 881. Fixed and random 
effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ and τ, estimated for each foundation combination. 
Outcome variables have been standardised. Difference score calculated as mean(Score1, Score2) * (1 
- abs(Score1 - Score2)). For condition: control is the reference level. For fixed effects, SE is provided 
in parentheses. 
Ranks apart split by rank chosen predicting RT 
Multilevel models were fit to predict RT, μ and τ for each rank, based on the 
MFQ and the MFCT, that was chosen from the rank not chosen in a given trial. As in 
previous analyses, equally ranked choices were dropped, and a set of planned contrasts 
compare each rank category to the mean of the subsequent rank categories. 
Ranks apart split by split by rank chosen on MFQ 
Figure 12.6 shows plots for RT, μ and τ for each rank chosen, based on MFQ 
scores. There were marginal main effects of condition for mean RT on 1st rank choices, 
β = .34, p < .10 (see Table 12.16), and 3rd rank choices, β = .32, p < .10 (see Table 12.18), 
and a significant effect for τ on 1st rank choices, β = .33, p < .05, with higher values in 
the alcohol condition. There were no other main effects of condition for mean RT, μ and 
τ, βs < |.37|, ps > .10 (see Table 12.16 – Table 12.20).  
For mean RT, there were only effects of ranks apart for 1st rank choices when 
the 2nd rank was not chosen, β = .21, p < .05, and a marginal effect when the 4th rank 
was not chosen, β = .23, p < .10 (see Table 12.16). There were no other significant effects 
for ranks apart, βs < |.17|, ps > .10, nor interactions between condition and ranks apart, 
βs < |.23|, ps > .10 (see Table 12.16 – Table 12.20). 
As in Study 1 and 2, there is a weak downward trend in μ (see Figure 12.6, panel 
b), however only a few planned contrasts are significant. For 3rd rank choices, μ was 
higher against 1st ranked, β = .24, p < .10 (see Table 12.18). For τ, an opposite trend can 
be seen (see Figure 12.6, panel c), with lower τ against 1st ranked, β = -.40, p < .01, and 
2nd ranked foundations, β = -.54, p < .01 (see Table 12.18), and for 4th rank choices 
against 2nd ranked foundations, β = -.64, p < .001 (see Table 12.19). There were no other 
significant effects for ranks apart for μ, βs < |.22|, ps > .10, nor τ, βs < |.39|, ps > .10. 
There were a number of significant interactions between ranks apart and 
condition. In μ, when 1st ranked foundations were chosen,  there is a larger difference, 
with higher μ in the alcohol condition, when the 3rd rank was not chosen versus lower 
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ranks, β = .32, p < .10 (see Table 12.16). An interaction can also be seen for 5th rank 
choices, with a larger difference, and higher μ in the alcohol condition, when the 1st 
rank was not chosen relative to lower ranks, β = .65, p < .05 (see Table 12.20). In τ, there 
are marginally larger differences, with higher τ in the alcohol condition, when 1st 
ranked, β = .37, p < .10, and 2nd ranked foundations, β = .39, p < .10, were not chosen in 
3rd rank choices. In 5th rank choices, there was a larger difference against 1st ranked 
choices, β = -.89, p < .05, in the opposite direction with higher τ in the control condition. 
No other interactions were significant for μ, βs < |.36|, ps > .10, nor τ, βs > |.39|, ps > .10. 
As in Study 1 and 2, these models suggest a weak pattern with μ decreasing, and 
τ increasing for choices between lower ranked foundations, though fewer significant 
planned contrasts are seen here. As in Study 2, there are no consistent differences in 
mean RT, μ and τ, across conditions. 
Ranks apart split by split by rank chosen on MFCT 
Figure 12.7 shows plots for RT, μ and τ for each rank chosen, based on MFCT 
scores.  
Contrary to Study 2, there were some main effects of condition. These included 
on 2nd rank choices marginally for both mean RT, β = .38, p < .10, and μ, β = .31, p < .10 
(see Table 12.17), on 3rd rank choices for τ, β = .36, p < .05 (see Table 12.18), on 4th rank 
choices for mean RT, β = .44, p < .05, and μ, β = .43, p < .05 (see Table 12.19), and 
marginally on 5th rank choices for μ, β = .36, p < .10 (see Table 12.20), with higher values 
in the alcohol condition. There were no other main effects of condition, βs < |.31|, ps > 
.10. 
As with ranks apart based on the MFQ, there were a few main effects of number 
of ranks apart based on the MFCT for mean RT. There were effects when the 2nd ranked 
foundation was not chosen for 4th, β = -.28, p < .01 (see Table 12.19), and marginally for 
5th rank choices, β = -.27, p < .10 (see Table 12.20). In addition, there was an interaction 
for 4th rank choices, with a larger difference between conditions, and higher RT in the 
alcohol condition, against 2nd ranked foundations, β = .36, p < .05, than for lower ranks. 
There were no other significant effects for ranks apart, βs < |.19|, ps > .10, nor 
interactions between condition and ranks apart, βs < |.29|, ps > .10 (see Table 12.16 – 
Table 12.20). 
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There were significant main effects for ranks apart for μ and τ . For 2nd rank 
choices, μ was marginally lower against 1st ranked foundations, β = .22, p < .10, and 
lower against 3rd ranked foundations, β = -.28, p < .10, relative to lower ranked 
foundations. For 3rd rank choices, τ was marginally lower against 1st ranked 
foundations, β = -.33, p < .10, and 2nd ranked foundations, β = -.58, p < .001, with higher 
μ for the latter, β = .37, p < .05. τ was also lower for 4th rank choices against 1st ranked, β 
= -.38, p < .05, and 2nd ranked foundations, β = -.37, p < .05, and for 5th rank choices 
against 1st ranked foundations, β = -.50, p < .10. There were no other main effects for μ, 
βs < |.32|, ps > .10, nor τ, βs < |.26|, ps > .10.  
There were a number of significant interactions between ranks apart and 
condition. In μ, for 1st rank choices, there was a marginally smaller difference for 4th 
ranked relative to 5th ranked foundations, β = -.54, p < .05, with a higher μ in the alcohol 
condition. For 5th rank choices against 2nd rank choices, there is a larger difference in μ, 
β = .50, p < .10, relative to lower ranked choices, with a higher value in the alcohol 
condition. In τ, there is an interaction for 5th rank choices, with a larger difference 
between conditions in choices against 2nd ranked foundations compared with lower 
ranks, β = -.61, p < .10, with higher τ in the alcohol condition. No other interactions 
were significant for μ, βs < |.36|, ps > .10, nor τ, βs > |.50|, ps > .10. 
As in previous studies, these models suggest weakly decreasing μ, and 
increasing τ, for choices between lower ranked foundations, though, as in models with 
ranks based on the MFQ, fewer significant planned contrasts are seen here. As in Study 
2, there are no consistent differences in mean RT, μ and τ, across conditions. 
 
Figure 12.6. Condition and ranks chosen on MFQ, split by ranks not chosen, predicting RT (a), μ (b) 
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Figure 12.7. Condition and ranks chosen on MFCT, split by ranks not chosen, predicting RT (a), μ (b) 
and τ (c) for Study 3. Error bars denote 95% CIs, corrected for within-subject designs based on Morey 
(2008). 
 
Table 12.16. Predicting RT, μ and τ for 1st Rank choices on the MFQ and MFCT for Study 3 
 Models 
 MFQ MFCT 
 log RT log μ log τ log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects       
    Intercept -.22 (.14) -.05 (.13) -.18 (.11) -.15 (.14) -.06 (.12) -.11 (.12) 
    Condition (Alcohol v. Control) .34† (.19) .03 (.18) .33* (.16) .30 (.19) .11 (.17) .23 (.17) 
    Ranks Apart       
        2 RNC v. 3, 4, 5 .21* (.09) .13 (.13) -.08 (.15) .06 (.08) .09 (.13) .03 (.13) 
        3 RNC v. 4, 5 -.05 (.10) -.07 (.14) .11 (.17) -.11 (.09) .15 (.14) -.12 (.14) 
        4 RNC v. 5 .23† (.13) .08 (.19) .19 (.22) .03 (.11) .19 (.16) -.13 (.17) 
    Condition : Ranks Apart       
        Condition : 2 RNC v. 3, 4, 5 -.18 (.12) .17 (.18) -.21 (.21) .06 (.12) .09 (.18) -.08 (.18) 
        Condition : 3 RNC v. 4, 5 .16 (.14) .32† (.19) -.34 (.23) .16 (.12) -.16 (.19) .03 (.19) 
        Condition : 4 RNC v. 5 .01 (.18) .09 (.25) -.17 (.30) -.09 (.15) -.54* (.23) .26 (.23) 
Random effects       
    By Subject - σ       
        Intercept .86 .72 .57 .87 .70 .68 
    Residual .48 .67 .80 .46 .70 .72 
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LogLik -321 -390 -417 -339 -430 -437 
AIC 662 800 854 698 880 894 
BIC 699 837 892 736 918 933 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 311 (MFQ) and 340 
(MFCT). RNC – Rank not Chosen. Fixed and random effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ 
and τ for ranks apart based on the MFQ and the MFCT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
For condition: control is the reference level. Helmert coding compares each rank category to the 
mean of the subsequent categories. For fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses. 
 
Table 12.17. Predicting RT, μ and τ for 2nd Rank choices on the MFQ and MFCT for Study 3 
 Models 
 MFQ MFCT  
 log RT log μ log τ log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects       
    Intercept -.18 (.14) -.17 (.12) -.04 (.12) -.19 (.14) -.17 (.12) -.11 (.12) 
    Condition (Alcohol v. Control) .30 (.19) .27 (.17) .08 (.16) .38† (.20) .31† (.16) .23 (.17) 
    Ranks Apart       
        1 RNC v. 3, 4, 5 .10 (.08) .17 (.14) -.24 (.15) .12 (.07) .22† (.13) .03 (.13) 
        3 RNC v. 4, 5 .11 (.09) -.06 (.15) .13 (.16) -.09 (.08) -.28* (.13) -.12 (.14) 
        4 RNC v. 5 .08 (.12) .16 (.20) -.08 (.21) -.02 (.10) .20 (.16) -.13 (.17) 
    Condition : Ranks Apart       
        Condition : 1 RNC v. 3, 4, 5 .10 (.11) .15 (.19) .14 (.20) -.03 (.10) .28 (.18) -.08 (.18) 
        Condition : 3 RNC v. 4, 5 -.03 (.12) .13 (.20) -.02 (.22) .04 (.11) .26 (.19) .03 (.19) 
        Condition : 4 RNC v. 5 .16 (.16) .36 (.27) -.18 (.29) -.05 (.13) -.22 (.22) .26 (.23) 
Random effects       
    By Subject - σ       
        Intercept .87 .66 .63 .89 .67 .65 
     Residual .42 .71 .77 .41 .69 .73 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .03 / .82 .05 / .49 .02 / .41 .04 / .83 .06 / .51 .05 / .47 
LogLik -292 -392 -408 -306 -422 -437 
AIC 603 805 836 631 865 894 
BIC 641 842 873 670 903 933 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 307 (MFQ) and 338 
(MFCT). RNC – Rank not Chosen. Fixed and random effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ 
and τ for ranks apart based on the MFQ and the MFCT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
For condition: control is the reference level. Helmert coding compares each rank category to the 
mean of the subsequent categories. For fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses. 
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Table 12.18. Predicting RT, μ and τ for 3rd Rank choices on the MFQ and MFCT for Study 3 
 Models 
 MFQ MFCT  
 log RT log μ log τ log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects       
    Intercept -.13 (.14) -.08 (.13) -.10 (.12) -.11 (.14) .03 (.12) -.19† (.10) 
    Condition (Alcohol v. Control) .32† (.19) .19 (.18) .26 (.17) .27 (.19) .01 (.17) .36* (.14) 
    Ranks Apart       
        1 RNC v. 2, 4, 5 .004 (.09) .24† (.14) -.40** (.15) .05 (.10) .17 (.16) -.33† (.17) 
        2 RNC v. 4, 5 -.11 (.10) .16 (.15) -.54** (.16) -.04 (.10) .37* (.15) 
-.58*** 
(.17) 
        4 RNC v. 5 -.08 (.13) -.15 (.19) -.07 (.21) 
-.003 
(.11) 
.04 (.18) -.07 (.19) 
    Condition : Ranks Apart       
        Condition : 1 RNC v. 2, 4, 5 .08 (.13) -.10 (.19) .37† (.21) -.08 (.14) -.18 (.22) .22 (.24) 
        Condition : 2 RNC v. 4, 5 .23 (.14) -.01 (.21) .39† (.23) .07 (.14) -.15 (.21) .35 (.24) 
        Condition : 4 RNC v. 5 .04 (.17) .28 (.26) -.03 (.27) -.05 (.15) -.14 (.24) -.01 (.27) 
Random effects       
    By Subject - σ       
        Intercept .85 .72 .64 .86 .65 .47 
    Residual .45 .69 .74 .48 .76 .84 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .03 / .79 .02 / .53 .06 / .46 .02 / .77 .02 / .44 .07 / .29 
LogLik -288 -362 -369 -319 -405 -413 
AIC 595 744 759 658 830 847 
BIC 632 781 795 695 867 884 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 284 (MFQ) and 307 
(MFCT). RNC – Rank not Chosen. Fixed and random effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ 
and τ for ranks apart based on the MFQ and the MFCT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
For condition: control is the reference level. Helmert coding compares each rank category to the 
mean of the subsequent categories. For fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses. 
 
Table 12.19. Predicting RT, μ and τ for 4th Rank choices on the MFQ and MFCT for Study 3 
 Models 
 MFQ MFCT  
 log RT log μ log τ log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects       
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    Intercept -.04 (.15) -.06 (.13) -.03 (.13) -.19 (.13) -.19 (.12) -.08 (.11) 
    Condition (Alcohol v. Control) .17 (.20) .16 (.17) .09 (.18) .44* (.18) .43* (.16) .12 (.16) 
    Ranks Apart       
        1 RNC v. 2, 3, 5 -.17 (.13) .08 (.19) -.27 (.17) -.19 (.13) .14 (.18) -.38* (.19) 





-.03 (.15) -.37* (.16) 
        3 RNC v. 5 .03 (.16) .12 (.23) -.20 (.21) .02 (.12) .16 (.17) -.26 (.18) 
    Condition : Ranks Apart       
        Condition : 1 RNC v. 2, 3, 5 .17 (.18) .19 (.25) -.02 (.23) .10 (.18) -.07 (.25) -.16 (.27) 
        Condition : 2 RNC v. 3, 5 .08 (.18) -.32 (.26) .39 (.24) .39* (.15) .36 (.22) .11 (.23) 
        Condition : 3 RNC v. 5 .12 (.21) .01 (.30) .22 (.27) -.08 (.17) -.21 (.24) .25 (.25) 
Random effects       
    By Subject - σ       
        Intercept .81 .58 .66 .79 .61 .55 
    Residual .55 .80 .71 .52 .74 .78 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .01 / .69 .02 / .36 .06 / .49 .06 / .72 .06 / .44 .06 / .37 
LogLik -285 -334 -318 -302 -361 -367 
AIC 590 688 656 625 742 754 
BIC 625 723 691 661 778 790 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 248 (MFQ) and 278 
(MFCT). RNC – Rank not Chosen. Fixed and random effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ 
and τ for ranks apart based on the MFQ and the MFCT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
For condition: control is the reference level. Helmert coding compares each rank category to the 
mean of the subsequent categories. For fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses. 
 
Table 12.20. Predicting RT, μ and τ for 5th Rank choices on the MFQ and MFCT for Study 3 
 Models 
 MFQ MFCT 
 log RT log μ log τ log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects       
    Intercept -.10 (.19) -.10 (.19) .02 (.15) -.12 (.16) -.07 (.15) -.04 (.13) 
    Condition (Alcohol v. Control) .27 (.26) .37 (.25) -.16 (.20) .31 (.21) .36† (.21) -.07 (.17) 
    Ranks Apart       
        1 RNC v. 2, 3, 4 -.10 (.17) -.10 (.21) -.05 (.28) -.04 (.18) .32 (.22) -.50† (.27) 
        2 RNC v. 3, 4 -.17 (.17) -.08 (.20) -.08 (.28) -.27† (.15) -.27 (.18) .02 (.23) 
        3 RNC v. 4 -.08 (.17) .20 (.20) -.39 (.27) .03 (.14) -.06 (.18) -.03 (.22) 
    Condition : Ranks Apart       
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         Condition : 1 RNC v. 2, 3, 4 
-.004 
(.24) 
.65* (.29) -.89* (.39) -.04 (.24) .04 (.30) .50 (.37) 
        Condition : 2 RNC v. 3, 4 .09 (.25) .16 (.29) -.01 (.39) .29 (.21) .50† (.26) -.61† (.32) 
        Condition : 3 RNC v. 4 -.01 (.22) -.13 (.26) .13 (.36) -.10 (.19) .03 (.24) -.15 (.30) 
Random effects       
    By Subject - σ       
        Intercept .81 .77 .44 .80 .72 .44 
    Residual .51 .62 .85 .55 .68 .87 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .03 / .72 .05 / .63 .09 / .28 .03 / .69 .05 / .55 .05 / .24 
LogLik -168 -186 -206 -246 -272 -292 
AIC 355 392 431 511 564 604 
BIC 385 422 462 545 597 637 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 152 (MFQ) and 212 
(MFCT). RNC – Rank not Chosen. Fixed and random effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ 
and τ for ranks apart based on the MFQ and the MFCT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
For condition: control is the reference level. Helmert coding compares each rank category to the 







13 Appendix 3: Chapter 7 
Structure of MFCT 
We replicated analyses regarding the structure of the task to data from the 
deliberation version of the MFCT. 
Valence score and length of items 
As in previous studies, we fit a logistic model predicting whether an item was 
chosen based on valence score and length (Table 13.1). Items with higher valence 
scores and longer in length are more likely to be chosen.  
Table 13.1. Choice by valence score and length for Study 4 
 Model 
  OR 
Fixed effects   
    Intercept .03 (.24) 1.03 
    Valence Score 1.54*** (.03) 4.65 
    Length .41*** (.04) 1.51 
    Valence Score : Length .40*** (.03) 1.49 
Random effects - σ   
        Subject < .001  
        Item Pair 1.27  
        Valence .11  
        Action .29  
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .30 / .51  
LogLik -16,768  
AIC 33,553  
BIC 33,618  
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 26,568. OR – Odds 
ratios. Fixed and random effects for logistic model predicting choice. Predictors have been 
standardised. For fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses. Pseudo R2 calculated using the delta 
method (Nakagawa et al., 2017). 
 
Valence scores were higher for individualising foundations than for binding 
foundations, and this is reflected in separate models predicting valence score for 
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choices (Table 13.2). For both chosen, β = -1.86, p < .001, and not chosen items, β = -
1.76, p < .001, binding foundations had lower valence scores than individualising 
foundations, and were shorter in length for both chosen, β = -.19, p < .001, and not 
chosen items, β = -.21, p < .001. 
Table 13.2. Valence score and length of items by foundation for Study 4 
 Models 
 Valence Score Length 
 Chosen Not Chosen Chosen Not Chosen 
Fixed effects     
    Intercept -.20*** (.01) .18*** (.01) -.02* (.01) .03*** (.01) 
    Foundation     
        Binding v. Individualising -1.86*** (.01) -1.76*** (.02) -.19*** (.02) -.21*** (.02) 
        Fairness v. Care .09*** (.01) .05*** (.01) .03* (.01) -.15*** (.02) 
        Loyalty v. Authority .37*** (.01) .31*** (.01) .02 (.02) -.07*** (.01) 
        Purity v. Authority -.22*** (.01) .01 (.01) -.03 (.02) -.19*** (.01) 
Random effects     
    By Subject - σ     
        Intercept .03 < .001 < .001 < .001 
        Item Pair .36 .28 .68 .56 
        Valence .36 .54 .51 .57 
        Action .36 .37 .51 .57 
    Residual .13 .03 .05 .03 
Marginal R2/ Conditional R2 .60 / .98 .49 / >.99 .01 / >.99 .04 / >.99 
LogLik -12,775 -14,373 -18,807 -18,600 
AIC 25,570 28,767 37,635 37,221 
BIC 25,645 28,842 37,710 37,296 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 13,284. Fixed and 
random effects for separate models predicting valence score and length of chosen and not chosen 
items in a given trial. Outcome variables have been standardised. Individualising, care and authority 
are reference levels. For fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses.  
 
The difference in valence score for the items in a given trial also had an effect on 
RT, β = -.13, p < .001, with quicker choices as the difference in valence score between 
items increased (Table 13.3). There was also an effect for the difference in the length of 
items on RT, β = .06, p < .001, with slower choices between items with a larger 
difference in length. 
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Table 13.3. RT by difference in valence score and length for Study 4 
 Models 
 log RT 
Fixed effects   
    Intercept .003 (.05) .003 (.05) 
    Difference in Valence Score -.13*** (.01)  
    Difference in Length  .06*** (.01) 
Random effects   
    By Subject - σ   
        Intercept .46 .46 
        Item Pair .50 .50 
        Valence .50 .50 
        Action .50 .50 
    Residual .19 .19 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .02 / .96 .003 / .96 
LogLik -17,321 -17,428 
AIC 34,655 34,871 
BIC 34,708 34,923 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 13,284. Fixed and 
random effects for separate models predicting standardised log RT from standardised absolute 
differences in valence score and length between items in a given trial. For fixed effects, SE is 
provided in parentheses. 
 
These effects of valence score and length found in previous studies are largely 
replicated in Study 4. Also as in the preceding studies, this is likely impacted by 
differences across foundations, with items for individualising foundations tending to be 
rated as are more positive/negative, and be longer in length. 
Effect of blocks 
Analyses assessed whether condition and blocks on the MFCT had any effect on 
responses and RT patterns. Figure 13.1 shows a histogram of the distribution of RTs 
across all trials in the deliberation condition. 
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Figure 13.1. Distribution of RTs across all trials in Study 4 
 
As in previous studies, neither the valence, nor the action formulation of items, 
nor the interaction between valence and action had an effect on MFCT scores. However, 
the interaction between valence and action did affect RT, β = -.10, p = < .01.with passive 
items being faster in the virtue block. 
Also as in previous, there was a significant effect of foundation on MFCT scores, 
with binding foundations being chosen less, β = -.78, p < .001, and slower, β = .26, p < 
.001, than individualising foundations. As in previous studies, this likely reflects that 
most participants were liberal, prioritising individualising foundations. Further 
significant interactions between valence, action, and foundation can be seen in Table 
13.4, Figure 13.2 and Figure 13.3. 
Table 13.4. MFCT score and RT by blocks and foundation for Study 4 
 Models 
 MFCT Score log RT 
Fixed effects   
    Intercept -.002 (.04) .27*** (.05) 
    Valence (Virtue v. Vice) -.0003 (.05) -.10*** (.02) 
    Action (Passive v. Active) -.003 (.05) -.32*** (.02) 
    Foundation   
        Binding v. Individualising -.78*** (.09) .26*** (.04) 
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        Loyalty v. Authority .16* (.06) -.03 (.03) 
        Purity v. Authority -.30*** (.06) .05 (.03) 
    Valence : Action .004 (.07) -.10** (.03) 
    Valence : Foundation   
        Valence : Binding v. Individualising -.88*** (.12) -.07 (.05) 
        Valence : Fairness v. Care .78*** (.08) -.14*** (.03) 
        Valence : Loyalty v. Authority .38*** (.09) .03 (.04) 
        Valence : Purity v. Authority .42*** (.09) -.04 (.04) 
    Action : Foundation   
        Action : Binding v. Individualising -.71*** (.12) .07 (.05) 
        Action : Fairness v. Care -.03 (.08) .04 (.03) 
        Action : Loyalty v. Authority .34*** (.09) -.03 (.04) 
        Action : Purity v. Authority .003 (.09) -.02 (.05) 
    Valence : Action : Foundation   
        Valence : Action : Binding v. Individualising 1.40*** (.17) -.16* (.07) 
        Valence : Action : Fairness v. Care -.41*** (.11) .08† (.04) 
        Valence : Action : Loyalty v. Authority -1.03*** (.13) .09 (.06) 
        Valence : Action : Purity v. Authority -.63*** (.13) -.01 (.07) 
Random effects   
    By Subject - σ   
        Intercept < .001 .46 
    Residual .72 .86 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .48 / .48 .06 / .27 
LogLik -1,863 -16,970 
AIC 3,771 33,984 
BIC 3,891 34,149 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 1,700 (MFCT Score) and 
13,284 (log RT). Fixed and random effects for separate models predicting MFCT score and log RT. 
Outcome variables have been standardised. For RT model, foundation represents the foundation of 
the item chosen in a given trial. Planned contrasts for foundation compare individualising to binding 
foundations (with the former as the reference level), and then compare Care to Fairness (former as 
reference level), and Authority to Loyalty and Purity (Authority as reference level). For valence and 
action, vice and active are reference levels. For fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses. 
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Figure 13.2. MFCT score (a) and RT (b) by valence block and foundation in Study 4. Error bars denote 
95% CIs, corrected for within-subject designs based on Morey (2008). 
 
 
Figure 13.3. MFCT score (a) and RT (b) by action block and foundation in for Study 4. Error bars 
denote 95% CIs, corrected for within-subject designs based on Morey (2008). 
 
Within-subject mean RTs and Ex-Gaussian parameters were fit for each block 
(see Table 13.5 and Figure 13.4). Contrary to previous studies, the interaction between 
valence and action did not predict mean RT, μ, or τ, βs < |.29|, ps > .10. There were main 
effects for valence on mean RT, β = -.18, p < .05, and τ, β = -.25, p < .01, with higher 
values in the vice blocks. There were also higher values for active blocks across all 
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Table 13.5. RT, μ and τ by blocks for Study 4 
 Models 
 log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects    
    Intercept .39*** (.10) .34** (.10) .35** (.11) 
    Valence (Virtue v. Vice) -.18* (.08) .01 (.10) -.25** (.09) 
    Action (Passive v. Active) -.56*** (.08) -.63*** (.10) -.41*** (.09) 
    Valence : Action -.09 (.11) -.11 (.14) -.07 (.13) 
Random effects    
    By Subject - σ    
        Intercept .80 .70 .74 
    Residual .50 .62 .62 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .11 / .75 .12 / .61 .07 / .62 
LogLik -350 -398 -399 
AIC 712 808 809 
BIC 735 831 832 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 340. Fixed and random 
effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ and τ. Outcome variables have been standardised. 




Figure 13.4. Mean RT (a), μ (b) and τ (c) by blocks in Study 4. Error bars denote 95% CIs, corrected for 
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Consistent with previous studies, these analyses indicate that the block 
structure of the task impacts response patterns and RTs on the MFCT, with quicker and 
easier choices between virtue and passive items.  
We assessed internal reliability of the full MFCT and for each block, collapsing 
across conditions. Table 13.6 shows split-half reliability coefficients. Reliability is 
acceptable for the full task, and across blocks. 
 
Table 13.6. Bootstrapped split-half reliability across blocks for Study 4 
 rBoot Bias 95% CI of r SE rBoot 
Study 4 (N = 85) 
    Full Task .85  -.004  [.80, .90]  .02  
    Vice .82  -.01  [.78, .88]  .03  
    Virtue .81  -.04  [.77, .94]  .05  
    Active .80  -.02  [.75, .88]  .04  
    Passive .79  .02  [.70, .83]  .03  
Note. Bootstrapped with 5,000 iterations. 
 
Correlating MFQ and MFCT Scores across blocks 
As in previous studies, there was no evident difference in correlations between 
the active and passive blocks, 95% CI [-.10, .14]. However, unlike previous, correlations 
were higher in virtue blocks, 95% CI [-.31, -.07]. 
Table 13.7. Correlations between MFQ and MFCT scores across blocks for Study 4 
 Sample r rBoot Bias 95% CI of r SE rBoot 95% CI of Difference 
Study 4 (N = 85)  
    Vice  .45  .46  -.016  [.40, .55]  .040  
[-.31, -.07]  
    Virtue .62  .60  .023  [.52, .64]  .032  
    Active .52  .56  -.034  [.52, .69]  .040  
[-.10, .14]  
    Passive  .51  .53  -.024  [.49, .62]  .034  
Note. Bootstrapped with 5,000 iterations. CIs are the Bias Corrected Accelerated (BCa) intervals 
 
Predicting RT on the MFCT 
As participants completing the deliberated version of the MFCT were instructed 
to take time to consider their choices, we had no specific predictions as to how RT 
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patterns will differ from the normal version of the task. Exploratory analyses 
conducted in previous studies were replicated on a combined dataset (N = 253), 
implementing control and deliberation conditions. 
Difference in foundation scores predicting RT 
Separate multilevel models (see Table 13.8) were fit to predict RT from the 
difference between MFQ and MFCT scores, entered into the models as linear (x) and 
quadratic (x2) terms, predicting that RT will be highest when the difference is 0 
indicating that two foundations are equally valued, and that the effect on RT would be 
non-linear. Figure 13.5 plots these quadratic regressions. 
As in Study 1 and 2, only the linear term was significant when difference was 
based on MFQ scores, β = -.07, p < .01, while the quadratic term was significant for 
difference in MFCT scores, β = -.02, p < .001. As in previous studies, these effects are 
small. There were effects of condition in both models, βs > .13, ps < .10, with longer RTs 
in the deliberation condition. There were no evident interactions between condition 
and any other terms in the models, βs < |.03|, ps > .10. 
Table 13.8. Predicting RT from condition and difference in MFQ and MFCT scores for Study 4 
 Models 
 log RT 
Fixed effects   
    Intercept .05 (.04) .05 (.04) 
    Condition (Alcohol v. Control) .13† (.08) .17* (.08) 
    Difference in MFQ Scores -.07** (.02)  
    Difference in MFQ Scores2 .002 (.01)  
    Condition : Difference in MFQ Scores .02 (.04)  
    Condition : Difference in MFQ Scores2 -.01 (.01)  
    Difference in MFCT Scores  -.02 (.02) 
    Difference in MFCT Scores2  -.02*** (.01) 
    Condition : Difference in MFCT Scores  -.03 (.04) 
    Condition : Difference in MFCT Scores2  .004 (.01) 
Random effects   
    By Subject - σ   
        Intercept .53 .53 
        Foundation Combination < .001 < .001 
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        Valence < .001 < .001 
        Action .35 .34 
    Residual .77 .77 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .01 / .41 .02 / .41 
LogLik -50,074 -49,984 
AIC 100,169 99,989 
BIC 100,264 100,084 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 40,128. Fixed and 
random effects for separate models predicting log RT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
Quadratic models fit terms for difference in scores (x) and squared difference in scores (x2) between 
foundations in a trial. In order to preserve a minimum value of 0 interpretable as no difference 
between scores for the quadratic term, difference predictors in these models were scaled by SD 




Figure 13.5. Predicting RT for Study 4 with quadratic models for (a) difference in MFQ scores and (b)  
difference in MFCT scores between foundations in a trial. Grey areas represent 95% CI boundaries. 
 
Ranks apart predicting RT 
As in previous studies, multilevel models were fit to predict RT, μ and τ from 
number of ranks apart, with a set of planned contrasts (Helmert coding) to test 
whether the former increases with fewer ranks apart. A total of 124 participants had 
equally scored foundations on the MFQ, and 37 on the MFCT, and as in previous, these 
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subject mean RTs, μ and τ calculated for ranks apart categories based on the MFQ and 
MFCT, respectively.  
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Figure 13.7. Distribution of RT (a), μ (b) and τ (c) across MFCT rank apart categories in Study 4 
 
Ranks apart on MFQ 
As in previous studies, a trend of decreasing RT and τ, as the number of ranks 
apart increases, can be seen in Figure 13.8 (panels a and c). Values were higher in one 
rank,  βs > .14, ps < .001, and two rank apart choices, βs > .07, ps < .05, relative to 
further apart choices (see Table 13.9). This was not reflected in μ, βs < .06, ps > .10.  
There were clear effects of condition, with higher mean RT, β = .38, p < .01, and 
τ , β = .72, p < .001, and lower μ, β = -.54, p < .001, in the deliberation condition. 
Interactions between condition and number of ranks apart for two rank apart choices 
and lower in both mean RT and τ, βs > .19, ps < .10, that reflect steeper downward 
trends in the deliberation version of the task. 
Ranks apart on MFCT 
Similar patterns can be seen when ranks apart are based on the MFCT (see 
Figure 13.9). Here, all comparisons are significant for mean RT, βs > .12, ps < .001, and 
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trend. There were higher μ values in one rank apart choices, β = .14, p < .05, however 
this did not extend to other comparisons, βs < .10, ps > .10. 
Again, there were clear main effects of condition, with higher mean RT, β = .40, 
p < .01, and τ, β = .74, p < .001, and lower μ, β = -.57, p < .001, in the deliberation 
condition. All interactions were significant for mean RT, βs > .09, p < .10, again 
reflecting a steeper downward trend in the deliberation condition. However, there 
were no evidence of interactions for τ, βs < .12, p < .10. 
Table 13.9. Predicting RT, μ and τ from condition and ranks apart on the MFQ and MFCT for Study 4 
 Models 
 MFQ MFCT 
 log RT log μ log τ log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects       

















    Ranks Apart       












        3 RA v. 4 .02 (.04) .06 (.08) .02 (.08) 
.12*** 
(.04) 
.10 (.07) .03 (.06) 
    Condition : Ranks Apart       






        Condition : 2 RA v. 3, 4 .20*** (.05) -.21† (.11) .19† (.10) 
.20*** 
(.05) 
.04 (.10) .07 (.09) 






Random effects       
    By Subject - σ       
        Intercept .92 .74 .73 .92 .75 .77 
    Residual .29 .61 .56 .30 .60 .52 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .05 / .92 .08 / .63 
.14 / 
.68 
.06 / .91 .08 / .64 .15 / .73 
LogLik -607 -1,040 -984 -669 -1,129 -1,020 
AIC 1,234 2,099 1,988 1,359 2,278 2,059 
BIC 1,282 2,147 2,035 1,407 2,327 2,108 
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Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 883 (MFQ) and 970 
(MFCT). RA – Ranks Apart. Fixed and random effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ and τ 
for ranks apart based on the MFQ and the MFCT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
Helmert coding compares each rank apart category to the mean of the subsequent categories. For 
condition: control is the reference level. For fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses. 
 
 
Figure 13.8. Condition and ranks apart on MFQ predicting RT (a), μ (b) and τ (c) for Study 4. Error bars 
denote 95% CIs, corrected for within-subject designs based on Morey (2008). 
 
 
Figure 13.9. Condition and ranks apart on MFCT predicting RT (a), μ (b) and τ (c) for Study 4. Error 
bars denote 95% CIs, corrected for within-subject designs based on Morey (2008). 
 
These analyses broadly replicate the patterns found in previous studies, 
reflecting a downward trend in RT and τ, tracking decreasing conflict in decisions 
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participants are instructed to deliberate their responses. This trend is not evident in μ, 
isolating the time to physically make responses. However, contrary to previous studies 
manipulating cognitive load, which found no effects of condition, μ was lower in the 
deliberative version of the task relative to the normal speeded version. 
Weighted difference scores predicting RT 
As in previous studies, a difference score was created for each inter-foundation 
combination to weight by the mean score of foundations in a choice. Difference scores 
based on the MFQ and on the MFCT correlated at r = .63, p <.001, 95% CI [.60, .66]. 
Separate multilevel models (see Table 13.10) were fit to predict RT from 
difference scores based on the MFQ and MFCT. There were no effects for MFQ or MFCT 
difference scores, βs < |.01|, ps < .10. There is an interaction between condition and 
MFCT  difference scores, β = .02, p < .05, with a steeper slope in the control condition. 
As in previous, these results may indicate that the weighted difference score does not 
adequately capture differences in value. 
Table 13.10. Predicting RT from condition and difference score based on MFQ and MFCT for Study 4 
 Models 
 log RT 
Fixed effects   
    Intercept -.04 (.04) -.04 (.04) 
    Condition (Deliberation v. Control) .13† (.07) .13† (.07) 
    Difference Score MFQ -.01 (.01)  
    Condition : Difference Score MFQ .02 (.02)  
    Difference Score MFCT  .001 (.01) 
    Condition : Difference Score MFCT  .02* (.01) 
Random effects   
    By Subject - σ   
        Intercept .52 .53 
        Foundation Combination < .001 < .001 
        Valence < .001 < .001 
        Action .35 .35 
    Residual .77 .77 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .004 / .40 .004 / .40 
LogLik -50,143 -50,141 
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AIC 100,304 100,300 
BIC 100,382 100,378 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 40,128. Fixed and 
random effects for separate models predicting log RT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
Difference score calculated as mean(Score1, Score2) * (1 - abs(Score1 - Score2)). For condition: 
control is the reference level. For fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses. 
 
A further set of models were fit, collapsing RT and fitting within-subject Ex-
Gaussian parameters for each inter-foundation combination (see Table 13.11). Here, 
there was a significant effect of difference score based on the MFQ, with decreasing μ, β 
= -.06, p < .01, though no other effects or interactions were significant, βs < |.04|, ps > 
.10. Again, there were main effects of condition, with increased mean RT, βs = .65, ps < 
.001, and τ, βs > .69, ps < .001, and decreased μ, βs < -.37, ps < .001, in the deliberation 
condition.  
Table 13.11. Predicting RT, μ and τ from condition and diff. score based on MFQ and MFCT for Study 
4 
 Models 
 MFQ MFCT 
 log RT log μ log τ log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects       











    Condition .65*** (.11) 
-.37*** 
(.10) 




    Difference Score MFQ -.02 (.01) -.06** (.02) .01 (.02)    
    Condition : Diff. Score 
MFQ 
.01 (.03) .04 (.04) -.01 (.04)    
    Difference Score MFCT    .02 (.01) -.03 (.02) .02 (.02) 
    Condition : Diff. Score 
MFCT 
   .03 (.02) .02 (.03) .02 (.03) 
Random effects       
    By Subject - σ       
        Intercept .84 .68 .67 .84 .68 .67 
        Foundation 
Combination 
.40 .65 .61 .40 .65 .61 
    Residual .20 .28 .26 .20 .28 .26 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .09 / .96 .04 / .92 .11 / .93 .09 / .96 .03 / .92 .11 / .93 
  APPENDIX 3 
 245 
Log Likelihood -2,032 -3,006 -2,854 -2,029 -3,010 -2,853 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 4,079 6,027 5,722 4,071 6,034 5,720 
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 4,120 6,068 5,763 4,112 6,075 5,761 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 2,530. Fixed and 
random effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ and τ, estimated for each foundation 
combination. Outcome variables have been standardised. Difference score calculated as 
mean(Score1, Score2) * (1 - abs(Score1 - Score2)). For condition: control is the reference level. For 
fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses. 
 
Weighted ranks apart predicting RT 
We fit models (see Table 13.12) that included a bias term to weight number of 
ranks apart by the mean rank for foundations in a choice.  
As in previous studies, for ranks based on both MFQ and MFCT scores, RT is 
negatively predicted by mean rank, βs < -.05, ps < .001, and by number of ranks apart, 
βs < -.04, ps < .001, indicating that as the value, and the difference in value, of 
foundations in a choice increases, time to make the choice decreases. However, as in 
previous studies, there was no evidence of an interaction between these for ranks 
based on either MFQ or MFCT scores, βs < |.003|, ps > .10.  
There were marginal main effects of condition, βs = .13, ps < .10, and 
interactions between condition and ranks apart on the MFQ, β = -.02, p < .10, and on the 
MFCT, β = -.03, p < .01, indicating a steeper negative slope in the deliberation condition. 
There was a significant three-way interaction between condition, mean rank, and ranks 
apart on the MFCT, β = -.04, p < .05. No other interactions including condition were 
significant, βs < |.02|, ps > .10. 
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Table 13.12. Predicting RT from condition, mean rank, and ranks apart on the MFQ and MFCT for 
Study 4 
 Models 
 log RT 
 MFQ MFCT 
Fixed effects   
    Intercept -.04 (.04) -.04 (.04) 
    Condition (Deliberation v. Control) .13† (.07) .13† (.07) 
    Mean Rank -.05*** (.01) -.06*** (.01) 
    Ranks Apart -.04*** (.01) -.06*** (.01) 
    Condition : Mean Rank .01 (.01) -.02 (.01) 
    Condition : Ranks Apart -.02† (.01) -.03** (.01) 
    Mean Rank : Ranks Apart -.003 (.01) -.003 (.01) 
    Condition : Mean Rank : Ranks Apart .02 (.02) -.04* (.02) 
Random effects   
    By Subject - σ   
        Intercept .53 .53 
        Foundation Combination < .001 < .001 
        Valence < .001 < .001 
        Action .35 .34 
    Residual .77 .77 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .01 / .40 .01 / .40 
LogLik -50,069 -49,993 
AIC 100,164 100,013 
BIC 100,276 100,124 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 40,128. Fixed and 
random effects for separate models predicting log RT. Outcome variables and predictors have been 
standardised. Mean rank calculated as mean(Rank1, Rank2), of reversed ranks, such that higher 
mean rank indicates more valued foundations. For condition: control is the reference level. For 
fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses. 
 
Ranks apart split by rank chosen predicting RT 
Multilevel models were fit to predict RT, μ and τ for each rank, based on the 
MFQ and the MFCT, that was chosen from the rank not chosen in a given trial (see Table 
13.13 to Table 13.17). As in previous analyses, equally ranked choices were dropped, 
  APPENDIX 3 
 247 
and a set of planned contrasts compare each rank category to the mean of the 
subsequent rank categories.  
Ranks apart split by rank chosen on MFQ 
Figure 13.10 shows plots for RT, μ and τ for each rank chosen, based on MFQ 
scores. Mean RT, βs > .26, ps < .10, and τ, βs > .37, ps < .01, were higher in the 
deliberation condition for all choices, with lower μ in 1st,, 3rd and 4th rank choices , βs < -
.18, ps < .10. 
As in previous studies, there appears to be a shift from a weak downward trend 
in mean RT and τ, to a weak upward trend, as the value of the foundation are chosen 
decreases. However, contrasts in models do not always reflect this. 
When highest valued foundations (1st rank) were chosen, mean RT and μ were 
higher, βs > .13, ps < .01, against 2nd ranked foundations, with no significant contrasts 
for τ, βs < |.03|, ps > .10. For 2nd rank choices, μ was higher, β = .16, p < .05, while τ was 
lower, β = -.24, p < .001, when the 1st rank was not chosen, with no effect for RT, βs < 
|.08|, ps > .10. For both 3rd and 4th rank choices, τ was lower against both 1st ranked, βs 
< -.20, ps < .05, and 2nd ranked foundations, βs = -.26, ps < .01, with a marginal contrast 
in 4th rank choices against 3rd ranked foundations, β = -.20, p < .10. For 5th rank choices, 
τ was marginally lower against both 2nd ranked, β = -.21, p < .10, and 3rd ranked 
foundations, β = -.36, p < .01. There were no contrasts for mean RT and μ, that reflected 
these trends, βs < |.15|, ps > .10. Mean RT, βs > .26, ps < .10, and τ, βs > .37, ps < .01, 
were higher in the deliberation condition for all choices, with lower μ in 1st,, 3rd and 4th 
rank choices , βs < -.18, ps < .10. There were a number of significant interactions 
between ranks apart and condition, that most consistently appeared in choices against 
higher ranked foundations. 
As in previous studies, these models suggest a weak pattern with μ decreasing, 
and τ increasing for choices between lower ranked foundations. As in Study 2, there are 
no consistent differences in mean RT, μ and τ, across conditions. 
Ranks apart split by split by rank chosen on MFCT 
Figure 13.11 shows plots for RT, μ and τ for each rank chosen, based on MFCT 
scores.  Mean RT, βs > .26, ps < .05, and τ, βs > .45, ps < .001, were higher in the 
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deliberation condition for all choices, with marginally lower μ in 1st, and 5th rank 
choices , βs < -.21, ps < .10. 
When highest valued foundations (1st rank) were chosen, mean RT and μ were 
higher, βs > .15, ps < .01, against 2nd ranked foundations, with no significant contrasts 
for τ, βs < |.08|, ps > .10. For 2nd rank choices, μ was higher, β = .18, p < .01, when the 1st 
rank was not chosen, with no effect for RT, βs < |.05|, ps > .10, nor τ, βs < |.08|, ps > .10. 
For both 3rd and 4th rank choices, τ was lower against both 1st ranked, βs < -.33, ps < 
.001, and 2nd ranked foundations, βs < -.37, ps < .001, with a contrast in 4th rank choices 
against 3rd ranked foundations, β = -.22, p < .05. μ was higher against both 1st ranked, βs 
= .23, ps < .01, and 2nd ranked foundations, βs > .17, ps < .10. For 5th rank choices, all 
contrast were significant for τ was lower against both 2nd ranked, β = -.22, p < .10, and 
3rd ranked foundations, β = -.22, p < .05. There were fewer significant interactions 
between ranks apart and condition than for the MFQ. 
As in previous studies, these models suggest weakly increasing τ for choices 




Figure 13.10. Condition and ranks chosen on MFQ, split by ranks not chosen, predicting RT (a), μ (b) 
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Figure 13.11. Condition and ranks chosen on MFCT, split by ranks not chosen, predicting RT (a), μ (b) 
and τ (c) for Study 4. Error bars denote 95% CIs, corrected for within-subject designs based on Morey 
(2008). 
 
Table 13.13. Predicting RT, μ and τ for 1st Rank choices on the MFQ and MFCT for Study 3 
 Models 
 MFQ MFCT 
 log RT log μ log τ log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects       
    Intercept -.10 (.07) .06 (.06) -.18** (.06) -.11 (.07) .09 (.06) -.20*** (.06) 
    Condition .26* (.12) -.26* (.11) .53*** (.10) .29* (.12) -.27* (.11) .57*** (.10) 
    Ranks Apart (RA)       
        2 RNC v. 3, 4, 5 .13** (.04) .17** (.06) -.03 (.07) .15*** (.04) .18** (.06) .07 (.06) 
        3 RNC v. 4, 5 -.004 (.05) .04 (.07) .02 (.07) -.01 (.04) -.07 (.07) .08 (.07) 
        4 RNC v. 5 .03 (.06) .003 (.09) -.004 (.10) .09† (.05) .05 (.08) -.01 (.08) 
    Condition : RA       
        Condition :  
            2 RNC v. 3, 4, 5 
.03 (.08) .13 (.11) -.09 (.12) .07 (.07) .02 (.11) .04 (.10) 
        Condition :  
            3 RNC v. 4, 5 
.14† (.08) .06 (.12) .07 (.13) .22** (.07) .12 (.11) .11 (.11) 
        Condition :  




.17 (.16) -.01 (.09) .13 (.14) .001 (.13) 
Random effects       
    By Subject - σ       
        Intercept .86 .72 .65 .88 .71 .68 
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Marginal R2 / 
Conditional R2 
.02 / .78 .03 / .55 .07 / .49 .03 / .80 .03 / .53 .08 / .55 
LogLik -893 -1,088 -1,115 -946 -1,215 -1,194 
AIC 1,807 2,196 2,250 1,912 2,450 2,409 
BIC 1,854 2,244 2,298 1,961 2,499 2,457 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 874 (MFQ) and 970 
(MFCT). RNC – Rank not Chosen. Fixed and random effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ 
and τ for ranks apart based on the MFQ and the MFCT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
For condition: control is the reference level. Helmert coding compares each rank category to the 
mean of the subsequent categories. For fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses. 
 
Table 13.14. Predicting RT, μ and τ for 2nd Rank choices on the MFQ and MFCT for Study 4 
 Models 
 MFQ MFCT  
 log RT log μ log τ log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects       
    Intercept -.13† (.07) .04 (.06) -.16** (.06) -.14* (.07) .04 (.06) -.20*** (.06) 
    Condition .35** (.12) -.14 (.11) .48*** (.10) .42*** (.12) -.12 (.10) .57*** (.10) 
    Ranks Apart (RA)       
        1 RNC v. 3, 4, 5 .07 (.05) .16* (.07) -.24*** (.07) .05 (.05) .18** (.07) .07 (.06) 
        3 RNC v. 4, 5 .07 (.05) .03 (.07) .03 (.07) .01 (.05) -.06 (.07) .08 (.07) 
        4 RNC v. 5 .08 (.07) .01 (.10) .04 (.10) -.002 (.06) .03 (.08) -.01 (.08) 
    Condition : RA       
        Condition :  
            1 RNC v. 3, 4, 5 
.10 (.08) .33** (.12) .02 (.12) .13 (.08) .37** (.12) .04 (.10) 
        Condition :  
            3 RNC v. 4, 5 
.06 (.09) .04 (.13) .08 (.13) .10 (.08) .19 (.12) .11 (.11) 
        Condition :  
            4 RNC v. 5 
.15 (.11) -.06 (.16) .15 (.16) .12 (.10) -.12 (.14) .001 (.13) 
Random effects       
    By Subject - σ       
        Intercept .85 .70 .65 .84 .69 .62 
     Residual .48 .70 .71 .50 .71 .73 
Marginal R2 / Conditional 
R2 
.04 / .77 .02 / .51 .07 / .49 .04 / .75 .03 / .50 .08 / .46 
LogLik -896 -1,101 -1,096 -997 -1,212 -1,194 
AIC 1,812 2,221 2,213 2,014 2,444 2,409 
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BIC 1,859 2,269 2,260 2,062 2,492 2,457 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 862 (MFQ) and 953 
(MFCT). RNC – Rank not Chosen. Fixed and random effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ 
and τ for ranks apart based on the MFQ and the MFCT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
For condition: control is the reference level. Helmert coding compares each rank category to the 
mean of the subsequent categories. For fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses. 
 
Table 13.15. Predicting RT, μ and τ for 3rd Rank choices on the MFQ and MFCT for Study 4 
 Models 
 MFQ MFCT  
 log RT log μ log τ log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects       
    Intercept -.11 (.07) .08 (.06) -.18** (.05) -.11 (.07) .06 (.06) -.17** (.05) 
    Condition .40*** (.12) -.21† (.11) .60*** (.09) .38** (.12) -.10 (.11) .49*** (.09) 
    Ranks Apart (RA)       
        1 RNC v. 2, 4, 5 -.05 (.05) .11 (.07) -.20* (.08) -.02 (.05) .23** (.07) -.33*** (.08) 
        2 RNC v. 4, 5 -.04 (.05) .09 (.07) -.26** (.09) -.0001 (.05) .23** (.07) -.37*** (.08) 
        4 RNC v. 5 -.04 (.07) -.07 (.09) -.06 (.11) .03 (.06) .09 (.08) -.09 (.09) 
    Condition : RA       
        Condition :  
            1 RNC v. 2, 4, 5 
.20* (.09) -.05 (.12) .16 (.14) -.01 (.09) .21 (.13) -.03 (.15) 
        Condition :  
            2 RNC v. 4, 5 
.14 (.09) .16 (.12) .09 (.15) .08 (.08) .09 (.12) .02 (.14) 
        Condition :  
            4 RNC v. 5 
.07 (.11) .11 (.15) .05 (.18) -.15 (.10) .08 (.14) -.13 (.16) 
Random effects       
    By Subject - σ       
        Intercept .85 .74 .54 .84 .68 .50 
    Residual .48 .67 .79 .49 .71 .80 
Marg. R2 / Cond. R2 .04 / .77 .02 / .56 .10 / .39 .03 / .75 .03 / .49 .10 / .35 
LogLik -860 -1,021 -1,071 -939 -1,144 -1,177 
AIC 1,739 2,062 2,162 1,898 2,307 2,374 
BIC 1,786 2,109 2,209 1,946 2,355 2,422 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 811 (MFQ) and 891 
(MFCT). RNC – Rank not Chosen. Fixed and random effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ 
and τ for ranks apart based on the MFQ and the MFCT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
For condition: control is the reference level. Helmert coding compares each rank category to the 
mean of the subsequent categories. For fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses. 
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Table 13.16. Predicting RT, μ and τ for 4th Rank choices on the MFQ and MFCT for Study 4 
 Models 
 MFQ MFCT  
 log RT log μ log τ log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects       
    Intercept -.10 (.07) .06 (.06) -.17** (.06) -.11 (.07) .05 (.06) -.18*** (.05) 
    Condition .35** (.12) -.18† (.11) .54*** (.09) .37** (.12) -.08 (.11) .45*** (.09) 
    Ranks Apart (RA)       
        1 RNC v. 2, 3, 5 -.08 (.06) .10 (.09) -.29** (.09) -.10† (.06) .17† (.09) -.47*** (.10) 
        2 RNC v. 3, 5 -.08 (.07) .09 (.09) -.33*** (.10) -.05 (.05) .19* (.08) -.38*** (.08) 
        3 RNC v. 5 -.01 (.08) .09 (.10) -.20† (.11) -.01 (.06) .10 (.09) -.22* (.10) 
    Condition : RA       
        Condition :  
            1 RNC v. 2, 3, 5 
.26* (.11) -.06 (.15) .38* (.16) -.06 (.10) .08 (.15) -.01 (.17) 
        Condition :  
            2 RNC v. 3, 5 
.04 (.11) .14 (.15) -.02 (.16) -.02 (.08) -.04 (.13) .13 (.14) 
        Condition :  
            3 RNC v. 5 
.12 (.13) .08 (.17) .15 (.19) -.18† (.10) -.06 (.15) -.07 (.16) 
Random effects       
    By Subject - σ       
        Intercept .80 .64 .47 .85 .66 .48 
    Residual .55 .75 .83 .48 .73 .81 
Marg. R2 / Cond. R2 .03 / .69 .01 / .43 .10 / .32 .04 / .77 .01 / .45 .11 / .34 
LogLik -808 -935 -949 -867 -1,079 -1,097 
AIC 1,635 1,891 1,918 1,755 2,178 2,214 
BIC 1,681 1,937 1,964 1,802 2,225 2,261 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 709 (MFQ) and 827 
(MFCT). RNC – Rank not Chosen. Fixed and random effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ 
and τ for ranks apart based on the MFQ and the MFCT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
For condition: control is the reference level. Helmert coding compares each rank category to the 
mean of the subsequent categories. For fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses. 
 
Table 13.17. Predicting RT, μ and τ for 5th Rank choices on the MFQ and MFCT for Study 4 
 Models 
 MFQ MFCT 
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 log RT log μ log τ log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects       
    Intercept -.08 (.09) .08 (.08) -.16* (.07) -.11 (.07) .12† (.07) -.24*** (.06) 
    Condition .27† (.16) -.10 (.14) .37** (.12) .39** (.12) -.21† (.12) .58*** (.10) 
    Ranks Apart (RA)       
        1 RNC v. 2, 3, 4 -.07 (.08) -.10 (.10) -.17 (.12) .05 (.10) .17 (.12) -.22† (.13) 
        2 RNC v. 3, 4 .04 (.08) .14 (.11) -.21† (.12) -.04 (.08) .02 (.09) -.14 (.10) 
        3 RNC v. 4 -.09 (.08) .15 (.11) -.36** (.12) -.10 (.08) -.05 (.09) -.22* (.10) 
    Condition : RA       
         Condition :  
            1 RNC v. 2, 3, 4 
-.08 (.14) .60** (.19) -.46* (.21) -.01 (.16) -.26 (.19) .14 (.21) 
        Condition :  
            2 RNC v. 3, 4 
-.03 (.14) .23 (.19) -.10 (.21) .10 (.14) .12 (.16) -.07 (.18) 
        Condition :  
            3 RNC v. 4 
-.02 (.13) -.46* (.18) .30 (.20) .19 (.13) .19 (.16) .27 (.18) 
Random effects       
    By Subject - σ       
        Intercept .83 .67 .51 .75 .66 .47 
    Residual .51 .71 .80 .62 .75 .84 
Marg. R2 / Cond. R2 .02 / .73 .04 / .49 .09 / .35 .04 / .61 .01 / .45 .09 / .30 
LogLik -508 -595 -616 -762 -826 -843 
AIC 1,037 1,211 1,253 1,545 1,672 1,706 
BIC 1,078 1,252 1,294 1,589 1,717 1,751 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 465 (MFQ) and 625 
(MFCT). RNC – Rank not Chosen. Fixed and random effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ 
and τ for ranks apart based on the MFQ and the MFCT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
For condition: control is the reference level. Helmert coding compares each rank category to the 







14 Appendix 4: Chapter 8 
Structure of MFCT 
Exploratory analysis 
We then replicated analyses applied in previous studies to assess effects of the 
structure of the MFCT, specifically looking at whether the valence score and length of 
item pairings differ across foundation, and if there are any differences in response or 
RT patterns across blocks on the MFCT 
Valence score and length of items 
We fit a logistic model predicting whether or not an item was chosen based on 
valence score and length (Table 14.1). As in previous studies, items with higher valence 
scores and longer in length are more likely to be chosen. 
Table 14.1. Choice by valence score and length for Study 5 
 
Model  
  OR 
 
Fixed effects   
    Intercept .01 (.13) 1.01 
    Valence Score 1.19*** (.01) 3.28 
    Length .24*** (.01) 1.27 
    Valence Score : Length .29*** (.01) 1.34 
Random effects - σ   
        Subject < .001  
        Item Pair .99  
        Valence .05  
        Action .15  
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .22 / .38  
LogLik -144,839  
AIC 289,695  
BIC 289,777  
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 223,418. OR – Odds 
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ratios. Fixed and random effects for logistic model predicting choice. Predictors have been 
standardised. For fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses. Pseudo R2 calculated using the delta 
method (Nakagawa et al., 2017). 
 
 
As in previous studies, valence scores were higher for individualising 
foundations than for binding foundations, and this is reflected in separate models 
predicting valence score for choices (Table 14.2). For both chosen, β = -1.82, p < .001, 
and not chosen items, β = -1.76, p < .001, binding foundations had lower valence scores 
than individualising foundations, and were also shorter in length for both chosen, β = -
.12, p < .001, and not chosen items, β = -.26, p < .001. 
Table 14.2. Valence score and length of items by foundation for Study 5 
Models  
 Valence Score Length 
 Chosen Not Chosen Chosen Not Chosen 
Fixed effects     
    Intercept -.15*** (.002) .14*** (.002) -.01*** (.003) .03*** (.003) 
    Foundation     
        Binding v. Individualising -1.82*** (.005) -1.76*** (.01) -.12*** (.01) -.26*** (.01) 
        Fairness v. Care .09*** (.003) .03*** (.004) -.005 (.004) -.11*** (.01) 
        Loyalty v. Authority .30*** (.004) .36*** (.004) .01* (.01) -.05*** (.01) 
        Purity v. Authority -.12*** (.004) -.04*** (.004) -.04*** (.01) -.20*** (.005) 
Random effects     
    By Subject - σ     
        Intercept .02 < .001 < .001 < .001 
        Item Pair .57 .62  1.00 .98 
        Valence .21 .21 .05 .02 
        Action .17 .21 .02 .09 
    Residual .14 .11 .04 .05 
Marginal R2/ Conditional R2 .58 / .98 .51 / .99 .003 / > .99 .04 / > .99 
LogLik -109,912 -118,341 -158,342 -156,528 
AIC 219,845 236,702 316,704 313,077 
BIC 219,941 236,798 316,801 313,173 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 111,709. Fixed and 
random effects for separate models predicting valence score and length of chosen and not chosen 
items in a given trial. Outcome variables have been standardised. Individualising, care and authority 
are reference levels. For fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses.  
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As in previous studies, we fit models exploring whether RT might be predicted 
by valence score and item length (Table 14.3). The difference in valence score did have 
an effect on RT, β = -.09, p < .001, with quicker choices as the difference in valence score 
between items in a trial increased. There was also an effect for the difference in the 
length of items on RT, β = .05, p < .001, with slower choices between items with a larger 
difference in length. 
Table 14.3. RT by difference in valence score and length for Study 5 
 Models 
 log RT 
Fixed effects   
    Intercept -.001 (.02) -.001 (.02) 
    Difference in Valence Score -.09*** (.002)  
    Difference in Length  .05*** (.002) 
Random effects   
    By Subject - σ   
        Intercept .63 .63 
        Item Pair .44 .44 
        Valence .44 .44 
        Action .44 .44 
    Residual .17 .17 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .01 / .97 .002 / .97 
LogLik -131,706 -132,213 
AIC 263,425 264,440 
BIC 263,493 264,508 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 111,709. Fixed and 
random effects for separate models predicting standardised log RT from standardised absolute 
differences in valence score and length between items in a given trial. For fixed effects, SE is 
provided in parentheses. 
 
Effect of blocks 
Table 14.4 shows separate models predicting scores and RT on the MFCT from 
block valence, block action, and foundation.  
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Neither the valence, nor the action formulation of items, nor the interaction 
between valence and action had an effect on MFCT scores. However, the interaction 
between valence and action did affect RT, β = -.26, p = < .001.with passive items being 
faster in the virtue block. 
There was a significant effect of foundation on MFCT scores, with binding 
foundations being chosen less than individualising foundations, β = -.48, p < .001. This 
is reflected in RTs, with binding foundations chosen slower than individualising 
foundations, β = .20, p < .001. This pattern is consistent with previous studies, even 
though participants were spread across political orientation, M = 3.29, SD = 1.36, 
reflected in the smaller effect on MFCT scores than found in previous studies, -.92 < βs 
< -.75, ps < .001. 
Significant interactions between valence, action, and foundation can be seen in 
Table 14.4, Figure 14.1 and Figure 14.2. 
Table 14.4. MFCT score and RT by blocks and foundation for Study 5 
 Models 
 MFCT Score log RT 
Fixed effects   
    Intercept -.001 (.01) .26*** (.02) 
    Valence (Virtue v. Vice) -.002 (.02) -.10*** (.01) 
    Action (Passive v. Active) -.001 (.02) -.26*** (.01) 
    Foundation   
        Binding v. Individualising -.48*** (.03) .20*** (.01) 
        Fairness v. Care -.82*** (.02) .18*** (.01) 
        Loyalty v. Authority -.12*** (.02) .01† (.01) 
        Purity v. Authority -.01 (.02) .05*** (.01) 
    Valence : Action .002 (.03) -.19*** (.01) 
    Valence : Foundation   
        Valence : Binding v. Individualising -.89*** (.04) -.02 (.02) 
        Valence : Fairness v. Care .76*** (.03) -.14*** (.01) 
        Valence : Loyalty v. Authority .45*** (.03) -.03** (.01) 
        Valence : Purity v. Authority .28*** (.03) -.07*** (.01) 
    Action : Foundation   
        Action : Binding v. Individualising -.74*** (.04) .06*** (.02) 
        Action : Fairness v. Care .03 (.03) .002 (.01) 
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        Action : Loyalty v. Authority .42*** (.03) .02† (.01) 
        Action : Purity v. Authority -.12*** (.03) -.08*** (.01) 
    Valence : Action : Foundation   
        Valence : Action : Binding v. Individualising 1.03*** (.06) -.17*** (.02) 
        Valence : Action : Fairness v. Care -.33*** (.04) .02 (.01) 
        Valence : Action : Loyalty v. Authority -.99*** (.05) .02 (.02) 
        Valence : Action : Purity v. Authority -.60*** (.05) .08*** (.02) 
Random effects   
    By Subject - σ   
        Intercept < .001 .63 
    Residual .76 .74 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .42 / .42 .06 / .45 
LogLik -16,107 -126,870 
AIC 32,257 253,785 
BIC 32,423 253,997 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 14,000 (MFCT Score) 
and 111,709 (log RT). Fixed and random effects for separate models predicting MFCT score and log 
RT. Outcome variables have been standardised. For RT model, foundation represents the 
foundation of the item chosen in a given trial. Planned contrasts for foundation compare 
individualising to binding foundations (with the former as the reference level), and then compare 
Care to Fairness (former as reference level), and Authority to Loyalty and Purity (Authority as 
reference level). For valence and action, vice and active are reference levels. For fixed effects, SE is 
provided in parentheses. 
 
 
Figure 14.1. MFCT score (a) and RT (b) by valence block and foundation in Study 5. Error bars denote 
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Figure 14.2. MFCT score (a) and RT (b) by action block and foundation in for Study 5. Error bars 
denote 95% CIs, corrected for within-subject designs based on Morey (2008). 
 
Within-subject mean RTs and Ex-Gaussian parameters were fit for each block 
(see Table 14.5 and Figure 14.3). The interaction between valence and action predicted 
mean RT, β = -.38, p < .001, μ, β = -.19, p < .001, and τ, β = -.11, p < .05, indicating faster 
processing speed and lower conflict for passive virtue items.  
Table 14.5. RT, μ and τ by blocks for Study 5 
 Models 
 log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects    
    Intercept .31*** (.04) .28*** (.04) .17*** (.04) 
    Valence (Virtue v. Vice) -.12*** (.02) -.07* (.03) -.12** (.04) 
    Action (Passive v. Active) -.38*** (.02) -.39*** (.03) -.17*** (.04) 
    Valence : Action -.24*** (.03) -.19*** (.04) -.11* (.05) 
Random effects    
    By Subject - σ    
        Intercept .88 .76 .71 
    Residual .38 .59 .69 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .08 / .85 .07 / .65 .02 / .53 
LogLik -2,366 -3,214 -3,501 
AIC 4,743 6,440 7,014 
BIC 4,779 6,475 7,049 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 2,800. Fixed and 
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standardised. For valence and action, vice and active are reference levels. For fixed effects, SE is 
provided in parentheses. 
 
 
Figure 14.3. Mean RT (a), μ (b) and τ (c) by blocks. Error bars denote 95% CIs, corrected for within-
subject designs based on Morey (2008). 
 
As in previous studies, these analyses indicate that the block structure of the 
task does impact response patterns and RTs on the MFCT differentially across 
foundations. For RT, it is quicker and easier to make choices between virtue and 
passive items.  
Table 14.6 shows split-half reliability coefficients. Reliability for the full task, 
and across blocks in the task, is acceptable, but slightly lower for the active blocks, 
likely reflecting more complex items in these blocks. 
Table 14.6. Bootstrapped split-half reliability across blocks for Study 5 
 rBoot Bias 95% CI of r SE rBoot 
Study 5 (N = 700) 
    Full Task .79  .03  [.73 , .80]  .02  
    Vice .77  .02  [.71, .79]  .02  
    Virtue .75  -.02  [.70, .83]  .03  
    Active .65  .09  [.50, .62]  .03  
    Passive .79  .004  [.75, .83]  .02  
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Correlating MFQ and MFCT Scores across blocks 
A mean correlation coefficient was calculated for each block to explore whether 
this correlation maintains across blocks (see Table 14.7). Unlike previous studies, there 
were differences across blocks, with higher correlations in virtue, 95% CI [-.24, -.13], 
and passive blocks, 95% CI [.07, .17]. 
Table 14.7. Correlations between MFQ and MFCT scores across blocks for Study 5 
 Sample r rBoot Bias 95% CI of r SE rBoot 95% CI of Difference 
Study 5 (N = 700)  
    Vice  .34  .36  -.016  [.35, .39]  .015  
[-.24 , -.13] 
    Virtue .49  .48  .004  [.45, .50]  .014  
    Active .36  .35  .015  [.30, .36]  .014  
[.07 , .17]  
    Passive  .46  .46  .002  [.43, .48]  .014  
Note. Bootstrapped with 5,000 iterations. CIs are the Bias Corrected Accelerated (BCa) intervals 
 
Exploratory RT analysis 
Weighted difference scores predicting RT 
As in previous studies, a difference score was created for each inter-foundation 
combination to weight the difference between foundation scores by the mean score of 
the two foundations in a choice (calculated as mean(Score1, Score2) * (1 - abs(Score1 - 
Score2)). Difference scores based on the MFQ and MFCT correlated at r = .50, p <.001, 
95% CI [.48, .52].  
Separate multilevel models (see Table 14.8) were fit to predict RT for each trial 
from difference scores based on MFQ and MFCT scores. There were no effects for MFCT 
difference scores, β = -.004, p > .10. However there was an effect for MFQ difference 
scores, β = -.04, p < .001, which contrary to expectation that an increased difference 
score would predict higher RT, shows a trend in the opposite direction. We found this 
same effect in Study 2, but not across other studies. 
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Table 14.8. Predicting RT from difference score based on MFQ and MFCT 
 Models 
 log RT 
Fixed effects   
    Intercept -.002 (.02) -.002 (.02) 
    Difference Score MFQ -.04*** (.01)  
    Difference Score MFCT  -.004 (.003) 
Random effects   
    By Subject - σ   
        Intercept .62 .62 
        Foundation Combination < .001 < .001 
        Valence < .001 < .001 
        Action .35 .35 
    Residual .70 .70 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .001 / .51 .00 / .51 
LogLik -129,740 -129,774 
AIC 259,493 259,561 
BIC 259,560 259,629 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 111,709. Fixed and 
random effects for separate models predicting log RT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
Difference score calculated as mean(Score1, Score2) * (1 - abs(Score1 - Score2)). For fixed effects, SE 
is provided in parentheses. 
 
As in previous studies, a further set of models were fit, collapsing RT and fitting 
within-subject Ex-Gaussian parameters to RT distributions for each inter-foundation 
combination (see Table 14.9). Here, difference score based on MFQ scores negatively 
predicted RT, μ, and τ, βs < -.05, ps < .001, with a marginal effect for μ based on MFCT 
difference scores, β = -.01, p < .10. Generally, these analyses suggest that the weighted 
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Table 14.9. Predicting RT, μ and τ from difference score based on MFQ and MFCT 
 Models 
 MFQ MFCT 
 log RT log μ log τ log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects       
    Intercept -.00 (.04) -.00 (.03) -.00 (.03) -.00 (.04) -.00 (.03) -.00 (.03) 





-.05*** (.01)    
    Difference Score MFCT    
-.004 
(.005) 
-.01† (.01) -.01 (.01) 
Random effects       
    By Subject - σ       
        Intercept .93 .80 .64 .93 .80 .64 
        Foundation 
Combination 
.32 .54 .71 .32 .54 .71 
    Residual .18 .25 .30 .18 .25 .30 
Marginal R2 / Conditional 
R2 
.003 / .97 .003 / .94 .002 / .91 .00 / .97 .00 / .94 .00 / .91 
LogLik -4,251 -7,309 -8,806 -4,285 -7,321 -8,812 
AIC 8,513 14,629 17,623 8,579 14,651 17,634 
BIC 8,547 14,663 17,657 8,614 14,685 17,668 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 7,000. Fixed and 
random effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ and τ, estimated for each foundation 
combination. Outcome variables have been standardised. Difference score calculated as 
mean(Score1, Score2) * (1 - abs(Score1 - Score2)). For fixed effects, SE is provided in parentheses. 
 
Ranks apart split by rank chosen predicting RT 
As in previous studies, we replicated ranks apart analyses on RT distributions 
split by the rank of the foundation that was chosen in each trial.  
Multilevel models were fit to predict RT, μ and τ for each rank, based on the 
MFQ and the MFCT, that was chosen from the rank not chosen in a given trial (see Table 
14.10 to Table 14.14). Here, we dropped equally ranked choices as these occurred 
much less frequently than other choices. A set of planned contrasts compare each rank 
category to the mean of the subsequent rank categories. 
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Ranks apart split by split by rank chosen on MFQ 
Figure 14.4 shows plots for RT, μ and τ for each rank chosen, based on MFQ 
scores. As in previous studies, there were indications of shifting patterns of RT, μ and τ, 
across rank choices.  
Choosing against the highest other rank – i.e. against 2nd when the 1st rank was 
chosen, or against the 1st rank when the 5th rank was chosen – tended to incur higher 
mean RT for 1st and 2nd rank choices, βs > .04, ps < .05, shifting to lower mean RT for 
3rd and 5th rank choices, βs < -.07, ps < .01. In contrast, μ was significantly higher in 
choices against the highest other rank in all but 5th rank choices, βs > .07, ps < .10, while 
τ was lower, βs < -.08, ps < .05. This dissociation between μ and τ carries through all 
rank choices, with weakly decreasing μ, and increasing τ as choices are made between 
foundations lower and further apart in value. However, this is only significant as a 
trend in lower rank choices, with decreasing μ in 3rd and 4th rank choices, βs > .07, ps < 
.10, and increasing τ in 3rd, 4th and 5th rank choices, βs < -.16, ps < .001, where the 1st 
and 2nd rank is not chosen compared to lower ranks. 
Taken together, these models suggest a weak pattern with μ decreasing, and τ 
increasing, for choices between lower ranked foundations, indicating a decreasing time 
to physically make choices, but increasing decision conflict.  
Ranks apart split by split by rank chosen on MFCT 
Figure 14.5 shows plots for RT, μ and τ for each rank chosen, based on MFCT 
scores. There was a consistent trend in 1st rank choices, where RT decreased as the 
value of the foundation not chosen decreased, βs > .03, ps < .05. However, this was not 
the trend in RT across all choices – choosing against the highest other rank tended to 
incur lower mean RT for 2nd, 4th and 5th rank choices, βs < -.04, ps < .05. There were no 
other effects in mean RT, βs < |.03|, ps > .10. 
There were no effects for μ and τ in 1st rank choices, βs < |.07|, ps > .10, and only 
an effect for μ in 2nd rank choices, with higher μ in choices against 1st rank compared to 
lower ranks, β = -.11, p > .001.  
As with ranks based on the MFQ, a dissociation between μ and τ came through 
as a trend in lower rank choices, with decreasing μ in 3rd and 5th rank choices, βs > .06, 
ps < .10, and increasing τ in 3rd, 4th, and 5th rank choices, βs < -.11, ps < .05, where the 
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1st, 2nd rank, and 3rd (for 4th and 5th rank choices) is not chosen compared to lower 
ranks. 
Similar to those based on MFQ scores, these models suggest weak patterns of 
decreasing μ, and increasing τ, for choices between lower ranked foundations, 
indicating decreasing time to physically make choices, but increasing decision conflict.  
 
 
Figure 14.4. Ranks chosen on MFQ, split by ranks not chosen, predicting RT (a), μ (b) and τ (c) for 
Study 5. Error bars denote 95% CIs, corrected for within-subject designs based on Morey (2008). 
 
 
Figure 14.5. Ranks chosen on MFCT, split by ranks not chosen, predicting RT (a), μ (b) and τ (c) for 
Study 5. Error bars denote 95% CIs, corrected for within-subject designs based on Morey (2008). 
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 Models 
 MFQ MFCT 
 log RT log μ log τ log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects       
    Intercept -.02 (.04) -.02 (.03) .01 (.03) -.01 (.04) -.01 (.03) -.003 (.03) 
    Ranks Apart       
        2 RNC v. 3, 4, 5 .06*** (.02) .09*** (.03) -.08* (.04) .07*** (.02) .03 (.03) .05 (.03) 
        3 RNC v. 4, 5 .001 (.02) .003 (.03) -.05 (.04) .03* (.02) .03 (.03) .02 (.04) 
        4 RNC v. 5 .06* (.03) .04 (.04) .02 (.05) .05* (.02) .03 (.03) .07 (.04) 
Random effects       
    By Subject - σ       
        Intercept .93 .82 .59 .93 .81 .66 
    Residual .38 .59 .80 .37 .59 .75 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 .001 / .86 .002 / .66 .002 / .35 .001 / .87 .00 / .66 .001 / .44 
LogLik -2,125 -2,814 -3,232 -2,228 -3,074 -3,472 
AIC 4,263 5,641 6,476 4,469 6,161 6,955 
BIC 4,297 5,675 6,510 4,504 6,196 6,991 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 2,390 (MFQ) and 2,648 
(MFCT). RNC – Rank not Chosen. Fixed and random effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ and 
τ for ranks apart based on the MFQ and the MFCT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
Helmert coding compares each rank category to the mean of the subsequent categories. For fixed 
effects, SE is provided in parentheses. 
 
Table 14.11. Predicting RT, μ and τ for 2nd Rank choices on the MFQ and MFCT for Study 5 
 Models 
 MFQ MFCT 
 log RT log μ log τ log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects       
    Intercept -.01 (.04) -.01 (.03) .001 (.03) .001 (.04) .01 (.03) -.003 (.03) 
    Ranks Apart       
        1 RNC v. 3, 4, 5 .04* (.02) .11*** (.03) -.17*** (.04) -.04* (.02) .11*** (.03) .05 (.03) 
        3 RNC v. 4, 5 .02 (.02) .06* (.03) -.05 (.04) .03 (.02) .03 (.03) .02 (.04) 
        4 RNC v. 5 .05† (.03) .02 (.04) .07 (.05) .02 (.02) .03 (.04) .07 (.04) 
Random effects       
    By Subject - σ       
        Intercept .92 .81 .57 .91 .79 .57 
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    Residual .42 .60 .82 .40 .61 .81 
Marginal R2 / 
Conditional R2 
.001 / .83 .003 / .64 .01 / .33 .001 / .84 .002 / .63 .03 / .35 
LogLik -2,253 -2,809 -3,175 -2,346 -3,043 -3,472 
AIC 4,518 5,630 6,361 4,704 6,098 6,955 
BIC 4,553 5,664 6,396 4,739 6,133 6,991 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 2,335 (MFQ) and 2,564 
(MFCT). RNC – Rank not Chosen. Fixed and random effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ 
and τ for ranks apart based on the MFQ and the MFCT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
Helmert coding compares each rank category to the mean of the subsequent categories. For fixed 
effects, SE is provided in parentheses. 
 
Table 14.12. Predicting RT, μ and τ for 3rd Rank choices on the MFQ and MFCT for Study 5 
 Models 
 MFQ MFCT 
 log RT log μ log τ log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects       
    Intercept .02 (.04) .01 (.03) .01 (.03) .02 (.04) .02 (.03) -.004 (.03) 
    Ranks Apart       
        1 RNC v. 2, 4, 5 -.07** (.02) .09** (.03) -.33*** (.04) -.03 (.02) .12*** (.03) -.36*** (.04) 
        2 RNC v. 4, 5 -.01 (.02) .10** (.03) -.16*** (.04) -.01 (.02) .16*** (.03) -.30*** (.04) 
        4 RNC v. 5 -.03 (.03) .001 (.04) -.04 (.06) .02 (.02) .05 (.03) -.05 (.05) 
Random effects       
    By Subject - σ       
        Intercept .89 .80 .53 .90 .80 .52 
    Residual .45 .60 .84 .43 .59 .83 
Marginal R2 / 
Conditional R2 
.001 / .80 .003 / .64 .02 / .30 .00 / .81 .01 / .65 .04 / .31 
LogLik -2,230 -2,619 -2,964 -2,348 -2,847 -3,281 
AIC 4,472 5,249 5,940 4,707 5,706 6,574 
BIC 4,506 5,283 5,974 4,742 5,741 6,609 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 2,168 (MFQ) and 2,418 
(MFCT). RNC – Rank not Chosen. Fixed and random effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ 
and τ for ranks apart based on the MFQ and the MFCT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
Helmert coding compares each rank category to the mean of the subsequent categories. For fixed 
effects, SE is provided in parentheses. 
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Table 14.13. Predicting RT, μ and τ for 4th Rank choices on the MFQ and MFCT for Study 5 
 Models 
 MFQ MFCT  
 log RT log μ log τ log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects       
    Intercept .04 (.04) .02 (.03) .01 (.03) .03 (.03) .03 (.03) -.02 (.03) 
    Ranks Apart       
        1 RNC v. 2, 3, 5 -.001 (.03) .07† (.04) -.23*** (.05) -.11*** (.03) .01 (.03) -.39*** (.05) 
        2 RNC v. 3, 5 -.01 (.03) .08* (.04) -.17*** (.05) -.01 (.02) .09** (.03) -.25*** (.04) 
        3 RNC v. 5 .03 (.03) .07 (.04) -.09 (.06) -.02 (.03) .02 (.03) -.11* (.05) 
Random effects       
    By Subject - σ       
        Intercept .89 .77 .48 .87 .79 .44 
    Residual .44 .63 .87 .46 .60 .88 
Marginal R2 / 
Conditional R2 
.00 / .80 .002 / .61 .01 / .24 .002 / .78 .002 / .64 .03 / .23 
LogLik -2,015 -2,435 -2,748 -2,319 -2,686 -3,105 
AIC 4,042 4,883 5,508 4,650 5,383 6,222 
BIC 4,076 4,916 5,541 4,684 5,417 6,256 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 1,984 (MFQ) and 2,253 
(MFCT). RNC – Rank not Chosen. Fixed and random effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ 
and τ for ranks apart based on the MFQ and the MFCT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
Helmert coding compares each rank category to the mean of the subsequent categories. For fixed 
effects, SE is provided in parentheses. 
 
Table 14.14. Predicting RT, μ and τ for 5th Rank choices on the MFQ and MFCT for Study 5 
 Models 
 MFQ MFCT 
 log RT log μ log τ log RT log μ log τ 
Fixed effects       
    Intercept .03 (.05) .04 (.04) -.02 (.04) .04 (.04) .06† (.04) -.04 (.03) 
    Ranks Apart       
        1 RNC v. 2, 3, 4 -.12*** (.03) .003 (.04) -.25*** (.06) -.11** (.04) .10* (.05) -.34*** (.06) 
        2 RNC v. 3, 4 -.07* (.03) .02 (.04) -.22*** (.06) -.04 (.03) .06† (.04) -.26*** (.05) 
        3 RNC v. 4 .005 (.03) .06 (.04) -.07 (.06) .001 (.03) .07† (.04) -.13* (.05) 
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Random effects       
    By Subject - σ       
        Intercept .88 .79 .49 .86 .77 .45 
    Residual .44 .60 .86 .47 .62 .88 
Marginal R2 / 
Conditional R2 
.003 / .80 .001 / .63 .02 / .26 .002 / .77 .003 / .61 .03 / .23 
LogLik -1,245 -1,500 -1,734 -1,820 -2,107 -2,380 
AIC 2,502 3,012 3,479 3,652 4,225 4,772 
BIC 2,532 3,043 3,510 3,685 4,258 4,804 
Note. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Number of observations = 1,259 (MFQ) and 1,725 
(MFCT). RNC – Rank not Chosen. Fixed and random effects for separate models predicting log RT, μ 
and τ for ranks apart based on the MFQ and the MFCT. Outcome variables have been standardised. 
Helmert coding compares each rank category to the mean of the subsequent categories. For fixed 
effects, SE is provided in parentheses. 
 
